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This dissertation is fundamentally concerned with how individuals use information cues 
during primary elections to evaluate and select among a field of candidates all belonging to the 
same political party.  When partisan heuristic cues – well-established as the most critical 
determinant of vote choice – are effectively held constant, voters are expected to turn to other 
easily accessible information about candidates in order to sort them and identify the most 
suitable option.  This project assesses one such type of information – the demographic status of 
candidates.  Primary voters are expected to (1) prefer the most ideologically proximate candidate 
as their preferred party nominee and (2) employ ideological stereotypes embedded in 
demographic cues to help subtype and sort their primary options.  Primary candidates, on the 
other hand, should appeal to different subgroups of voters via ideological signals embedded in 
policy messages presented to voters.  Moreover, since certain primary candidates are considered 
counterstereotypical – not striking voters as typical demographic groups associated with 
particular parties – there are also possible gains and losses for candidates based purely on their 
demographic status and not merely the ideological tone of their messages.  The interaction of 
different types of information should generate different preferences for various types of voters in 
primary elections. 
The first two chapters discuss demographic trends across America’s main political 
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iv 
parties, discuss the void in the literature related to intra-party decision-making, and present a 
theory related to how both candidate and voter characteristics condition evaluations in a primary 
context.  A third chapter details two survey experiments – a low-information setting and a high-
information setting – that are fielded to test theoretical expectations.  Chapters Four through Six 
present the results of the two studies.  A concluding chapter summaries the findings and 
integrates this work into the larger literature on cue use in an electoral context.  I also discuss 
limits of the current project and specify a series of steps to more thoroughly probe the issues 
initially tested in this dissertation. 
v 
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1.0  CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Following Barack Obama’s re-election in the 2012 presidential election, the Republican Party 
began to more actively reflect on how to respond to an increasingly pressing shift in American 
demographics: white voters are comprising less and less of the overall voting population as other 
racial groups – namely African Americans and Hispanics – participate more in politics.  Since 
non-white voters overwhelmingly support the Democratic Party, this evolution represents, at 
best, a legitimate electoral concern for Republican Party, and, at worst, an existential threat to the 
Party’s long-term viability.  Not only have Republicans struggled to appeal to new voters, but the 
party has even lost ground in some key areas – for instance, in the 2004 presidential election 
George W. Bush collected forty-four percent of the Hispanic vote (nearly reaching parity with 
his Democratic opponent), but eight years later Mitt Romney received less than one-third of 
Hispanic votes.1 
The last few years have seen a rise in movements designed to address this demographic 
challenge.  Internal party movements like the Future Majority Caucus were developed to 
1 The Washington Post (http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/a-rubio-campaign-blueprint-for-all-the-world-to-
see/2015/05/23/6711c5ba-00ca-11e5-8b6c-0dcce21e223d_story.html) recently noted that if the 2016 Republican 
presidential nominee matches Mitt Romney’s 2012 tally of 17 percent of the nonwhite vote, that candidate would 
have to attract support from 65 percent of white voters, a feat no achieved only by Ronald Reagan in his landslide 
1984 re-election victory.  George W. Bush managed to win 58 percent of the white vote and 26 percent of the 
nonwhite vote in 2004, yet given demographic shifts in the last decades, these same proportions would not be 
sufficient to achieve a Republican victory in 2016. 
1 
promote the election of Republican Hispanics and women to public office.2   In December 2012, 
a month after Obama’s re-election, Reince Priebus, Chairman of the Republican National 
Committee, announced a new initiative.  The Growth and Opportunity Project (GAOP) was 
designed to “provide an honest review of the 2012 election cycle” and develop strategies to 
bolster the Republican Party’s chances in future elections.3          
 One of the most central goals of the GAOP is to diversify the party’s constituency.  As 
authors of the GAOP outline put it: “Unless the (Republican National Committee) gets serious 
about tackling this problem, we will lose future elections.  […]  We have to work hard at 
engaging demographic partners and allies” (Barbour et al. 2013, 12).  Whit Ayres, Republican 
analyst and pollster for Senator Marco Rubio’s 2016 election bid, echoes this sentiment in a 
recent book, submitting that if Republicans are to regain the White House, they must fare 
significantly better among minorities than they have in the past (Ayers 2015).  The GAOP 
authors stress inclusion throughout their report, and of the fourteen specific recommendations 
they prescribe in the “Demographic Partners” section, five focus explicitly on targeting minority 
voters in an effort to expand the Party’s base.  Two others emphasize the need for the Party to 
recruit non-white and non-male candidates to run as Republicans.  The authors note that 
Republican Party committees “should be encouraging and championing their desire to seek 
elective office” (Barbour et al. 2013, 21).        
2 http://futuremajorityproject.gop/ 
3 Five co-chairs were assigned to the GAOP project – Henry Barbour, Sally Bradshaw, Ari Fleischer, Zori 
Fonalledas, and Glenn McCall.  Their methodology included the following: meeting or speaking with more than 
2,600 people, both inside and outside Washington, and including “voters, technical experts, private sector officials, 
Party members, […] elected office holders, […] Republicans from all ideological backgrounds;” Holding in-depth 
focus groups with voters who used to call themselves Republicans but who left the Party because “they thought we 
weren’t conservative enough or because we were too conservative;” conducting a poll among 2,000 Republican 
Hispanic voters; launching a survey of political practitioners at the state and national level as well as Republican and 
Independent pollsters; collected data from more than 36,000 individuals that participated in an online survey to 
determine priorities for the Republican Party. 
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 On the whole, the GAOP outlines a number of strategies that, in theory, will help the 
Party achieve its goals.  Yet largely absent from the pages of the GAOP report is a discussion of 
how Republican voters participating in primary elections will respond to efforts to reach out to 
non-white voters or how Republicans will react to female or minority candidates running under 
the Republican banner.4   As will be discussed below, citizens are known to infer about political 
candidates on the basis of demographic features like race and gender.5  Scholars have speculated 
that these tendencies will have a detrimental effect on counterstereotypical candidates – those 
that do not conform to expectations or fit existing stereotypes – like female or African American 
Republicans, most notably because voters tend to assume non-white and non-male candidates to 
be more ideologically liberal than white men (Koch 2000, McDermott 1997).   
 I argue that primaries represent perhaps the greatest hurdle to the Republican Party’s 
long-term demographic vision as it is currently conceived in the GAOP report, for it is when a 
non-white or non-male faces a conventional white male Republican in intra-party contests that 
Republican voters must be convinced to support candidates that do not “look the part.”  How can 
counterstereotypical political candidates overcome this challenge?  More generally, what are the 
consequences – good or bad – of being a non-white or non-male candidate in a primary election?  
Before proposing an answer to these questions, we must first understand the nature of the 
challenge itself.  It starts with primary elections themselves. 
4 GAOP’s discussion of reforming primary elections focuses on logistical and scheduling changes for 2016 – 
reducing the number of primary debates and moving up primary elections – and ignore potential challenges involved 
in motivating Republican primary voters to support unconventional candidates. 
5 It should be noted that I employ a variety of terms (such as “sex” and “gender”) to indicate demographic 
differences between political candidates in order to help facilitate the flow of the narrative.  However, as Virginia 
Prince (2005, 29) notes, “Sex and gender are not the same thing.  We are born […] not only into male and female, 
but into man and woman.”  In other words, female is an adjective, reflecting individuals sense of identity, while sex 
is a noun referencing anatomy.  These two concepts overlap for many individuals, but not universally, and therefore 
this technical note is warranted.  Nevertheless, this project is only concerned with how individuals use physical 
attributes (race, sex) to sort and evaluate political candidates, and therefore references in this text like gender, 
women, and female all refer to a candidate’s sex. 
 3 
                                                 
1.1 WHY PRIMARIES 
While race and gender are known to be significant determinants in political impression formation 
generally, we should expect them to be particularly relevant in primary elections.  Political 
research on demographic cues has historically ignored the role of parties (King and Matland 
2003; Shafer 2013), yet even as parties are brought into the scholarly fold, “investigations of the 
role of [demographic cues in] intra-party contests are rare” (Jackman and Vavreck 2010, 155). 
Our collective focus on race and gender in general elections, while serving a crucial end in its 
own right, nevertheless skips over the electoral step in which race and gender ought to be even 
more central considerations in candidate evaluations – primary elections where party labels are 
not the predominant factor in vote choice – and should therefore be more substantively 
significant in our collective quest to uncover how voters form attitudes and make decisions. 
Several factors contribute to the centrality of demographic cues in these primary 
elections.  For instance, from a purely technical standpoint these cues matter because candidates 
must win primary contests in order to compete in the fall general election and thus any effort to 
increase descriptive representation of women and racial minorities in office must start in the 
spring.  Yet primary contests also matter from a behavioral perspective.  While the Republican 
Party has concluded that it needs more female and minority candidates to run under the party 
banner, programs like the GAOP fail to account for potential challenges these candidates may 
encounter within the party simply by running to be the nominee in the fall.  Authors of the 
GAOP, for example, acknowledge that the Party “must recognize the unique challenges female 
candidates face in winning elections,” but the recommendation associated with this observation 
implores the Party to “provide training programs for potential female candidates that includes 
fundraising guidance, digital strategy, etc.” (21). These prescriptions fail to account for how 
4 
Republican voters (potentially) evaluate unconventional candidates in other ways.   
 The electoral landscape is also considerably more complicated during spring intra-party 
elections than during general elections in the fall.  Primary elections represent extremely 
complex information environments.  Unlike general elections, which feature one candidate from 
each major political party, the field of primary contenders often begins with many candidates.  
Since voters are known to minimize cognitive output in political decision making (Downs 1957; 
Lupia 1994), the extensive field of candidates in primary elections increases the likelihood that 
voters attempting to distinguish one candidate from another will reach for easily accessible 
information – like race and gender – rather than seek more appropriate – but also more costly – 
policy information.  Indeed, voters are increasingly likely to rely on heuristic cues when facing a 
complex decision (Lau and Redlawsk 2001) and reliance on cues is known to decrease as 
information about candidates increases (Matson and Fine 2006).  Recent work by Jones (2014) 
also finds that race affects impressions of candidates even when they provide other political 
information to voters.           
 A related issue concerns the nature of choice in primary elections.  The high degree of 
ideological similarity and policy congruence among candidates in primary elections dramatically 
reduces the cost of defecting from one candidate to another.  As a result, voters who are 
particularly disposed to support – or reject – one candidate over another should have relatively 
little trouble doing so in a primary contest because alternative choices are ideologically 
proximate.  In a general election, on the other hand, this defection is far more costly, for the 
alternative vote choice requires a voter to support another party (or abstain from the election 
altogether).  To the extent that race and gender affect voters’ willingness to support political 
candidates, their substantive effects are much more relevant in spring primary elections. 
 5 
 A fourth reason to focus on race and gender explicitly in primary elections is due to the 
fact that the voting population shifts ideologically during spring nomination contests and the 
general election in the fall.  Figure 1 provides an abstract illustration of this idea.  In the general 
election, candidates focus on rallying their own partisan supporters, attracting independents, and 
picking off some moderate voters from the other party.  In primary contests, on the other hand, 
the constituency to which candidates appeal is significantly smaller, focusing on only about half 
of the general ideological spectrum.6   While the median voter in a general election represents the 
ideological center and may or may not affiliate with a political party, in primary elections the 
median voter falls in the middle of partisan distributions of Democrats and Republicans, 
respectively, and almost certainly belongs to one of the major parties.  As a result, a voter’s 
location relative to the rest of the voting public shifts, sometimes dramatically, depending on the 
election context.  A Republican voter located just to the right of the ideological center, for 
instance, would be considered a moderate in the general election but would represent the liberal 
end of the spectrum among a population consistently only of Republicans.  Given the tendency to 
impose an ideological “penalty” on female or African American candidates (e.g. to presume they 
are more liberal than white men), the ideological distribution of voters within party primaries 
implies that different types of partisan voters may be more or less likely to support some 
candidates over others. 
6 It could be argued that in open-primary states – where voters from all parties may select which party’s primary 
they wish to participate in – the voting population will not be comprised solely of citizens from a single partisan 
stripe.  While there is some truth to this, there is evidence to suggest that candidates target the primary electorate 
(e.g. more ideologically extreme voters) rather than the overall median voter (Brady, Han, and Pope 2007). 
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Figure 1: Targeted Voters In Primary and General Election Campaigns 
The most crucial factor motivating this effort to study the role of race and gender in 
primary elections, however, is also the most basic: in primary elections the most important and 
oft-used electoral cue – party affiliation – is effectively neutralized.  Scholars regularly affirm 
that a candidate’s party identification provides the central cue that helps voters make an informed 
choice (Aldrich 1995; Mondak 1993; Schaffner and Streb 2002).  Party labels dramatically 
simplify the voting process by allowing individuals to associate a general political/ideological 
philosophy with particular candidates without needing to invest heavily in learning about specific 
candidates (Rahn 1993).  Yet in primary elections this cue is largely useless as a tool for 
distinguishing a voter’s electoral options because all candidates affiliate with the same party. 
These unique features of primary elections imply that since voters share a partisan in-
group status with all candidates they must find some basis for discerning among them.  As noted 
above, the lack of utility provided by partisan cues in primary elections suggests that voters will 
reach for other accessible cues – like race and gender – during primary contests.  This renders 
demographic information far more relevant in a primary context than in a general election where 
party labels dominate the decision-making calculus.  As a result, the potential for the Republican 
7 
Party not only to recruit but to nominate counterstereotypical candidates will depend in no small 
part on how its own voters process information about and evaluate Republican candidates in 
party primaries.  But how do they do that, and why is it problematic for the very candidates 
currently championed by Republican leaders as essential for the longevity of the party? 
1.2 THE (OLD) DILEMMA OF THE COUNTERSTEREOTYPICAL REPUBLICAN 
CANDIDATE 
Just as party labels are known to serve as heuristic devices that allow individuals to infer about 
political parties, demographic cues like race and gender affect how citizens evaluate politicians.  
Political scientists have long established voters’ latent propensity to impose a variety of traits and 
qualities on political candidates purely as a function of demographic status.  Voters presume, for 
example, that non-white or non-male candidates possess certain traits that white men do not 
(Huddy and Terkildsen 1993), and to be particularly well- or poorly-suited to tackle various 
policy domains like education or national defense (Sigelman et al. 1995).   As noted above, 
women (Koch 2002) and African Americans (Mcdermott 1997) are also perceived by individuals 
to be more ideologically liberal, all else equal, than white males.  Koch (2000) for instance, uses 
pooled election data to compare where voters place male and female candidates on an ideological 
scale, controlling for a variety of other covariates, including estimates of actual candidate 
ideology.  He concludes that “utilization of gender stereotypes to infer candidates’ ideological 
orientation/position leads citizens to perceive female candidates as being more liberal than they 
are” (426).  McDermott (1998) utilizes an experiment in which fictional candidates without party 
labels are either male or female.  She finds that more liberal (conservative) respondents are more 
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likely to express support for the female (male) candidate.  Similarly, Republican respondents 
tend to prefer the male candidate while Democratic respondents favored the female candidate.7   
Most political office seekers possess a demographic status that is ideologically consistent with 
their partisan status.  That is, the ideological leanings voters associate with each type of 
information are in the same direction.  For instance, gender status “female” implies ideological 
liberalism, and so does the party label “Democrat,” and therefore a female Democrat poses little 
cognitive challenge to voters attempting to infer about her political views.  White male 
Republicans are similarly stereotypical in this sense, for “male” and “Republican” are both 
associated with a conservative ideological output.    
 Counterstereotypical candidates like female or African-American Republicans present a 
problem.  They possess multiple cues – demographic and partisan – that do not align with 
preconceived notions concerning these candidates’ ideological disposition.  Republican women, 
for instance, simultaneously provide a liberal cue (gender) along with a conservative cue 
(partisanship) (Dolan 2004; Koch 2000).  The resulting confusion leads to a dilemma for 
counterstereotypical political candidates: voters may withdraw/fail to support them, not 
necessarily out of sexism or racism, but because they are not sure what conclusions to draw.  
When voters are unsure about a candidate, they are less likely to support her (Alvarez 1997).  
Furthermore, as discussed above, the primary context is one in which it is largely costless to 
switch one vote choice for another since candidates are so similar to one another to begin with, 
and therefore this sort of confusion is particularly dangerous for counterstereotypical candidates 
in this stage of the game.         
 Recent election statistics are consistent with this classic formulation of this dilemma.  
7 Interestingly, McDermott also includes a treatment condition in featuring only male candidates.  In this scenario, 
respondents’ ideology has no effect on expressed vote choice. 
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Since there is not enough data to analyze racial minority groups running as Republicans, I focus 
for the moment on women, although the logic of the dilemma applies similarly to other 
counterstereotypical groups.  Scholars note that female candidates, once nominated, can raise 
money and garner votes at similar rates as their male counterparts (Burrell 1998; Dolan 1998; 
Smith and Fox 2001).  Seltzer, Newman, and Leighton (1997, 79) go as far as to say that 
“winning elections has nothing to do with the sex of the candidate.”  Some work even finds that 
women enjoy similar primary election rates as men (Lawless and Pearson 2008).  Yet when we 
focus on primary elections across parties, we see significant differences between stereotypical 
Democratic female candidates in their party primaries and counterstereotypical Republican 
female candidates in theirs.           
 Consider, for instance, the midterm elections in 1994 and 2010, two years that saw large 
Republican gains in Congress.  In both elections, there were more non-incumbent female 
Republican candidates running in party primaries than non-incumbent female Democratic 
candidates.  In 1994, 37% of Republican women won the primaries they entered, compared to 
48.7% of Democratic women.  In 2010, the gap increased; 31.4% of Republican women won 
their primary elections compared to 50.3% of female Democrats.  Two of the Republican Party’s 
most successful elections in recent history, in short, were not good for Republican women, and it 
is at least in part because they did not make it onto the general election ballot.   
 Looking at recent trends more generally, we see more evidence that counterstereotypical 
candidates struggle in primaries.  Table 1 and Figure 2 present the win rates for Democratic 
women and Republican women in their respective primaries.  For over twenty years Democratic 
women have succeeded in securing their party’s nomination at higher rates than Republican 
women, and the difference between the parties in terms of female representation on the general 
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election ballot has increased since 2008 – indeed, Democratic women have a statistically 
significant advantage over Republican women in terms of primary election win rate over the last 
decade.8   It must be noted that these data do not distinguish incumbents from challengers.  
Given that women are more likely to run (and hold office) as Democrats, coupled with the fact 
that incumbents enjoy considerable advantages that aid in seat retention, the data may paint a 
somewhat more favorable portrait of electoral life as a female Democrat than a female 
Republican.  Still, overall the descriptive statistics combined with the anecdotal data above 
suggest that Republican women struggle to secure their party’s nomination moreso than do their 
Democratic counterparts.  This poses a challenge to the Republican Party’s vision of a more 
diverse candidate pool in future elections. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 Democratic women enjoy a mean win rate during this period of 53.92% to Republican women’s mean win rate of 
44.14% (t=5.12, p==0.001) 
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 Table 1: Number and Success Rate of Women in Congress by Party, 1994-2012 
   Data from the Center for Women and Politics (CWAP) 
 
 
Year 
Number of 
Democratic 
Women 
Candidates 
Democratic 
Women Primary 
Win Rate 
Number of 
Republican 
Women 
Candidates 
Republican 
Women Primary 
Win Rate 
Democratic 
Women Win Rate 
Advantage 
1994 78 48.7% 81 37% +11.7% 
1996 104 49% 65 44.6% +4.4% 
1998 68 61.8% 50 58% +3.8% 
2000 66 65.2% 50 54% +11.2% 
2002 71 56.3% 55 50.9% +5.4% 
2004 85 60% 59 55.9% +4.1% 
2006 95 53.7% 47 40.3% +13.3% 
2008 97 47.4% 43 41.9% +4.4% 
2010 77 46.8% 113 27.4% +19.4% 
2012 145 50.3% 86 31.4% +18.9% 
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 Figure 2: Female Success in Primaries Across Parties in U.S. House Elections, 1994-2012 
1.3 PARTY DIFFERENCES LEAD TO AN EMERGING PUZZLE 
The dilemma of the counterstereotypical Republican is clearly a challenge for the Republican 
Party, particularly today.  The urgency motivating the Party’s relatively new push for a more 
diverse constituency has emerged not only due to demographic shifts in the American populace 
but because the Party has lost considerable ground with non-white and non-male voting blocs in 
recent decades.  The Republican Party, of course, was originally founded as an anti-slavery 
party, and enjoyed widespread supported from emancipated slaves and their descendants until 
the Great Depression when Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal policies appealed to African 
American citizens deeply affected by rampant poverty.  In the 1960s, civil rights legislation 
supported by Democrats (namely President Lyndon Johnson) in conjunction with the anti-
 13 
government rhetoric from leading Republicans (namely Barry Goldwater) precipitated additional 
migration of African Americans to the Democratic Party.9  In American elections since that time, 
African American voters have represented one of the most reliably Democratic voting blocs in 
the country. 
The Republican Party’s reputation with women has similarly fluctuated over time.  The 
Party’s policy vision in the mid-twentieth century included a platform aligned to a large degree 
with women’s interests.  Indeed, “in the 1950s and early 1960s, Republicans were relatively 
more favorable to women’s rights than were Democrats” (Wolbrecht 2002, 238).10  This edge 
began to erode in the 1970s, a period during which the parties were not particularly distinct in 
terms of support for women’s rights, before polarizing in the opposite direction starting around 
1980.  Party realignment among women has since manifested itself in a variety of ways ranging 
from higher rates of Democratic Party affiliation among women (see below) to an increasing 
prominence of women’s rights at Democratic Party conventions since the 1970s to a higher 
proportion of women in Democratic congressional delegations (Wolbrecht 2000).  The partisan 
gender gap, however, does not parallel the partisan racial gap.  While female individuals tend to 
support the Democratic Party more than men to this day, there is far more partisan parity 
between the sexes than between the races.  As the figures below show, Republican women are 
not uncommon whereas Republican African Americans remain fairly rare among the citizenry. 
The evolution of party reputations on minority and women’s rights has resulted in the 
modern political reality that a majority of non-white and non-male candidates affiliate and/or 
9 It should be noted that this grossly oversimplifies the situation.  Many Southern Democrats in this era, for instance, 
resisted civil rights legislation, and in fact a higher proportion of Republican legislators in Congress (about 80% in 
both chambers) support the 1964 Civil Rights Act than did Democrats.  However, the reputation of the parties on 
civil rights have diverged considerably in the years since. 
10 For example, for nearly four decades prior to 1980, the Republican Party officially endorsed the Equal Rights 
Amendment while Democrats opposed it until 1972 (Frum 2000). 
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support the Democratic Party, even though the size of the gap is far larger across race than it is 
across gender.  Nevertheless, this reality represents an electoral problem for Republicans in an 
increasingly non-white American populace.  It also represents a puzzle to scholars of cues and 
voter behavior.  Research in political science implies that female or African American 
Republicans will struggle to achieve electoral success because their demographic status implies 
ideological liberalism.  Yet if the same question is approached from a psychological perspective, 
an entirely different set of theoretical expectations emerges.  Psychological literature on 
attribution theory and expectancy violations argues that individuals tend to legitimize political 
objects (candidates, messages, etc.) that fail to conform to expectations.  Messages that appear 
incongruent with the interests of the message provider (e.g. Republican party membership for an 
African American whose race is not associated with that party) become more powerful because 
messengers become more authentic (Walster, Aronson, and Abrahams 1966).    
 This phenomenon is known not only to increase the persuasiveness of political messages 
but also to increase positive affect for counterstereotypical messengers (Bergan 2012; Eagly, 
Wood, and Chaiken 1978).  Hayes (2005), for instance, finds that candidates whom voters 
perceive to possess counterstereotypical qualities (like a Republican candidate viewed as 
compassionate or a Democrat who appears to be tough on crime) can increase their appeal to 
voters.  We are thus left with an intriguing puzzle: how is it that being a counterstereotypical 
Republican candidate is problematic according to political scientists yet ostensibly a beneficial 
status if we draw from psychology research?  One of the key goals of this project is to help 
reconcile these two literatures and determine when and how counterstereotypical status can be an 
electoral asset or liability in primary elections. 
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1.3.1 Can Democrats be Demographically Counterstereotypical? 
Absent thus far is a discussion of counterstereotypical Democratic candidates.  Do 
African American or female Democrats face similar struggles as their Republican counterparts?  
My answer is a qualified no.  By definition, one reason the Republican Party has struggled to 
attract non-white and non-male voters to its ranks is because these citizens tend to support the 
Democratic Party.  Most African American voters report greater affect for the Democratic Party.  
Figure 3 summarizes this trend in recent years.  Surges in African American registration and 
turnout in 2008 for the first African American presidential candidate – a Democrat – further 
affirm this effect.  Since the Democratic Party has – in recent decades – been increasingly 
associated by all voters as being the party for African Americans, it follows that most African 
American political candidates run as Democrats.  Simply put, being a Democratic African 
American voter or politician is not unexpected.  
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Men Women African Americans 
 
 
 
 
 
Data from Pew Research 
Figure 3: Party Identification by Demographic Group, 1990-2012 
 
A similar pattern of support for the Democratic Party exists among women, although the 
gap in party preference is considerably smaller.  As Figure 3 demonstrates, in 2012 37% of 
women aligned with the Democratic Party compared to only 24% who favor Republicans.  Since 
1996, the Democratic presidential candidate has enjoyed winning a majority of female votes 
while the Republican candidate has enjoyed winning more men.11   For instance, in 2012 Barack 
Obama (D) won 55% of women’s votes to Mitt Romney’s (R) 44% while Romney enjoyed a 
52% to 45% edge over Obama among male voters.  If we look at female candidates in Table 1, 
we observe that since 1996 only one election season (2010) featured more Republican women 
running in primary elections than Democratic women.  As with African Americans, women have 
historically supported and run for office as members of the Democratic Party at higher rates than 
11 http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/fast_facts/voters/documents/GGPresVote.pdf 
Democrats (%) 
Republicans (%) 
Independents (%) 
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the Republican Party.  A female Democrat is not an unusual sight for a voter.   
 If we consider the representation of women in Congress across the parties we see more 
evidence that being a female Democrat politician is more or less “normal” while being a female 
Republican remains the exception.  Consider Figures 4 and 5.  Since the early 1990s (recall 1992 
was “The Year of the Woman” (Atkeson 2003)) in both the U.S. House and U.S. Senate, the 
number of women in the Democratic ranks of Congress has grown larger women in on the 
Republican side in terms both of (1) the total number of women in the party caucus as (2) the 
proportion of the caucus comprised of women.  Whereas in 1991 there were 19 Democratic 
female Representatives to the Republicans’ nine, by 2013 that gulf had widened to 58 
Democratic women to 19 Republicans.  In the Senate, Republican women have never numbered 
higher than five, while Democratic women have been steadily increasing to over 15 by 2013.  As 
a proportion of seats held by a party, the results in the Senate are even more convincing.  
Republican women have never held more than ten percent of Republican seats, while today 
women hold just under 30 percent of Democratic seats.  As far as representation in Congress 
goes, the last twenty years have seen women become increasingly popular in the Democratic 
Party while their presence in the Republican Party remains stagnant.  Put differently, female 
Republican politicians are counterstereotypical and female Democratic politicians are not. 
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 Figure 4: Women's Representation in U.S. House by Party, 1991-2013 
 
 
Figure 5: Women's Representation in U.S. Senate by Party, 1991-2013 
 
It should be noted that this discussion is not meant to imply (1) that women and African 
Americans have achieved equality – descriptively or substantively – even within the Democratic 
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Party; or (2) that counterstereotypical politicians cannot exist within the Democratic Party.  
Instead, I suggest that because the party has successfully appealed to racial minorities and 
women, and since most female/minority candidates are Democrats, the notion of a 
demographically counterstereotypical Democrat is an unlikely one insofar as there is no 
demographic status a Democratic politician can hold that would strike voters as unexpected.  In 
other words, anyone looks like a plausible Democrat.  While the 2008 Democratic primaries 
eventually became a high-profile race between a female and an African American, the original 
field of candidates also included five white males and one male of mixed racial descent.12  
 All of this said, Democrats can just as easily be counterstereotypical in non-demographic 
domains.  Political parties have reputations among the voters (Hayes 2005), and a Democrat with 
traits or attributes inconsistent with her party’s reputation may be classified as 
counterstereotypical.  Similarly, a Democrat maintaining membership in certain groups or 
organizations – Evangelical Christians or the Tea Party, for instance – would strike individuals 
as counterstereotypical just as an African American committed to the Republican Party is.  This 
project, however, focuses on the use of demographic cues when evaluating primary election 
candidates in a general sense.  In this way, some Republican politicians can be 
counterstereotypical, but Democratic politicians cannot. 
12 These include Senator Joe Biden, Senator Chris Dodd, Former Senator John Edwards, Former Senator Mike 
Gravel, Representative Dennis Kucinich, and Governor Bill Richardson, whose heritage includes elements of 
Caucasian and Hispanic race. 
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1.4 SUMMARY AND NEXT STEPS 
We have now arrived at the crux of the challenge I will address in the following chapters.  
Republican Party leaders have recognized the Party’s limited ability to appeal to new 
demographic blocs of voters that historically it has not relied on to achieve electoral success.  
These same leaders acknowledge that they must do something to respond to this development, 
for the proportion of white, male individuals within the general electorate – bread and butter 
voters for the Party – is decreasing.  Republican strategists are encouraging the Party to nominate 
and elect more women and racial minorities, surmising that descriptive representation signifies 
one avenue for the party to make inroads with female and minority voters.     
 I suggest, however, that there is reason to be wary of this strategy, and, paradoxically, the 
challenge to Republican Party success in the future actually lies with Republican voters.  
Political scientists have well-established that voters infer a great deal about politicians on the 
basis of demographic features like race and gender.  In general, this sort of inference may 
actually be detrimental to the electoral prospects of female or African American Republicans, 
namely because their gender and race, respectively, tend to be associated with the Democratic 
Party and a more liberal ideology.  While these traits may be beneficial in a general election 
where those same associations may allow female or African American Republicans to appeal to 
more centrist or liberal-leaning voters, these candidates will never make it on the ballot in 
November without winning primary elections in the spring.      
 Given that primary elections represent the first hurdle in securing a party’s nomination, 
and coupled with the questionable remedy laid out by Republican Party leaders, I submit that a 
more dedicated scholarly effort must be aimed at understanding how race and gender work in 
primary elections.  Above I identified a series of conditions unique to the primary process, and 
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the scholarly literature thus far does not sufficiently explore how demographic cues affect 
decision-making in this context.  We must fundamentally focus on both voters and candidates 
and develop a theoretical basis for examining the consequences – good and bad – for different 
types of political candidates in party primaries.  Can (negative) stereotypes be neutralized?  Can 
counterstereotypical candidates benefit from violating expectations?    
 What should a theory concerning the use of race and gender stereotypes in primaries 
cover?  In the next chapter I developed a two-pronged approach that focuses on voters and 
candidates, respectively.  The first part of the theory draws on spatial logic and heuristics 
literature to argue that there is an additive effect of partisanship and demographic status when it 
comes to evaluating primary candidates.  I argue that since voters both share a partisan affiliation 
with all primary candidates, and therefore maintain have a generalized sense of candidates’ 
ideologies and policy views, they may use race and gender more precisely to locate, or sort, these 
candidates within a party’s ideological space.  From here, voters’ own ideological dispositions 
should influence their evaluations of their primary options.  In other words, since a voter can 
select from several candidates representing the voter’s party, race and gender will help her 
decide which primary choice is most aligned with her own ideological disposition, and she is 
expected to express more favorability towards candidates she perceives to be most ideologically 
like herself.  
 The second part of the theory approaches the issue from the candidates’ perspective.  
Above I briefly established that some primary candidates are counterstereotypical, not fitting 
voters’ preconceived notions about their policy and ideological views.  The classic dilemma of 
the counterstereotypical Republican argues that these candidates generate confusion and, 
subsequently, voters will withdraw support from them.  How is it, then, that these candidates can 
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succeed in Republican primary elections?  The answer, I suggest, comes in the form of policy 
information.  When demographic information conflicts with partisan status, voters may struggle 
to accurately infer about primary candidates.  A candidate can remedy this by supplying 
ideological information that allows voters to move away from conflicting categorical information 
and focus on more precise and relevant policy information.  This “scale-tipping information” acts 
to resolve the cognitive conflict that results from categorical cues implying opposite 
ideologically dispositions.  From here, I posit that it may even be possible for 
counterstereotypical candidates to activate positive affect via expectancy violations given that 
they have established themselves within ideological subgroups within parties. 
1.4.1 Project Outline 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Chapter Two reviews the relevant literature that I 
seek to expand with this work.  I then develop a theory of primary decision-making in which I 
integrate research on demographic cues as ideological stereotypes with basic spatial mapping 
processes to predict when certain types of primary voters will prefer certain types of primary 
candidates.  I then go on to discuss the concept of individuating information and develop a new 
variant of it that emerges when other, categorical pieces of information are in conflict. 
Theoretical and empirical expectations for both parts of the theory are presented.  Chapter Three 
provides details of two survey-experiments I conducted to test the hypotheses.  
Chapters Four through Six provide empirical analysis of the theory and its implications. 
Chapter Four presents results from the low-information analysis when only categorical 
information is provided to respondents.  Chapters Five and Six analyze results from the second 
study in which individuating policy information is introduced.  The first of these chapters 
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focuses exclusively on how this information affects perceptions of candidates as they pertain to 
ideology, and the second emphasize related attitudes about politicians as potential party 
candidates.  Chapter Seven closes the project, summarizing the results of the experiments, 
discussing their limitations, and discussing the implications for gender- and race-based politics 
moving forward.  Finally, since this project is by no means the last word on race and gender in 
primary elections (indeed, it is one of the first), I also spend time in the final chapter discussing 
how the results of this work will contribute to additional study on this topic.    
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2.0  CHAPTER TWO: THEORY 
Conventional accounts of the application of demographic stereotypes in rendering evaluations of 
politicians conclude that counterstereotypical African American and female candidates in the 
Republican Party are trapped in an information dilemma for voters attempting to render 
judgments about them.  These candidates are members of the conservative political party yet 
individually are presumed by voters to be more liberal than white males (Huddy and Terkildsen 
1993a; Koch 2000; Mcdermott 1997).13   Consequently, they struggle when running as 
Republicans (King and Matland 2003).  While these concerns are not unfounded, the bases for 
them are not adequately established.  Almost all work on the role of race and gender cues has 
been studied in either a non-partisan context (e.g. Jones 2014; Mcdermott 1998) or a general 
election context where race and gender cues are drown out by partisanship (e.g. Dolan 2004; 
Hayes 2011; Koch 2000, 2002).  Intra-party analysis of demographic cues in primaries has 
typically been restricted to specific election cycles (e.g. Jackman and Vavreck 2010). 
As established in Chapter 1, the unique nature of primary electoral politics suggests that 
generalized claims about the role of race and gender in voter decision-making do not necessarily 
apply in the same way they do in the fall.  In the following pages I propose an alternative 
theoretical formulation of how these cues are applied in intra-party contests.  The chapter is 
13 Koch (2002) finds this bias to occur even when controlling for candidate’s actual ideology. 
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roughly divided into three parts: first, I briefly chronicle our extant knowledge of racial, gender, 
and partisan cues in American elections, emphasizing their role as ideological signals in the 
candidate evaluation process.  I then integrate these stereotypes into basic spatial logic, arguing 
that primary voters use race and gender to sort primary candidates and identify their most 
preferred candidate.  Finally, I explore the role of political information in primaries, formulating 
a model of scale-tipping information that suggests counterstereotypical candidates can provide 
policy messages that compel voters to focus on the ideological substance of the candidate’s 
policy views and not the conflict generated by categorical cues.  This, in turn, allows 
counterstereotypical candidates to level the electoral playing field, and perhaps even reverse it.,   
Ultimately, this project seeks to provide some answers to two central questions that have been 
heretofore un- or under-appreciated in the cue literature: the first concerns the nature of 
subgroups within parties: how do ideological moderates behave differently than ideological 
extremists?  Second, how does policy information condition the impact of other information cues 
that have historically been studied in isolation? 
2.1 USING (EASY) INFORMATION: RACE, GENDER, AND IDEOLOGICAL 
INFERENCE 
There is little debate in modern political science that voters are by and large “cognitive misers,” 
interested in minimizing mental output in the course of making political decisions.  As Fiske and 
Neuberg (1990, 14) put it, “we are exposed to so much information that we must in some matter 
simplify our social environment – for reasons of cognitive economy, we categorize others as 
members of particular groups – groups about which we often have a great deal of […] 
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stereotypic knowledge.”  In an effort to make reasonably informed decisions without incurring 
the costs required to obtain the information required to do so, voters turn to cues about 
candidates.  A cue is a simple, easily-obtained piece of information about a candidate which 
facilitates inference about the candidate as a whole.  One of the best documented of political 
phenomena is the tendency for voters to use cues to aid in decision-making in low-information 
contexts (e.g. Lau and Redlawsk 2001); indeed, as information decreases, reliance on cues 
increases (Matson and Fine 2006).  Voters often use cues to place political candidates into 
categories (Fiske and Taylor 1991).  Once in these categories (race, party, gender, etc.), voters 
can assign attributes to particular candidates based on characteristics they associate with the 
category as a whole.  Race and gender represent two of the most well-developed cue literatures 
in social science and here I briefly discuss each in turn.     
 Research on racial cues has affirmed that they activate negative feelings towards African 
Americans among white voters and can stimulate anti-African American policy preferences 
across a variety of contexts, from general policy issues like support for disaster assistance 
(Iyengar and Hahn 2007) to race-related policy domains like welfare, affirmative action, and 
immigration (Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008; Federico 2004; Hutchings and Valentino 2004; 
Valentino 2002) to elections (Citrin, Green, and Sears 1990; Jackman and Vavreck 2010; 
Mendelberg 2001; Peffley and Hurwitz 2005, 2007; Tesler and Sears 2010).  White voters 
penalize African American candidates in their evaluations while rating white candidates more 
positively (Berinsky et al. 2011; Best and Williams 1990; Terkildsen 1993).14   Indeed, as race 
becomes more salient among white voters, they are increasingly less likely to support African 
14 Subsequent generations of research have probed such cues more deeply.  For instance scholars have even found 
that skin complexion matters: the lighter a black candidate’s skin, the more acceptable he is to white voters (Maddox 
and Gray 2002; Weaver 2012). 
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American candidates (Schaffner 2009).15  These patterns contribute to African American 
candidates only rarely elected achieving electoral success outside of majority-minority 
districts.16  
 Gender cues have historically shared some common characteristics and consequences as 
racial cues.  Both cues remain capable of activating negative feelings towards the group 
depicted.17   Armstrong and McAdams (2009), for instance, find that individuals are more likely 
to rate a message favorably if it is attributed to a man rather than a women.  However, 
electorally, women have achieved greater electoral parity with men than have racial minorities; 
for instance, women do not appear to suffer from systematic bias at the polls (Cook 1998; 
Duerst-Lahti 1998; Fox 2000; Smith and Fox 2001).  Nevertheless, electoral equality has not 
been achieved; women, for example, are far more susceptible to primary competition than men 
(Lawless and Pearson 2008).  The figures from the last chapter also highlight the persistent gulf 
in descriptive representation between men and women in Congress, especially among 
Republicans.          
 Fundamentally, however, why do racial and gender cues activate attitudes towards these 
politicians?  Part of the answer is found in classic models of racism and sexism that stimulate 
biases against non-white and non-male candidates (e.g. Githens and Prestage 1977; Kirkpatrick 
1974).  Yet there is additional explanation, as well: given their desire to simplify the political 
15 Some scholars have argued against this trend, suggesting that white voter discrimination against blacks does not 
appear in election data (e.g. Highton 2004). 
16 (Canon 1999, 10) points out that “in the 6667 House elections in white majority districts between 1966 and 1996 
(including special elections), only 35 (0.52%) were won by blacks.” 
17 Women and African Americans share other group characteristics, as well; for instance, both are known to be 
uniquely capable of influencing behaviors stemming from shared group status. Members of underrepresented groups 
more sensitive towards issues impacting their group, and consequently are particularly more likely to support them.  
Women have a stronger preference for same-sex representation than men (Dolan 2008).  Atkeson (2003) finds that 
women are more likely to participate in elections when female candidates are running.  Female candidates also enjoy 
marginally greater support among voters of their own gender (Brians 2005; Dolan 2004). 
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environment when pressed to make electoral decisions, voters tend to impose on political 
candidates ideas and attitudes they associate with groups of which candidates are a part.  Party 
labels, for instance, help voters make an informed choice by associating specific, unknown 
candidates with known (generalized) policy views (Aldrich 1995; Downs 1957; Mondak 1993; 
Rahn 1993; Schaffner and Streb 2002).  Voters, consequently, tend to view candidates through 
the lens of party reputations (Hayes 2005).        
  Race and gender activate similar associations.18  Specifically, African Americans and 
women are viewed differently than white men on three dimensions of political attributes: (1) 
traits, (2) issues, and (3) ideology.  Men, for example, are perceived as “tough,” “aggressive,” 
“self-confident,” and “assertive” while women are more often viewed as “compassionate,” 
“gentle,” “kind,” and “caring” (Huddy and Terkildsen 1993a; 1993b).  Assessments of candidate 
traits have been shown to activate both positive and negative attitudes about the candidates 
themselves (Kahn 1996; Lawless 2004; Sanbonmatsu 2002).  Furthermore, trait perceptions have 
been found to influence vote choice, both in presidential (Bishin, Stevens, and Wilson 2006; 
Hayes 2009) and subnational elections (Druckman 2004; Fridkin and Kenney 2009; Hayes 
2010).            
 Individuals are also known to associate candidates of different demographic groups with 
particular policy interests and competency in specific issue areas.  African American and female 
candidates, for instance, are significantly more likely to be perceived as interested in minority 
issues than are white men (Mcdermott 1998).  Sigelman et al. (1995) find that minority status 
boosts the perception that moderate or conservative candidates would be compassionate towards 
18 For this reason, I justify treating women and African Americans as theoretically similar in this particular context, 
for both groups are associated with the same underlying political ideology.  As I discuss in the closing chapter, 
however, this does not mean that these groups – or any others – can always be presumed to generate similar feelings 
within individuals. 
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disadvantaged groups.  More generally, men are perceived as better equipped to oversee policy 
in certain domains – national security, for instance – while women are presumed to be more 
competent in areas like education and healthcare (Alexander and Andersen 1993; Kahn 1996; 
Lawless 2004).  
Finally, and most importantly for my purposes, impressions of politicians’ ideology are 
strongly influenced by their demographic status.19   Voters perceive female political candidates 
to be significantly more liberal than male candidates overall (Koch 2000, 2002; Sigelman et al. 
1995; Williams 1990).  Similar patterns exist even when politicians are members of the same 
party.20   King and Matland (2003) find that voters tend to believe the term “conservative” is 
more fitting for a male Republican than a female Republican.  Dolan (2004) adds that female 
Republican incumbents are perceived to be more liberal than male Republican incumbents.  
Jones (2014) finds that even when political candidates present policy views – which should 
reduce reliance on demographic cues – voters still perceive non-white politicians as more 
ideologically liberal than white males, regardless of the policy view they profess.    
 In short, two main points have been summarized in this section.  First, individuals are 
highly dependent on heuristic cues in the course of making political decisions.  Second, 
individuals hold ideological stereotypes about politicians on the basis of both partisan affiliation 
19 Not all demographic research finds significant differences in impression formation as a function of differences 
between demographic groups.  Brooks (2011), for instance, finds that voters do not evaluate men and women 
differently based on displays of emotions.  Others fail to find a relationship between a voter’s ideology and the race 
of a politician she is evaluating (e.g. Colleau et al. 1990; Weaver 2012).  Most studies, however, find significant 
effects. 
20 In the abstract, demographic-based assumptions about candidate ideology are not necessarily unjustified.  As the 
first chapter illustrated, most African American and female voters do report greater affect for the Democratic Party.  
Tate (1993, 1) even observes that “in the 1992 elections [blacks] voted overwhelmingly Democrats, as they had in 
the last seven presidential elections […] [This] despite the fact that the Democratic presidential nominee, Bill 
Clinton, had done little to earn their votes.”  Surges in black registration and turnout in 2008 for the first black 
presidential candidate – a Democrat – further affirm this effect.  Women also support the Democratic Party at higher 
levels than white men do, though the difference is not as robust as it is for racial minorities.   
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and demographic information like race and gender, where white male candidates are perceived to 
be more ideologically conservative than all other demographic groups.  Thus it becomes all the 
more likely that when partisanship is constant across candidates, primary voters may use 
demographic information as ideological information.  A priori, given the well-documented 
association between the Democratic Party/ideological liberalism and women and racial 
minorities, primary voters who encounter non-white candidates should use this information to 
modify their views of those candidates’ ideological positions within a pool of party candidates.  
From here, voters’ perceived ideological congruence with different candidates should condition 
the degree to which candidate evaluations are favorable. 
In the next sections, I argue that demographic cues as well as other candidate attributes – 
namely, policy messages – signal important information that aid in the decision-making process 
by helping voters ideologically sort candidates  within their own parties. 
2.2 HOW VOTERS EVALUATE PRIMARY CANDIDATES: ASSUMPTIONS 
UNDERLYING INFORMATION USE 
A model of information-based sorting and selection begins with a several critical assumptions 
concerning voters’ goals and objectives when using cues in primary elections.  First, voters are 
presumed to know and access generalized stereotypes about political and demographic groups.  
While many voters are not highly informed about politics overall, the cue literature discussed 
above provides a reasonable basis to make this claim.  A second assumption is more specific to 
intra-party contexts.  Individuals in a primary setting are expected to use information to sort a 
group of like-minded candidates in a way that allows the individual to identify which party 
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choice is best suited to represent his or her interests.  Unlike in general elections where 
copartisanship between voter X and candidate Y may be sufficient for that X to support Y, in 
primaries ideology should be more central to the act of identifying a most preferred candidate.21  
Utilizing a basic spatial framework (e.g. Downs 1957), we should expect that an individual will 
generally prefer candidates she presumes to be ideologically proximate to herself more than she 
will prefer candidates she perceives to be more ideologically distant, even when multiple 
candidates share partisan status with her.  Consequently, both general demographic and specific 
information cues are presumed to be utilized by individuals to sort candidates ideologically for 
the purposes of identifying ideological congruence with various candidate options.  
 I also assume voters across both parties utilize demographic cues in a similar fashion as 
they concern ideological inference.  White male politicians have historically been the most 
common (and even the exclusive) demographic type across both parties in American politics.  As 
a result, they can plausibly subscribe to any ideology, but in the absence of ideological or 
partisan information voters cannot ideologically distinguish one white male candidate from 
other.  Yet relative to white male candidates, female and African American politicians may be 
perceived to be more liberal on the basis of demographic status alone.  In other words, in the 
absence of information signaling candidates’ ideological disposition, voters should not be able to 
infer and ideological difference between two men, but will be more likely to infer an ideological 
difference between a male and female, or white male and black male.   
21 Indeed, in a general election, even if race or gender have the power to alter impressions about candidates to some degree, it is unlikely voters would defect from their own party to support the other.  Scholars have well-established that individuals tend to prefer members of social in-groups to people with whom they do not share some status (Leonie Huddy 2001; Tajfel and Turner 1979).  This is the main reason extant literature on the intersection of gender and partisanship (e.g. Hayes 2011; Sanbonmatsu and Dolan 2009) is theoretically inadequate for specifying the role of demographic cues in primary elections. 
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Given the universality of liberal stereotypes associated with both female politicians and 
politicians of color, for instance, I assume that knowledge that a candidate is female will compel 
voters in both parties and of different ideological groups to all presume that candidate to be 
somewhat more liberal than they would, for instance, presume a white male candidate to be.  By 
the same token, voters should generally perceive any white male candidate to be somewhat more 
conservative than any African American male candidate.  This assumption, however, should not 
be taken to mean that the effects of demographic information on ideological perceptions are 
necessarily equivalent across different types of candidates.  Here I am merely positing that the 
direction of any shift in ideological perception on the basis of race or gender will be the same 
across voters.           
 This project also assumes that individuals will typically give more weight to information 
from a surprising or unconventional source than information from a stereotypical or expected 
source.  When candidate information is consistent (for instance, when only one piece of 
information is available or when multiple pieces of information – like race and party – are 
ideologically aligned), it represents a sort of cognitive equilibrium in voters’ minds.  All the 
available information, after all, “makes sense.”  On the other hand, when information is 
introduced that is inconsistent – as when a female candidate affiliates with the Republican Party 
– this equilibrium is disrupted and the voters are much more apt to modify their perceptions of 
the candidates.  
A fifth and final assumption concerns the nature of information available to individuals 
as they effort to evaluate political figures.  We may loosely characterize partisan and 
demographic cues as “easy,” or categorical, for they connote broad associations with ideological 
and other types of stereotypes.  Easy cues can be quite useful in generalizing about particular 
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objects, and they have the added benefit of high accessibility – voters need not invest a great deal 
of energy in acquiring easy information.  For instance, a voter watching a primary debate would 
not have to listen to a word uttered by any candidate but could still easily distinguish among 
candidates on the basis of race and gender.  Yet despite its accessibility, easy information can be 
detrimental in that it is often imprecise.  Specific objects may not always fit into the categories 
with which they are associated.  Indeed, counterstereotypical Republican politicians exemplify 
this very problem.  
The challenges posed by easy information can sometimes be rectified by more complex, 
candidate-specific information.  This individuating, or “hard,” information refers to knowledge 
that is more precise than the general stereotypes that are associated with easy information.  Since 
individuating information is more exact, voters should find it more relevant that easy, categorical 
information and therefore give it more weight in the evaluative process.  Individuating 
information, then, while more costly to obtain, should also be more influential in voters’ minds.  
Below I argue that when counterstereotypical candidates can resolve cue conflict through 
ideological signals embedded in individuating policy messages, they can overcome the 
challenges posed by ideological associations with race and gender in Republican primaries. 
In summary, the theory outlined in these pages relies on a set of assumptions about 
knowledge individuals have as well as how they use knowledge they are presented.  I implicitly 
assume voters have a set of attitudes and beliefs related to (1) partisan, (2) racial, and (3) gender 
cues.  I also anticipate that voters will use information – easy and hard – to ideologically sort 
primary candidates, and will generally prefer the most ideologically proximate option as their 
choice for their party’s nomination.  Furthermore, the more information is (1) unexpected and/or 
(2) specific, the more relevant it will be as voters attempt to evaluate primary candidates.  This, 
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as I argue below, allows counterstereotypical candidates to level the electoral playing field, and 
perhaps even reverse it. 
2.3 SORTING AND SELECTING WITH EASY INFORMATION 
The process of candidate sorting using cues often entails utilizing multiple pieces of information 
to subdivide, or subtype, voters into different groups.  Subtyping theory (Deaux et al. 1985; 
Devine and Baker 1991) posits that individuals are known to sort objects within global categories 
like “men.”  This sorting creates subtypes, or multiple groups which are similar on some 
dimension but different on another.  In party primaries, white male Democrats may constitute 
one subtype of “Democrats” while white female Democrats constitute another.  Scholars have 
found strong evidence of subtyping effects – individuals perceive differences across subgroups 
even when all members of those groups share a common global status.  Recent work by 
Schneider and Bos (2011) finds that African American politicians as a group are perceived 
differently than African Americans as a whole.  African American politicians, for instance, are 
considered more ambitious, confident, and educated than African American citizens.  Indeed, 
African American politicians in some ways share more group overlap with “African American 
professionals” and “politicians in general” than they do a simple racial group.  Applying the 
same logic to female politicians, Schneider and Bos (2014) again find that female politicians are 
not perceived to possess the same characteristics that voters ascribe to females in general.   
 As noted in the previous chapter, when primary voters are evaluating political candidates 
within their own parties, the need to distinguish among electoral choices is far more urgent than 
it is in general elections.  Demographic information provides a relatively costless, if not crude, 
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method for such discrimination.  While a primary voter may have general ideological 
expectations about a co-partisan, they may amend those expectations based on demographic 
information that accompanies the party cue.  In general, across both parties, we should expect 
female and African American candidates to be seen as more ideologically liberal than their white 
male counterparts.  Formally:   
H1: Democratic individuals will perceive female and African American 
Democratic candidates to be more ideologically liberal than white male 
Democratic candidates 
 
H2: Republican individuals will perceive female and African American 
Republican candidates to be more ideologically liberal than white male 
Republican candidates 
 
 Establishing ideological distinctions, however, is not sufficient for determining whether 
demographic cues lead different types of voters to conclude that some candidates are more 
ideologically proximate than others.  Thus another ideological measure must be considered. Just 
as I expect voters to use demographic cues to establish a candidate’s ideology, I also expect that 
demographic cues help establish ideological congruence between a primary voter and a 
particular candidate.  Formally: 
H3a: The more ideologically liberal a Democrat, the larger the perceived 
ideological gap between herself and a white male Democratic candidates 
 
H3b: The more ideologically conservative a Democrat, the larger the 
perceived ideological gap between herself and a female and African 
American Democratic candidates 
 
H3c: The more ideologically liberal a Democrat, the smaller the perceived 
ideological gap between herself and female and African American 
Democratic candidates 
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H3d: The more ideologically conservative a Democrat, the smaller the 
perceived ideological gap between herself and a white male Democratic 
candidates 
 
H4a: The more ideologically conservative a Republican, the larger the 
perceived ideological gap between herself and female or African American 
Republican candidates 
 
H4b: The more ideologically liberal a Republican, the smaller the perceived 
ideological gap between herself female or African American Republican 
candidates 
 
H4c: The more ideologically conservative a Republican, the larger the 
perceived ideological gap between herself and female or African American 
Republican candidates 
 
H4d: The more ideologically liberal a Republican, the smaller the perceived 
ideological gap between herself and female or African American Republican 
candidates 
 
 
 Finally, if, as I have argued, primary voters (1) use partisan and demographic cues to 
subtype candidates, and if voters (2) prefer more ideologically proximate candidates, different 
types of voters should prefer (e.g. express support for, perceive to be a good representative) 
different (demographic) types of primary candidates.  In Democratic primaries, the median voter 
is more liberal than is the median voter in a general election.  As a result, it follows that 
Democrats will perceive female or African American Democrats as more ideologically liberal 
than white male Democrats despite the shared partisan status.  Thus more ideologically liberal 
Democrats should perceive female or African American Democrats as more ideologically 
appropriate choices than white male Democratic candidates.  For Republicans, the opposite 
occurs.  Since female or African American Republicans will be perceived to be to the ideological 
left of the median primary voter, more ideologically moderate Republicans should view these 
counterstereotypical politicians as more appropriate representatives than will more ideologically 
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conservative Republicans.  This discussion motivates final set of hypotheses is justified.  
Formally, 
H5a: The more liberal a Democrat’s ideology, the more support she will 
express for female or African American Democratic candidates 
 
H5b: The more liberal a Democrat’s ideology, the less support she will 
express for white male Democratic candidates 
 
H5c: The more liberal a Democrat’s ideology, the more likely she will be to 
perceive female or African American Democratic candidates as good 
representatives 
 
H5d: The more liberal a Democrat’s ideology, the less likely she will be to 
perceive white male Democratic candidates as good representatives 
 
H6a: The more conservative a Republican’s ideology, the more support she 
will express for white male Republican candidates 
 
H6b: The more conservative a Republican’s ideology, the less support she 
will express for female or African American Republican candidates 
 
H6c: The more conservative a Republicans ideology, the more likely she will 
be to perceive white male Republican candidates as good representatives 
 
H6d: The more conservative a Republican’s ideology, the less likely she will 
be to perceive female or African American candidates as good 
representatives 
   
 In summary, the first set of empirical expectations is drawn from a model of spatial 
reasoning that integrates demographic stereotyping and basic subtyping theory with Downsian 
logic to primary elections.  Voters are expected to use race and gender to sort political candidates 
within political parties and form preferences based on where those candidates lie on an 
ideological spectrum relative to their own.  In this way, different ideological voters within parties 
are expected to form different candidate preferences.  Yet useful as this may be as a starting 
point, this model, with its emphasis on “easy,” categorical information, represents an incomplete 
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treatment of candidates – stereotypical and counterstereotypical – in primary elections.  First, I 
am for the moment assuming that other information about candidates (e.g. policy views) is 
unavailable (and therefore constant across candidates).  This is not entirely unreasonable – after 
all, earlier it was established that voters are known to be generally uninformed about specific 
candidates and are highly dependent on heuristic cues.        
 However, a greater challenge remains, at least for Republicans: the dilemma of the 
counterstereotypical Republican is based on the fact that counterstereotypical candidates 
generate cognitive conflict.  This may lead moderate Republican voters to be ambivalent among 
Republican candidates of any race or gender.  Without more information about candidates, these 
moderate voters – the very ones counterstereotypical candidates should target in primaries – may 
not be any more inclined to support African American/female Republicans over conventional 
white male candidates.  I must therefore consider more deliberately how voters process 
conflicting information and develop a model predicting the circumstances under which 
counterstereotypical candidates can overcome the (negative) stereotypes with which they are 
associated. 
2.4 LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD: INDIVIDUATING IDEOLOGICAL 
INFORMATION  
Voters use multiple categorical information cues to sort and evaluate primary candidates.  Above 
I argued this this is accomplished by utilizing ideological signals embedded in racial and 
demographic cues and using them to more precisely locate primary candidates along the 
ideological spectrum within political parties.  Focusing exclusively on easy, categorical 
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information, however, does not resolve the cue conflict problem voters encounter in Republican 
primary elections.  Given the prevailing liberal stereotypes associated with women and racial 
minorities, Republican voters are not likely to prefer counterstereotypical candidates to 
conventional ones when demographic and partisan status are the only pieces of information 
available to them.  How – if at all – can these candidates be electorally viable in primary 
elections?  The answer to this question requires us to move beyond global cue categories like 
race or party and focus on the role of individuating, candidate-specific knowledge in a primary 
context.  I submit that candidates can use this information to establish their ideological identities 
within parties and, once this has occurred, it becomes possible a candidate’s status as 
counterstereotypical to stimulate positive affect stemming from violating information 
expectations.           
 While scholars tend to emphasize categorical-based cue inference in candidate evaluation 
(Bianco 1998; Conover and Feldman 1989; Lodge, Steenbergen, and Brau 1995), approach is not 
sufficient for decision-making in party primaries.  An alternative evaluative route is based on an 
individuating approach in which candidate perception is a function not of categorical stereotypies 
(e.g. Democrats are pro-choice) but instead on specific information obtained about a particular 
candidate (e.g. she is pro-choice).22   In this section, I apply this processing to the primary 
context.  Since conflicting cues only exist in Republican primaries, I look only at Republican 
candidates and voters for the moment.       
22 Much of the early literature on individuating information did not consider demographic conditions.  Riggle et al. 
(1992), for example, study the impact candidate attractiveness, party membership, and voting record (2x2x2 design).  
They find, among other things, that candidate attractiveness has a strong impact on overall candidate evaluations 
when no other information is provided about a candidate, but this effect disappears when individuating partisan or 
ideological information is provided to voters.  Budesheim and DePaola (1994) employ a 2x2 design in which 
physical attractiveness versus personality information are contrasted with either favorable or unfavorable image 
information.  Unlike Riggle et al., they find that physical appearance influence candidate evaluation even when 
individuating personality information is provided. 
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 The key to individuating information within Republican primaries is that it should work 
differently for African American and female candidates than it does for white male candidates.  
African American and female candidates, we have established, send mixed categorical signals 
(Hayes 2011; Sanbonmatsu and Dolan 2009), which represent a cognitive challenge for 
Republican primary voters: which information dominates, the partisan label or the demographic 
cue?  Mcdermott (1997), summarizes the problem well: “because a Republican woman provides 
voters with two competing [categorical] cues, […] voters may not know which cue to give more 
weight” (278).           
 This conundrum implies that these candidates must find a way to signal their ideology to 
voters.  One way candidates may do this is to provide specific information, or individuating 
information, to redirect voters’ attention away from the tension between conflicting group 
categories (partisanship and demographic status).  In general, Individuating information has been 
shown to achieve one of two things: first, it may lead individuals to discard or discount 
categorical cues, as they prefer instead to use more precise individuating information to form 
impressions.  Crawford et al. (2011), for instance, finds that voters increasingly draw on 
individuating information about political candidates as it becomes more relevant to the task of 
rendering judgment.23  As the amount of information to which people are exposed increases, the 
less likely they are to rely on, for instance, gender cues in impression formation (Banducci, 
Everitt, and Gidengil 2002; Chang and Hitchon 2004; Pratto and Bargh 1991).  Arceneaux 
(2008) finds that voters focus on candidates’ individuating policy views rather than their partisan 
status when candidates present conflicting information (e.g. a conservative Democrat).  More 
23 For instance, if a voter is asked about a candidate’s view on stem-cell research, individuating information about 
the candidate’s views on abortion are more likely to be brought to bear than are the candidate’s views about tax 
policy. 
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recently, Boudreau and MacKenzie (2014) show that voters do not blindly follow partisan cues – 
specific policy information can mediate public opinion even when coupled with party labels.  In 
short, as individuating information enters the fray, global categorical cues become less relevant. 
 Alternatively, individuating information can also serve to help voters subtype, using a 
similar process as was introduced in the last section.  Above, subtyping was conceived as 
categorical information – race and gender – modifying other categorical information – party 
labels – thereby allowing voters to ideologically sort candidates within parties and helping them 
identify the differences that allow them to select one primary candidate over others.  That 
process, however, results in cue conflict for one group of candidates – counterstereotypical 
Republicans.  As a result, unlike most applications of individuating information, the mere act of 
subtyping a group of Republican political candidates does not necessary generate more clarity 
for Republican voters.  It may actually complicate the primary picture.    
 To move from complicating to clarifying candidate choice in Republican primary 
elections, I propose a slightly revised variant of individuating information.  In complex political 
environments individuals may be faced with contradictory categorical information.  When only 
categorical information is present, as discussed above, this cue conflict cannot necessarily be 
resolved.  Yet a specific type of individuating information – what we may call scale-tipping 
information – may aid this process.  Scale-tipping information does not merely (1) serve to 
replace categorical cues or (2) help classify candidates within categorical groups, but instead 
provide an ideological signal that has primacy relative to categorical cues that are in conflict.24   
In this way individuals can use scale-tipping information to simplify the evaluation process: 
when categorical cues are in tension, individuating information allows individuals to bypass the 
24 Individuating information more generally can refer to anything specific information that details to voters.  Not all 
such information, though, may help voters tip the scales towards one categorical cue or another. 
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“cue tie” by focusing on more precise, and therefore more relevant, ideological information.    
 Consider an African American candidate running in a Republican primary.  By himself, 
he represents cue conflict, and Republicans may assume he is politically moderate, or struggle to 
classify him at all out due to uncertainty.  However, if he establishes himself as politically 
conservative through individuating policy information, individuals can focus on these specific 
ideological credentials and dismiss the cue conflict.  This accomplishes two important 
objectives: first, uncertainty is reduced, and voters will be less likely to reject the candidate 
because they struggle to infer his ideological proclivities.  Second, individuating information 
provides a clear ideological signal that allows Republican voters to clearly sort this Republican 
along with others. 
 This scale-tipping variant of individuating information, by definition, will apply to 
African American or female Republican candidates, but it will not typically apply to 
conventional white male candidates.  It is counterstereotypical candidates, after all, that present 
conflicting cues, and thus these candidates have more to lose or gain from individuating 
information than others candidates do.  White male Republicans do not represent conflict, and 
therefore individuating policy information, while not irrelevant to voters, should be somewhat 
less relevant when evaluating conventional candidates relative to evaluating female or African 
American politicians.            
 A critical step in this process concerns the ideological direction implied by individuating 
information.  If an African American or female Republican provides individuating information 
that implies a more conservative worldview (say, an anti-tax pledge), voters will reject the liberal 
signal contained in the demographic cue and base their evaluations of the candidates on the 
ideological substance of the tax pledge.  On the other hand, if the candidate is described as 
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holding more moderate or liberal policy views (say, supporting a capital gains tax), this sends a 
different ideological signal and the conservative ideological cue associated with the Republican 
Party label is largely dismissed in lieu of specific information implying ideological moderation.25 
 In short, the concept of scale-tipping information is simple but central to the electoral 
viability of African American, female, or other Republican candidates that present conflicting 
partisan and demographic cues: I propose that categorical cue conflict can be resolved by 
individuating information that compels voters to attribute to candidates the ideology 
corresponding with their policy message rather than the ideology embedded within conflicting 
categorical cues.  In this way I expect that female and African American Republicans, given that 
they provide particular individuating information, will not struggle to earn support relative to 
stereotypical white male candidates.  In other words, when stereotypical and counterstereotypical 
candidates are similar in terms of their policy preferences, the role of demographic cues should 
play little role the impression formation process.  As a result, these counterstereotypical 
candidates are in a position to, in effect, level an electoral playing field that is conventionally 
assumed to work against them. 
Empirically, this discussion establishes several baseline hypotheses.  First, we should 
expect moderate Republicans to prefer ideologically moderate candidates to more conservative 
ones regardless of candidates’ demographic status.  We should similarly expect conservative 
25 This reasoning does not represent the first effort to unpack the individuating puzzle in a political context.  Leonie 
Huddy and Capelos (2002), for instance, study the interaction between partisan labels and candidate traits.  The 
authors rely on a parallel processing model (Kunda and Thagard 1996) that argues individuals may employ multiple 
stereotypes simultaneously.  They find that when individuating trait information is provided, all gender effects 
disappear, and the only significant determinant of respondents’ perceptions of candidate ideology is party labels. 
Hayes (2011) similarly finds that partisan cues dominate demographic ones.  Useful as these studies are, however, 
they do not speak theoretically to primaries where partisan affiliation is the same for all candidates.  Yet, as I have 
argued throughout, this is precisely the electoral environment in which individuating information is most critical for 
voters to distinguish among candidates. 
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Republicans to prefer ideologically conservative candidates to more ideologically moderate ones.  
Formally: 
 
H7: When political candidates provide the same individuating policy 
information,  race and gender will not impact ideological perceptions of 
candidates 
 
H8a: The more ideologically conservative a Republican primary voter, the 
more she will perceive as a conservative Republican primary candidate to be 
ideologically congruent 
 
H8b: The more ideologically conservative a Republican primary voter, the 
less she will perceive as a moderate Republican primary candidate to be 
ideologically congruent 
 
H8c: The more ideologically moderate a Republican primary voter, the less 
she will perceive as a conservative Republican primary candidate to be 
ideologically congruent 
 
H8d: The more ideologically moderate a Republican primary voter, the more 
she will perceive as a moderate Republican primary candidate to be 
ideologically congruent 
 
2.5 EXPECTANCY VIOLATIONS AND POSITIVE AFFECT 
The theoretical discussion thus far submits that individuating information helps candidates signal 
an ideology that can clarify for voters the true ideological nature of the candidate.  This model of 
candidate evaluation is fundamentally an informational one, where various cues provide 
ideological signals that help voters sort and select among primary candidates.  Individuating 
policy information can help neutralize the potentially negative electoral consequences of a 
candidate’s stereotypical status: since uncertainty is an electoral liability, and individuating 
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policy information redirects voters’ attention away from conflicting cues that cause it, this 
information can help level the playing field for unconventional Republican candidates.  
 Even if voters focus on individuating information while largely discarding categorical 
information, however, this does not preclude entirely the potential for race and gender to 
condition evaluations in an affective sense.  After all, voters do not simply forget the race, 
gender, or party of any given candidate they evaluate, even in the presence of individuating 
information.  Instead, we should expect those cues are relegated to secondary status as voters 
focus on the more precise policy information.  This creates a curious condition where female or 
African American Republicans can close the electoral gap between themselves and white male 
Republican candidates via individuating information, but their counterstereotypical status 
remains accessible to voters.           
 When this happens, a candidate’s status as counterstereotypical may ultimately be an 
electoral asset in an affective sense.  As noted above, individuals find conflicting information 
startling – preconceived notions about some object are no longer clearly applicable.  When this 
equilibrium is disrupted, individuals are much more prone to update their views of that object 
since initial impressions are questionable given the conflicting information.  Yet what kind of 
updating occurs?  My answer draws from psychological literature on attribution theory and 
expectancy violations, which proposes that individuals will lend more credence and legitimacy to 
political candidates who do not conform to expectations.  When a message’s content can be 
explained by attributes of the source (for instance, self-interest), then the message has little or no 
capacity to affect the recipient’s attitudes because no new information is provided (Cizmar and 
Layman 2009; Crawford et al. 2011).  Unanticipated messages, on the other hand, are more 
powerful.  Since they confound expectations, they compel recipients to focus more on the 
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substance of the information as well as render the messenger more authentic (Walster, Aronson, 
and Abrahams 1966).          
 In a political context, this phenomenon can both increase the persuasiveness of 
information as well as increase positive affect for the messenger (Bergan 2012; Eagly, Wood, 
and Chaiken 1978).  Bullock (2011) demonstrates that Republicans find arguments more 
persuasive when Democrats oppose a stereotypical Democratic policy view (expanding 
healthcare benefits) than when Democrats support it.  Hayes (2005) finds that candidates whom 
voters perceive to possess counterstereotypical qualities (like a Republican candidate viewed as 
compassionate) can increase their appeal to voters26.   Schneider (forthcoming) finds that male 
and female candidates that emphasize political policies not associated with their gender (e.g. a 
male candidate who mentions that education is a priority for him) improve their perceived levels 
of competency overall.  African American and female Republicans, therefore, may not only be 
able to use individuating policy information to neutralize any detrimental effects of race and 
gender, but may also generate positive affect via their counterstereotypical status.   
 This discussion implies a final theoretical point in which an affective component is 
introduction to the baseline information model.  If we take as given that (1) cue conflict is 
resolved, or at least downgraded, when candidates introduce individuating policy information, 
and that (2) individuals still recognize demographic cues even when individuating policy 
information is provided, and, finally, that (3) counterstereotypical messages can activate among 
its recipients positive affect for the messenger, it is plausible that female or African American 
candidates may not only level the electoral playing field, but may even tip it somewhat in their 
favor.            
26 In the 2000 presidential election, George W. Bush’s attempted to bill himself as a “compassionate conservative” 
for this very reason. 
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 Since individuating policy information is expected to exhibit primacy over categorical 
demographic and partisan information, any positive affect resulting from counterstereotypical 
status should be secondary to ideological considerations.  Thus, any affective benefits should 
occur principally after an ideological identity has been established.  In other words, 
counterstereotypical and ideologically moderate Republicans may enjoy positive affective gain 
(relative to ideologically moderate white males) among ideologically moderate Republican 
voters.  At the same time, within the population of ideologically conservative candidates, female 
and African American Republicans may enjoy more positive affect among conservative 
Republicans than would equally conservative stereotypical candidate.  In other words, given that 
an ideological identity is established, counterstereotypical status may activate positive affect 
among voters within that ideological group of voters.  Formally: 
 
H9a: The more ideologically conservative a Republican primary voter, the 
more she will support African American or female conservative candidates  
relative to white male conservative candidates 
 
H9b: The more ideologically conservative a Republican primary voter, the 
more she will perceive African American or female conservative candidates 
to be good representatives relative to white male conservative candidates 
 
H9c: The more ideologically moderate a Republican primary voter, the more 
she will support African American or female moderate candidates relative to 
white male moderate candidates 
 
H9d: The more ideologically conservative a Republican primary voter, the 
more she will perceive African American or female moderate candidates to 
be good representatives relative to white male moderate candidates 
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2.5.1 Policy Information and Democratic Party Choice 
The Democratic Party has not surfaced in the previous discussion on scale-tipping information, 
and with good reason: the absence of conflicting cues among Democratic candidates in effect 
means that voters face considerably less uncertainty across different demographic types of 
candidates.  At the same time, there are no counterstereotypical candidates to violate 
expectations and capitalize electorally as a result.  Empirical expectations for Democrats, then, 
are considerably more simple than they are for Republicans.  Race and gender should have 
limited effect on evaluations of Democratic primary candidates; instead, preferences should be 
formed solely on the basis of the ideological nature of candidates’ policy messages.  More 
ideologically moderate Democrats should prefer moderate candidates – of any demographic 
status – and more liberal Democrats should prefer the more liberal candidate regardless of 
demographic status.  Or, more formally: 
 
H10: Ideologically moderate Democrats should prefer ideologically moderate 
candidates to ideologically liberal candidates, but will not support one 
demographic  type of ideologically moderate group over any other 
 
H11: More liberal Democrats will prefer liberal candidates to ideologically 
moderate candidates, but will not support one demographic type of liberal 
group over any other 
2.6 SUMMARY AND LOOKING AHEAD 
This chapter began by reviewing the extant work on demographic cues as activators of 
stereotypes about men and women of different races, with a particular emphasis on ideology.  
After establishing a set of common set of assumptions that guide the theoretical and empirical 
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substance of the project, I develop theoretical models related to the role of demographic and 
policy cues in the candidate evaluation process.  Given the persistence of ideological associations 
with race and gender, I submit that when only categorical (easy) information about partisanship 
and demographic status is available to primary voters, they will integrate the two in their 
evaluation of candidate ideology.  From here, the degree to which primary voters express 
favorability towards different candidates should be a function of how they perceive candidates 
relative to their own political views.  The more the two sets of views align, the higher the levels 
of favorability.          
 The second part of the theory returns to the question of cue conflict in the Republican 
Party and how it may be resolved.  I posit that since individuating (hard) information is more 
precise, it should overwhelm any categorical cue conflict as voters are drawn principally to the 
ideological substance of candidates’ messages.  In this way, historically-underrepresented 
candidate groups – the same ones the extant political science literature suggests are at an inherent 
electoral disadvantage – should be able to level the electoral playing field and achieve parity 
with conventional white male Republican candidates.  Finally, I discuss the process of evaluating 
counterstereotypical candidates as potentially activating positive affect for candidates once they 
have established ideological identities among the electorate.  In the next chapters, I develop and 
test two survey experiments to explore these theoretical expectations. 
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3.0  CHAPTER THREE: METHODS AND DATA 
The preceding chapters established two related challenges: first, the problem the Republican 
Party faces in diversifying its voter base and, second, the academic puzzle of how voters will 
evaluate counterstereotypical Republican candidates given that the political science literature 
would suggest these candidates suffer from their demographic status and the psychology 
literature implies they may benefit from it.  The second chapter explores these issues in the 
unique context of party primary elections – which candidates must win in order to run in the fall 
– and develops two models of voter behavior.  First, the additive spatial reasoning model argues
that voters will use race and gender to sort candidates within parties’ ideological planes and 
identify the best representative of their interests.  Second, a variant of individuating information 
– scale-tipping information – reasons that candidates can resolve cue conflict for voters by
indicating which category is more relevant in the evaluation process.  Counterstereotypical 
candidates who can tip the scales are expected to level, and even reverse, the electoral playing 
field.  
3.1 INVESTIGATION STRATEGY 
To explore these issues empirically, I develop and administer two original survey experiments 
administered online using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform.  This hybrid methodology 
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embeds a randomly assigned treatment into a survey administered to a sample of U.S. adults.  
This approach, in theory, allows scholars to exploit the internal validity of experimentation via 
random assignment with the external validity surveys offer by sampling from the overall 
population.  Problems of artificiality, cost, and sample selection posed by experiments can be 
blunted (though not eliminated), as can the challenge of causal inference inherent in cross-
sectional survey analysis.  This approach is also especially well-suited for analysis of specialized 
subgroups in the overall population (Mutz 2011), which any study of political primaries 
necessarily entails.  Ultimately, as Lavine (2002, 242) put it, “survey experiments that integrate 
representative samples with the experimental control of questions represent the most valuable 
tool for gaining access to the processes that underlie opinion formation.”27   Not surprisingly, 
scholars have increasingly relied on this approach in public opinion research (e.g. Berinsky 
2007; Druckman and Leeper 2012; Sniderman and Theriault 2004; Tesler 2012; Turgeon 2009). 
 The two survey experiments developed below differ fundamentally in the nature of the 
information about candidates available to primary voters.  Study 1, which we may refer to as the 
low-information study, manipulates the race and gender of candidates while the political 
messages they provide to voters are both constant and ideologically neutral.  This allows tests of 
the additive spatial reasoning model where voters are expected to use race and gender to sort 
their primary options.  Study 2, the high-information study, manipulates race, gender, as well as 
policy messages.  Candidates will provide primary voters with either ideologically moderate or 
ideologically extreme (conservative for Republicans, liberal for Democrats) messages.  In both 
studies, analysis will focus on how voters evaluate candidates within their own party in a primary 
27 But see Barabas and Jerit (2010) and Gaines, Kuklinski, and Quirk (2007) who offer important qualifications 
concerning the survey experiment approach. 
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election context.  Before formalizing the two studies, however, an important discussion on the 
sample of voters and validation of their responses is in order. 
3.2 PARTICIPANT RECRUITMENT AND VALIDATION OF RESPONSES 
As noted above, two survey experiments are administered through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
(M-Turk) program.28   This online platform allows scholars to can create assignments (known as 
Human Intelligence Tasks, or HITs) and post them on the M-Turk server.  HITs are accessible by 
individuals, known as “Turkers” who have signed up to participate in the program and select 
from the thousands of HITs available at any given moment.  “Turkers,” who currently number 
roughly 100,000, come from all walks of life and are located around the world (Pontin 2007), 
although I limit these studies only to American respondents.29   The surveys themselves were 
designed by me using software developed by Qualtrics (a survey research company) and were 
subsequently administered through Qualtrics online.  HITs were posted on M-Turk containing a 
description of the study as well as a hyperlink that took respondents to a Qualtrics webpage 
where the survey was posted.  The description informed subjects that they would take part in a 
“short survey [that] involves providing your opinions towards politics and society in America 
today.”  Subjects were paid $0.60 and $0.69 for the first and second surveys, respectively, for 
participating in one of the two HITS.30          
 The M-Turk platform has become an increasingly popular method for political scientists 
28 Institutional Review Board documents are available in Appendix B. 
29 This is done through verification of the respondent’s location based on ISP address. 
30 The second study was slightly longer than the first, and thus the pay rate was marginally higher. 
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seeking to improve sample quality over conventional pools of college students while at the same 
time minimizing research costs (Mason and Suri 2012; Paolacci, Chandler, and Stern 2010).  A 
wealth of research has been undertaken in recent years to assess the validity and utility of M-
Turk as a recruitment method for social science research that helps overcome the well-
documented biases endemic to traditional college student samples (Sears 1986; Druckman and 
Kam 2011) or other populations representing small, unrepresentative sectors of society (Henrich, 
Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010).  On the whole, scholars find that M-Turk samples are at least as 
diverse – if not more representative – of the population when compared to other methods for 
recruiting experimental/survey participants, particularly when contrasted with college student 
samples (Buhrmester, Kwang, and Gosling 2011).31       
 Testing the external validity of M-Turk typically takes on one of two forms.  First, 
scholars compare descriptive statistics of Turkers with respondents from traditional survey 
methods.  Burmester, Kwang, and Gosling (2011) compare data collected from an M-Turk 
sample with statistics drawn from Gosling et al.’s (2004) Internet-based survey, concluding that  
“MTurk participants were more demographically diverse than standard Internet samples and 
significantly more diverse than typical American college samples.”   Berinsky, Huber and Lenz 
(2012) engage in a more exhaustive effort, comparing the measured characteristics of an M-Turk 
sample to three other types of samples: first, convenience samples used in political science 
research in three leading journals (American Political Science Review, American Journal of 
Political Science, and Journal of Politics); second, an Internet panel survey; and, third, a 
31 Not all studies reach precisely the same conclusion.  Berinsky, Huber and Lenz (2012), for instance, show that M-
Turk improves upon convenience samples but does not quite reach the same level of representativeness as do 
Internet-based panels or national probability samples.  They conclude that “All told, […] the MTurk sample does not 
perfectly match the demographic and attitudinal characteristics of the U.S. population but does not present a wildly 
distorted view of the U.S. population either” 
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probability sample of U.S. adults.  They find that the M-Turk sample “fares well” in comparison 
to convenience samples, and even improves in key areas like Democratic Party identification 
skew (355).  Similarly, compared to the Internet survey (The 2008-09 American National 
Election Panel Study (ANESP) administered by Knowledge Networks), M-Turk provides very 
similar results when it comes to characteristics of the measured population.32  Critically, on key 
political and psychological measures, the M-Turk sample is “more similar to the nationally 
representative samples than is the ANESP” (359).33  Turkers on the whole are somewhat more 
Democratic and liberal in their partisan and ideological orientations, respectively.34   
 Table 2 compares the descriptive statistics of my sample with those of a nationally 
representative sample collected by the Pew Research Center in 2014.  As the table illustrates, the 
M-Turk samples differ from the Pew sample in several ways.  Consistent with other reviews of 
the Turker pool, the two studies here are comprised of individuals that are somewhat younger 
and more education than a nationally representative sample.  Some of the differences, though, 
are not necessarily problematic.  For instance, while white respondents are overrepresented in the 
M-Turk studies, my principal focus is on the Republican Party, which itself is overwhelmingly 
white.  It is fair to conclude, then, that like other M-Turk samples those here do not constitute a 
perfectly representative cross-section of Americans.  Still, it improves upon some other 
collection methods.  Furthermore, since my focus is on micro-level evaluative processes 
(occurring within political parties) and not, say, aggregate public opinion or individual-level 
processes across racial minority groups, the absence of perfect representation is not as troubling.  
32 There are some differences, mainly those related to major life cycle events.  Turkers, for instance, are less likely to 
be married or own a home. 
33 The M-Turk and ANESP samples were also compared to nationally representative face-to-face samples collected 
by the ANES and CPS. 
34 This issue is not a concern for me because all respondents were blocked by party upon accepting the HIT.  I set a 
quota for Democrats and Republicans alike and, consistent with these findings, my Democratic quota was reached 
more quickly than my Republican quota. 
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Nevertheless, it is important to recognize the bounds of any particular dataset, and the studies 
conducted here have their limits like any other design. 
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 Table 2: Summary Statistics of Studies Compared to Recent National Sample 
 
 Study 1 Study 2* PEW** 
Trait/Attribute  
Percent Democrats 27.05 52.97 47.90 
Percent Republicans 23.33 47.03 36.81 
Percent Female 51.33 51.63 49.50 
Percent White 78.67 80.47 60.59 
Percent Black 9.05 8.19 12.89 
Percent Hispanic 4.86 4.56 17.98 
Age Range (%) 
18-29 (35.81) 
 
30-49 (44.57) 
 
50-64 (17.62) 
 
65+ (2.00) 
18-29 (38.94) 
 
30-49 (40.99) 
 
50-64 (17.00) 
 
65+ (3.07) 
18-29 (17.53) 
 
30-49 (25.72) 
 
50-64 (30.45) 
 
65+ (24.78) 
States represented 49 plus D.C. (North Dakota missing) 
47 plus D.C. 
(Alaska, South 
Dakota, Vermont 
missing) 
50 plus D.C 
Education Level (%) 
High School or less 
(12.95) 
 
Some College 
(23.90) 
 
College Graduate or 
More (51.52) 
High School or less 
(11.91) 
 
Some College 
(37.77) 
 
College Graduate or 
More (50.7) 
High School or less 
(34.87) 
 
Some College 
(20.08) 
 
College Graduate or 
More (40.61) 
Total Participants 1,050 1,076 2,002 
 
* Note: Non-partisans and independent voters were not eligible to participate in Study 2; this affects the 
summary statistics for this survey experiment, most notably by inflating the percentage of Democrats and 
Republicans in the sample. 
 
** Pew Research included respondents who “lean” Democratic or Republican as partisans. 
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 The second approach to ensure M-Turk’s validity is to replicate previous studies that do 
not use M-Turk and compare the results of the two approaches.  Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz 
(2012) use M-Turk samples to replicate three experiments: first, Raskinski’s (1989) classic 
question wording study of welfare attitudes; second, Tversky and Kahneman’s (1981) framing 
experiment concerning an “Asian Disease Problem;” and, third, Kam and Simas’ (2010) study on 
risk preference and framing effects.  In all three cases, the authors conclude, “the experimental 
results found using the MTurk sample are highly similar to those found in published research” 
(361).  Given that I embed experimental treatments within the surveys administered as part of 
this project, it is particularly encouraging that these tests demonstrate “MTurk subjects appear to 
respond to experimental stimuli in a manner consistent with prior research” (366).   
 Despite the research validating the M-Turk method, however, some questions about 
generalizability remain.35  A critical step to ensuring sample validity is to set qualification 
parameters on individual HITS (Chandler, Mueller, and Paolacci 2014).  Numerous steps were 
taken to ensure the sample for both surveys consisted of genuine, attentive partisans who were 
not simply advancing quickly through the survey just to achieve payment.  First, only Turkers 
with a 90% HIT approval rating or better – meaning that previous requesters were satisfied with 
the quality of their work and paid them at least 9 out of every 10 tasks Turkers attempted – were 
allowed to participate.  Second, only subjects with a minimum of 500 approved tasks to their 
credit qualified to complete the task.  Third, subjects were strictly prohibited from participating 
more than once, and participants in one study were not eligible to participate in the other 
35 For instance, in the United States, Asians are overrepresented while African American and Hispanic indivduals 
are underrepresented relative (Berinsky et al., 2012).  Turkers also tend to be more socially anxious (Shapiro et al., 
2013) and less extraverted than college-student samples (Goodman, Cryder, & Cheema, 2013; Kosara & 
Ziemkiewicz, 2010). 
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experiment.36  Since every user has a unique identification code, I was able to identify any repeat 
attempts and discard them.  Similarly, some potential respondents who did not initially qualify as 
eligible because they did not identify as partisan attempted to take the survey again, successfully 
surmising (or guessing) that changing their partisan affiliation may get them access to the task.  I 
monitored the IP addresses of all participants, and in instances where multiple entries were 
logged from the same location in rapid succession I flagged the qualifying (second) submission 
and deleted it from the final data set.37          
 Validation efforts were also embedded within the surveys themselves.  A series of 
preliminary questions were used to determine a potential subject’s eligibility.  Only Turkers 
affirming they were (1) American citizens, (2) 18 years of age or older, and (3) members of a 
major party (Democratic or Republican) were allowed to participate.38   Those who met these 
standards were allowed to complete the survey.  Unseen to respondents, an electronic timer 
tracked how much time was spent on each question on the survey.  Entries in which a participant 
spent less than 7 seconds on the page in Study 1 or 10 seconds on the page in Study 2 describing 
the political candidate (the direct treatment) were discarded because it is unlikely that the 
36 Despite the inclusion of a list of Turkers who had already participated in the first study listed in the prompt for the 
second with a warning to check to make sure they were not on the list, a handful of Turkers attempted to take both 
surveys.  Repeated attempted were flagged and discarded.  It is also possible, however, for individuals to open 
multiple M-Turk accounts and repeat surveys in this fashion, although this violates Amazon’s user agreement with 
Turkers.  By monitoring ISP addresses and the timing of survey submissions, this issue can be mitigated but not 
completely prevented. 
37 Only 20 entries from over 1,000 total Democratic and Republican subjects were discarded in this way.  It should 
be noted also that it is technically possible for two legitimate entries (one ineligible and one eligible) to come from 
the same location in quick succession – for instance, two college roommates make share a computer to complete 
MTurk tasks – it is highly unlikely.  There were also a few instances where multiple entries from different user IDs 
came from the same IP address but spread out over several days.  I keep these cases since they do not appear to 
represent someone attempting to game the system in one sitting.  It is far more plausible in these cases that separate 
users simply used a common computer. 
38 For Study 1, I elected to allow independent and non-partisan respondents to participate, as well, to see if the 
additive spatial reasoning model applied to persons who do not share in-group status with the candidates in question.  
Since it would be prohibitively expensive to do the same in the high-information design, only partisans participated 
in Study 2. 
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participant was closely reading the material.  In addition, at the end of the survey, several 
minutes after the treatment had been applied, respondents were asked via open-ended question to 
recall what they could remember about the candidate they evaluated earlier in the survey.  
Respondents who referenced the specific information from the treatment page – the candidate’s 
race, gender, party, policy priorities, and/or (in Study 2) ideological orientation (e.g. “He was 
very conservative”), were retained for analysis. 
3.2.1 Subject Assignment 
Respondents that qualified to participate in the studies were asked to read about and evaluate a 
candidate running in their own party’s primary.   For Study 1, since subjects reported their 
partisan affiliation in the preliminary questionnaire, they were blocked into Democrats and 
Republicans, respectively, and then randomly assigned to one of four candidates: a white male, a 
white female, an African American male, or a candidate with no demographic information.  This 
results in two separate 3 x 3 partial factorial designs – one for each party – containing four 
treatment cells and five empty cells.  A summary of this design is depicted in Table 3.  A total of 
512 respondents participated in the first study.  Figure 6 presents the distribution of respondents 
across the treatment conditions.39 
 
 
 
 
39 On the whole, since Turkers tend to be more Democratic than the population as a whole there are typically more 
Democratic respondents than Republicans respondents. 
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Table 3: Description of Study 1 Treatment Conditions 
 
 
Factor 2: Demographic 
None 
(control) White 
African 
American 
Factor 1: 
Gender 
None 
(control) Yes No No 
Male No Yes Yes 
Female No Yes No 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Assignment of Subjects in Study 1 
 
In the second study, partisans are again sorted into their respective party groups; this 
time, however, they are subsequently randomly assigned to read about one of eight candidates 
resulting from a 2 x 4 factorial design where the first factor is ideological tone of the message 
All Democrats n  n All Republicans 
 
70 White male 55 
 
70 White female 54 
72 African American Male 61 
72 No demographic trait 54 
Total 284  224 Total 
Randomly 
assigned to: 
Randomly 
assigned to: 
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(moderate versus extreme) and the second factor is the four demographic conditions noted above.  
Table 4 presents this design and Figure 7 summarizes the distribution of participants across 
treatment groups. 
 
Table 4: Description of Study 2 Treatment Conditions 
 
 
Factor 2: Demographic 
None 
(control) White Female 
African 
American 
Factor 1: 
Ideology 
Ideologically 
Moderate Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ideologically 
Extreme Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Candidate n Republicans Democrats n Candidate 
Moderate White 
male 51 
  
63 Moderate White male 
Moderate White 
female 50 73 
Moderate White 
female 
Moderate African 
American Male 51 70 
Moderate African 
American Male 
Moderate  
(No demographic 
trait) 
61 70 
Moderate  
(No demographic 
trait) 
Conservative 
White male 57 73 
Liberal White 
male 
Conservative 
White female 59 77 
Liberal White 
female 
Conservative 
African American 
Male 
53 67 Liberal African American Male 
Conservative (No 
demographic trait) 57 77 
Liberal (No 
demographic trait) 
Total subjects 439  570 Total subjects 
 
Figure 7: Assignment of Subjects in Study 2 
3.3 EXPERIMENTAL TREATMENT 
3.3.1 Manipulating Demographic Cues 
The manipulation of race and gender in both survey experiments was achieved by providing a 
picture of a white male, white female, a African American male candidate, or no picture at all.  
Pictures were used instead of other cues like a text box containing candidate demographic 
information to help ensure that respondents clearly associated a person with the message they 
Randomly 
assigned   
to: 
Randomly 
assigned   
to: 
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were reading.  However, to guard against the possibility that results are artifacts of the specific 
pictures in the study, I utilized photographs that had been pretested and found not to vary in 
terms of perceptions of candidate traits.         
 Thirty-seven undergraduates completed a short study (for course credit) in which they 
evaluated a series of candidates (six white males, six African American males, six white females, 
and six African American females) on a series of traits drawn from Todorov et al.'s (2005) study 
of candidate inference (these included: attractiveness, competence, likability, empathy, 
familiarity, willingness to vote for the candidate, typicality, and age).  No ideological or partisan 
information was provided to the respondents.  Each student was presented each picture (in a 
random order) and was asked to rate the individual on the traits above using Likert scales placed 
below the photograph.  Researchers subsequently paired sets of pictures with similar overall rates 
and conducted difference of means tests to ensure that the two candidates were not perceived to 
differ significantly in terms of traits. 
Since racial and gender stereotypes are, as discussed in the previous chapter, related to 
many traits like those used in this pretest, utilizing photographs of different racial and gender 
groups that do not vary in terms of trait attribution will actually bias the sample against finding 
race and gender effects.  That is, particular photos were found not to vary in terms of trait 
perception across white male, female, or African American candidates.  As a result, I am 
effectively utilizing photographs which activate fairly “mild” or moderate sentiments when it 
comes to personal traits.  This represents a potential drawback to this design, but since it is a 
more conservative approach, I opt to use it in these survey experiments. 
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3.3.2 Manipulating Policy Information 
The two studies differed fundamentally in the nature of the policy information available to 
primary voters.  In the low-information experiment, voters were given limited information about 
candidates’ policy views.  All candidates, regardless of party or race, provided the same generic 
policy message, tailored so as to not send an ideological signal: 
 
"I am running to be the nominee for the [Democratic/Republican] Party in the 2016 
general election.  I am running because I believe in America and want to do my part to 
help Americans thrive more than they ever have before.  I pledge that I will work 
tirelessly to achieve important goals like providing a quality education for our children, 
stimulating a strong economy, and keeping our streets safe for our citizens." 
 
 
In the second study, respondents were randomly assigned to read one of two policy 
messages, either a moderate message, which was the same for both parties, or an ideologically 
extreme message, which for Democrats was liberal in tone and for Republicans was conservative 
in tone.  Republican individuals, of course, evaluated either moderate or conservative candidates, 
while Democrats only evaluated moderate or liberal candidates.  Since these studies attempt to 
simulate decision-making in a primary context, liberal Republicans and conservative Democrats 
are not included because they are not especially plausible candidates (today).  Table 5 present 
the policy messages used in Study 2. 
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Table 5: Experimental Treatments Used in Study 2 
 
 Moderate Liberal Conservative 
As a life-long public servant, I 
have always believed that our 
job in government is to 
provide basic services to the 
people so that they may be 
able to pursue the American 
Dream. 
 
I will work to make sure that 
our economy is strong and 
citizens have jobs, that our 
country is safe and protected, 
and that our children all have 
access to a quality education. 
 
The best way to achieve these 
goals is for everyone in 
government to come together 
and pursue reasonable, 
balanced public policy 
through compromise.  The best 
public policy is made by 
taking the best ideas from both 
parties.” 
"As a life-long progressive, I 
have always believed that our 
job in government is to 
provide important services to 
the people to help ensure that 
everyone has what they need 
to pursue the American 
Dream. 
 
I will work to make sure that 
the government maintains a 
reasonable amount of control 
over the economy so we can 
ensure that people from all 
walks of life can find good 
jobs.  I will work to protect 
American citizens by 
supporting diplomatic 
solutions to the challenges 
our world faces in order to 
prevent conflict.  I will see 
that our children get the best 
education possible by 
supporting teachers and 
additional education spending 
in our classrooms so everyone 
has the resources they need to 
succeed.  The best public 
policy is made by committing 
to core progressive ideals.  As 
your candidate, I promise to 
do just that." 
“As a life-long conservative, 
I have always believed that 
our job in government is to 
provide a few basic services 
to the public and otherwise 
stay out of the way so that 
everyone may be free to 
pursue the American Dream. 
 
I will work to make sure that 
the economy is free so that 
businesses can compete and 
grow and produce jobs.  I 
will work to protect 
American citizens by 
ensuring that our military is 
the strongest in the world so 
it can protect our citizens.  I 
will see that our children get 
the best education possible 
by supporting school voucher 
programs and reducing the 
negative influence of teachers 
unions so that school 
leadership is returned to the 
local level where it belongs.  
The best public policy is 
made by committing to core 
conservative ideals.  As your 
candidate, I promise to do 
just that. 
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3.4 KEY DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
The hypotheses above reference primary voters evaluating candidates based on concepts like 
“appeal” and “preferences.”  More concrete measures of affect and support are necessary for 
these studies.  Consequently, after evaluating a political candidate, respondents in both surveys 
were asked to respond to three key questions.  First, partisans located the candidate on a seven-
point Likert scale running from “Very liberal” to “Very conservative.”  They also indicated the 
degree to which they agreed with the statements that (1) they would support the candidate in an 
election and (2) that, if elected, the candidate would support the interests of people like 
themselves.  For both questions, a seven-point scale was employed (“Strongly Disagree” to 
“Strongly Agree”).  The ideology measure will accomplish two goals; first, it will serve as a 
manipulation check on the policy information.  Second, it will allow me to speak to the broader 
literature that has focused exclusively in perceptions of candidate ideology.  The latter two 
measures, on the other hand, are designed to look beyond perceptions of candidates to see how 
those impressions influence electoral behavior.  Table 6 presents the three dependent variables. 
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Table 6: Primary Dependent Variables 
 
Dependent Variable Question posed to Respondent Scale 
Perception of 
Candidate’s Ideology 
Which of the following do 
you think best describes this 
candidate's political 
ideology? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very  
liberal 
 Very 
Conservative 
 
Voter’s Willingness to 
Support Candidate 
I would support this 
candidate as the 
[Democratic/Republican] 
Party's nominee in the fall 
general election. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Strongly 
Agree 
 
Voter’s Belief that 
Candidate Would 
Represent His/Her 
Interests 
If elected, this candidate 
would support the interests 
of people like me. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
3.5 OTHER VARIABLES 
A variety of ancillary measures are included in both Study 1 and Study 2.  A full variable index 
is included in Appendix A.  They may be summarized here into two types of variables: 
1) Demographic/personal: includes questions affirming/concerning citizenship 
status, state of residence, religious affiliation, marriage status, overall interest in politics, 
media consumption, race/ethnicity, education level, gender, income 
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2) Political views/status: partisanship, partisan type (weak/strong), self-identified 
ideology, feeling thermometers for both major parties and the Tea Party, a measure of 
feelings towards President Obama, voting history 
3) Measures/scales of latent racism/sexism: Questions concerning latent sexism are 
inspired by the Sexist Attitudes Towards Women Scale (SATWS) (Benson and Vincent 
1980), the Modern Sexism Scale (Swim, et al. 1995), and the Ambient Sexism Inventory 
(Glick and Fiske 1996).  A series of questions to address latent racism are drawn from 
(Feldman and Huddy 2010). 
4) Knowledge scale: consists of four questions which create an additive scale to 
serve as a proxy for political knowledge.  The number of correct answers (0 to 4) will 
serve as an index of political sophistication.  This method follows Delli-Carpini and 
Keeter (1996) and Gomez and Wilson (2001) among others. 
3.6 SUMMARY 
This chapter has discussed methodology and design of the two survey experiments that constitute 
the empirical tests of the theory developed in the previous chapter.  Efforts were made to select 
an appropriate method for the theoretical questions of interest, and steps were taken to validate 
the survey sample as much as possible.  In the next two chapters, I present and discuss the results 
of Studies 1 and 2, respectively. 
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4.0  CHAPTER FOUR: LOW-INFORMATION CONTEXT 
The first empirical study assesses the candidate evaluation process in a low-information 
environment in which only categorical information (demographic status and party affiliation) 
about candidates is known.  The theory above posits that voters are apt to use the ideological 
cues embedded in categorical labels (e.g. white male ⟶ conservative) to sort primary candidates 
from one another.  From here, it is the voters’ own ideological dispositions that are expected to 
influence their candidate judgments.  The results, however, are mixed.  They suggest that party 
cues may be more dominant than the theory above suggests.  Indeed, it does not appear that there 
is much sorting of candidates within parties, even when those candidates hold demographic cues 
that contain ideological signals.  
In the following pages I document the study in detail and draw conclusions about the 
consequence of race and gender in low-information electoral environments.  First, I present 
summary statistics of Republicans and Democrats and discuss the ideological distribution of 
partisans within those groups.  This includes a brief discussion contrasting ideologues and 
partisans and how both are subdivided for empirical purposes.  I next introduce the empirical 
strategy, which begins by looking at demographic cues’ effects on ideological perceptions and 
then transitions to discussing attitudinal measures. 
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4.1 DEFINING AND CONTRASTING IDEOLOGUES AND PARTISANS 
Although there is a robust correlation between a voter’s ideology and the strength of her 
partisanship, the concepts are not analogous.  The former refers to a set of ideas and beliefs that 
shape a person’s view of the political world, and the latter concerns the nature of person’s 
identification and association with a political party.  In the analysis below my principal focus is 
on ideological subgroups within parties because in primaries partisanship is constant and 
ideological cues are expected to be the main basis by which voters sort candidates.  
 Measures of ideology and partisanship are straightforward.  Individuals were initially 
asked the following question: Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a 
Republican, a Democrat, an  independent or what?  This facilitated initial sorting into partisan 
groups.  Respondents were later asked to indicate their political ideology using a standard seven-
point scale: When it comes to politics, how would you describe yourself […] as liberal, 
conservative, or neither liberal nor conservative?  Respondents could select one of the 
following: (1) “Very liberal,” (2) “Somewhat liberal,” (3) “Closer to liberal,” (4) “Neither liberal 
nor conservative,” (5) “Closer to conservatives,” (6) “Somewhat conservative,” or (7) “Very 
conservative.”  As Table 7 and Figure 8 show, and as we should expect, the distribution of 
ideologues is different across the parties, with very few strong partisans reporting strong 
ideological dispositions in the opposite direction.40   
 
 
 
40 In the course of cleaning the data, I dropped cases when a strong Republican reported a “very liberal” ideology 
(n=1) or a strong Democrat reported a “very conservative” ideology (n=4). 
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Table 7: Ideological and Partisan Distribution of Study 1 Participants 
 
 Democrats (Overall) 
Weak 
Democrats 
Strong 
Democrats 
Republicans 
Overall 
Weak 
Republicans 
Strong 
Republicans 
Mean ideology 
(SD) 2.18 (1.09) 2.70 (1.05) 1.72 (1.04) 5.55 (1.18) 5.07 (1.12) 6.43 (0.69) 
 
Percent “Very 
liberal” (n) 30.08 (80) 10.14 (14) 51.56 (66) 0.45 (1) 0.69 (1) 0 (0) 
Percent “Somewhat 
liberal” (n) 36.09 (96) 35.51 (49) 36.72 (47) 1.79 (4) 2.78 (4) 0 (0) 
Percent “Closer to 
liberal” (n) 21.43 (57) 35.51 (49) 6.25 (8) 4.91 (11) 7.64 (11) 0 (0) 
Percent “Neither 
liberal nor 
conservative” (n) 
7.14 (19) 12.32 (17) 1.56 (2) 5.36 (12) 7.64 (11) 1.25 (1) 
Percent “Closer to 
conservative” (n) 3.76 (10) 5.80 (8) 1.56 (2) 31.70 (71) 45.14 (65) 7.50 (6) 
Percent “Somewhat 
conservative” (n) 1.50 (4) 0.72 (1) 2.34 (3) 33.93 (76) 31.25 (45) 38.75 (31) 
Percent “Very 
conservative” (n) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 21.88 (49) 4.86 (7) 52.50 (42) 
Total n 266 138 128 224 144 80 
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 Figure 8: Ideological and Partisan Distribution of Study 1 Participants 
4.2 CANDIDATE EVALUATIONS: REPUBLICANS 
4.2.1 Perceived Ideology: Republicans 
The analysis begins with a very basic question: do Republican voters perceive ideological 
differences across different types of candidates?  The answer begins by plotting the perceived 
ideological location of each Republican candidates and testing to see if there are significant 
differences among them.  Figure 9 presents a graphical representation of the average ideological 
score for each type of candidate, along with the average Republican (note: not to scale).  As 
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expected the African American candidate is perceived as more liberal than the white male, but, 
contrary to expectations, the female candidate is viewed as slightly more conservative than the 
white male.  The Republicans, on average, perceive themselves to be more conservative than any 
type of candidate.41           
 These values are compared using one-way ANOVA to determine if the differences are 
statistically significant and the results indicate that they are not (F = 1.15, Prob > F = 0.33).  
Contrary to Hypothesis 2, Republicans do not perceive an ideological difference between 
stereotypical and counterstereotypical candidates.  This finding stands in stark contrast to much 
of the conventional wisdom on ideological stereotypes.  In this instance, the evidence suggests 
that voters do not impose an “ideological penalty” on female or African American Republican 
candidates, after all.  They are ideologically perceived to be similar to their stereotypical 
counterparts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41 Following the experiments in this project, I use the results to calculate the statistical power for each experimental 
condition.  The results vary considerably, as some conditions generate group values very close to the sample mean, 
while others are much more distinct.  For instance, in Study 1 sample power ranges from 5% for white Republican 
males to 81% for African American Republican males on the perceived candidate ideology variable.  Given that 
there was little variation about the overall group mean for some of the test groups, particularly white males in 
Republican conditions, lower-than-ideal statistical power levels were occasionally achieved.  For female and African 
Americans in the Republican Party, higher levels of power were achieved, often exceeding 80%.  The distribution of 
overall group and treatment condition test values in this project suggest that the research will benefit from additional 
analysis with a larger and more representative population in future iterations. 
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Figure 9: Perceived Ideological Location of Republican Candidates 
  
 To more deeply probe the issue of ideological perceptions, I assess what factors condition 
ideological impressions of primary candidates.  To do this I estimate a regression model for each 
type of candidate.  The key independent variable in this first set of analysis is the measure of 
respondents’ own ideological conservatism.  A variety of socioeconomic and other factors that 
have been previously associated with candidate ideology comprise the rest of the model which is 
presented below and described in Table 8:   
Baseline OLS Model:  Perceived Conservatism = β0 + 
β1Respondent_Conservatism + β2Respondent_Party_Affect + β3Weak_Partisan + 
β4Age + β5White_ Respondent + β6Education + β7Female_Respondent + 
β8Income + β9Latent_Racism (African Americans only) + β10Latent_Sexism 
(Females only) + ε 
 
(1) Liberal (7) Conservative 
 …….. 
Control 
Candidate 
(5.25) 
 
White 
Candidate 
(5.12) 
Republicans 
(5.55) 
Afr. American 
Candidate 
(4.92) 
 
Female 
Candidate 
(5.24) 
 
 ……. 
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Table 8: Description of Variables in Regression Models 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable Range Description 
Perceived Ideological Conservatism 1-7 Higher values correspond to higher levels of conservatism 
 
Independent Variables   
Respondent Conservatism 1-7 Higher values correspond to higher levels of conservatism 
Party Affect 0-100 
Higher values correspond to 
higher feelings of “warmth” for 
own party 
Weak Partisan 0-1 “1” indicates a weak partisan, “0” indicates a strong partisan 
Age Continuous Respondent age in year 
White Respondent 0-1 “1” indicates a Caucasian respondent, “0” indicates other 
Education 1-8 Higher values correspond with higher levels of education 
Female Respondent 0-1 “1” indicates a female respondent, “0” indicates male 
Income 0-15 Higher values correspond with higher income levels 
Latent Racism 0-6 Higher values correspond with lower levels of latent racism 
Latent Sexism: 0-6 Higher values correspond with higher levels of latent sexism 
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Table 9 presents the results.  The effects of ideology are only significant for stereotypical white 
male candidates.  As Republican voters grow increasingly conservative, they are increasingly 
likely to perceive white male primary candidates as ideologically conservative.  Interestingly, the 
same is not true for other types of candidates.  Ideological perceptions of female and African 
American candidates appear unaffected by the ideology of the voter evaluating them. 
 
 
Table 9: Determinants of Perceived Candidate Conservatism (Republicans) 
 
 Control White  Female  African American Respondent Conservatism -0.0003 (0.170) 0.522 (0.182)** -0.132 (0.203) 0.216 (0.140) Party Affect 0.020 (0.008)** -0.075 (0.008) 0.020 (0.012)* 0.018 (0.010)* Weak Partisan 0.045 (0.287) 0.308 (0.457) 0.013 (0.312) 0.036 (0.392) Age 0.008 (0.011) -0.001 (0.014) 0.005 (0.012) -0.002 (0.013) White respondent -0.028 (0.64) -0.087 (0.115) 0.267 (0.209) -0.113 (0.188) Education -0.230 (0.121) -0.002 (0.094) -0.003 (0.143) 0.174 (0.115) Female respondent -0.295 (0.297) -0.159 (0.306) -0.302 (0.337) 0.130 (0.300) Income -0.012 (0.026) -0.041 (0.035) 0.042 (0.052) 0.074 (0.045) Latent Racism - - - 0.171 (0.222) Latent Sexism - - -0.296 (0.208) - Constant 5.016 3.197 5.247 0.925 
     N 54 55 54 61 F 3.75 2.44 1.35 2.59 R2 0.33 0.19 0.17 0.28 RMSE 0.868 1.06 1.16 1.12 
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Figure 10 represents a graphical representation of the effects of respondent ideology on 
the ideological perception of the candidate they evaluate.  In each panel, the X axis represents 
respondents’ ideologies ranging from (1) very liberal to (7) very conservative.  The Y axis 
represents the predicted ideological location of each candidate using that same scale.  Note that 
the error bars represent 90% confidence intervals, and since there are very few cases 
ideologically liberal Republicans, these ranges will always be larger on the leftmost part of the 
figure.  It is clear from Figure 10 that the effects of respondent ideology are minimal in most 
cases; as the regression above showed, it only significantly affects perceptions of white male 
Republican candidates, who are perceived as increasingly ideologically conservative as 
respondents’ grow more conservative themselves.  These findings may reflect some level of 
uncertainty about counterstereotypical candidates.  When voters encounter a conventional 
candidate, their own ideology conditions their perception of that candidate, a phenomenon long-
known to affect candidate perceptions.  When they encounter unconventional candidates, though, 
they do not appear to impose their own ideology in the same way.  Even so, this does not lead to 
significant overall perceptions of ideology across candidate types.       
 Although the results are statistically insignificant, it is curious that female and African 
American candidates are not perceived in the same way.  Female candidates have a shallow, 
negative slope but African American candidates, like white males, see a steady (but statistically 
insignificant) increase.  In other words, as Republican voters grow more conservative they 
perceive female candidates to be more ideologically liberal (Panel C), but African American 
candidates are perceived to be more conservative as respondents do themselves (Panel D).  To 
reiterate: these are statistically insignificant trends but the patterns are illustrative in that (1) 
respondent ideology does not matter much in evaluating the ideology of counterstereotypical 
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candidates – perhaps owning to the cue conflict they generate – and (2) the slopes in are opposite 
directions, implying that female and African American candidates may not be “equal” 
counterstereotypes. 
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Figure 10: Predicting Candidate Conservatism As a Function of Voter Ideology (Republicans) 
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4.2.2 Ideological Congruence: Republicans 
In the last chapter I posited that respondent ideology alone was insufficient to assess candidate 
evaluation.  If voters are seeking the most ideologically proximate candidate when making a 
primary election choice, then the key variable of interest should be a measure of ideological 
congruence, or the degree to which a voter perceives herself to be ideologically aligned with a 
candidate.  I estimate another set of regression below but this time use ideological congruence as 
the dependent variable.  This measure is generated by taking the absolute value of the distance 
between where voter i rates her own ideological position and where she rates candidate j on the 
same scale.  The smaller the value, the less perceived ideological difference between the 
candidate and voter.    
 
Table 10: Average Ideological Distance Between Voter and Candidate (Republicans) 
 
 Average Gap Standard Deviation 
Control 0.87 1.02 
White 0.95 0.87 
Female 1.20 1.23 
African American 1.03 1.04 
 
  
Before turning to the regression analysis, a preliminary examination of the data is in 
order.  Table 10 presents the average perceived ideological gap across each demographic group.  
As expected, Republicans on the whole see counterstereotypical candidates as somewhat more 
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ideologically distant that white male candidate.  There is also somewhat more variance in 
respondents’ reactions the counterstereotypical candidates than the white male.  Yet when these 
differences are subjected to a statistical test, however, I fail to reject the null hypothesis (F = 
1.00, Prob > F = 0.39).  Ideological congruence is higher between Republicans and white male 
candidates relative to female or African American candidates, but not statistically significantly 
so.  These early results, then, provide little support the ideological congruence hypotheses. 
A more thorough examination of ideological congruence begins with Table 11, which 
presents the regression results from this alternative specification.  It shows that, as before, 
respondent ideology typically has little effect on the perceived ideological gap between voter and 
candidate.  Only in the control condition was there a slightly significant effect.  As Republicans 
grow increasingly conservative, they perceive the ideological gap between themselves and the 
control group Republican to grow larger.  No similar results occur in any of the demographic 
treatment conditions.  In fact, the slopes are opposite of the hypothesized direction.  Figure 11 
plots the effects of respondents’ ideology on perceived level of ideological incongruence.  That 
is, higher values on the y-axis indicate less ideological congruence.  Panel B shows, the slope for 
white male candidates is positive, suggesting that as Republicans grow more conservative they 
perceive an increasing gap between themselves and the candidate.  This may be the result of 
more conservative voters simply moving farther and farther to the ideological right and therefore 
increasing the distance away from the cluster of candidates.  However, the slopes for female 
(Panel C) and African American (Panel D) candidates are both negative, though again 
insignificant.  The data show that more conservative Republicans do not in fact see themselves as 
more ideologically distant from counterstereotypical candidates with demographic cues implying 
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ideological liberalism.  Instead, different types of ideologues see all types of candidates as 
relatively equidistant in terms of ideology. 
 
Table 11: Determinants of Perceived Ideological Congruity Between Voter and Candidate (Republicans) 
 
 Control White  Female  African American Respondent Conservatism 0.568 (0.294)* 0.183 (0.153) -0.066 (0.192) -0.126 (0.124) Party Affect -0.019 (0.009)** 0.006 (0.006) -0.034 (0.009)** -0.0003 (0.008) Weak Partisan -0.254 (0.301) -0.174 (0.357) -0.670 (0.331)** -0.191 (0.336) Age -0.015 (0.012) -0.006 (0.010) 0.008 (0.011) 0.003 (0.012) White respondent -0.054 (0.088) -0.053 (0.098) 0.129 (0.265) 0.327 (0.187) Education 0.065 (0.101) -0.117 (0.077) 0.003 (0.104) -0.034 (0.120) Female respondent 0.063 (0.273) -0.055 (0.253) -0.173 (0.279) -0.169 (0.270) Income 0.007 (0.031) 0.039 (0.031) -0.056 (0.042) -0.054 (0.040) Latent Racism - - - -0.170 (0.120) Latent Sexism - - 0.167 (0.182) - Constant -0.632 0.195 4.070 1.860 
     N 54 55 54 61 F 1.52 2.25 4.12 1.97 R2 0.34 0.21 0.43 0.18 RMSE 0.909 0.837 1.02 1.03 
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Panel C: Female Candidate 
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Figure 11: Perceived Ideological Incongruence As a Function of Voter Ideology (Republicans) 
 
4.2.3 Evaluating Candidates on Support and Representation Capacity: Republicans 
So far the theoretical expectations postulated above have not been borne out in the analysis.  
Republican voters tend to view Republican candidates of all demographic stripes as fairly similar 
to each other in terms of ideology.  In this section I assess ideologically and ideological 
congruence as determinant of voter attitudes beyond ideological perceptions.  I begin with the 
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issue of voters’ willingness to support candidates as nominees to represent the party in the 
general election.  Table 12 presents the results.  There is little effect of voters’ ideological 
perception on their willingness to support different types of candidates.  The one exception, 
however, is again white male candidates.  Here, as Republicans grow more conservative in their 
ideological outlook, they are increasingly less likely to support white male candidates, which is 
unexpected.  Theoretically, more conservative Republicans should increasingly support white 
male candidates as their conservatism grows.  While the coefficients are also negative for all the 
other candidates, as expected, they only achieve statistical significance with white men.    
 Figure 12 presents the results from Table 12 in graphical form.  Panel B illustrates the 
negative and marginally significant decline in support for white male candidates.  While I cannot 
conclude with certainty precisely why I observe this result, it is worth noting that white male 
Republican candidates have the highest levels of support among ideological liberals/moderate 
Republican voters – relative to the other candidates – and therefore have “further to fall” since 
increasing levels of conservatism among Republican primary voters correspond to lower levels 
of support across all candidate types.  While these results are inconsistent with theoretical 
expectations, though, they are highly consistent with those in the last section.  If variance in 
voters’ attitudes towards primary candidates stems from difference in perceived ideology across 
candidate groups (as I originally argued), then it follows that when there are no perceived 
ideological differences there are subsequently few differences in other attitudes, as well. 
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Table 12: Support for Candidate as a Function of Ideology (Republicans) 
 
 Control White  Female  African American Respondent Conservatism -0.053 (0.271) -0.255 (0.153)* -0.059 (0.144) -0.021 (0.114) Party Affect 0.022 (0.011)* 0.010 (0.006) 0.022 (0.009)** 0.016 (0.009)* Weak Partisan 0.022 (0.343) -0.517 (0.368) -0.404 (0.393) 0.071 (0.405) Age -0.021 (0.013)* 0.003 (0.011) -0.002 (0.013) -0.009 (0.014) White respondent 0.072 (0.146) -0.033 (0.188) -0.048 (0.184) -0.120 (0.146) Education -0.115 (0.127) 0.057 (0.110) 0.070 (0.118) -0.052 (0.114) Female respondent -0.148 (0.328) 0.247 (0.257) 0.299 (0.328) 0.191 (0.320) Income 0.024 (0.032) 0.018 (0.051) 0.022 (0.048) 0.024 (0.044) Latent Racism - - - 0.014 (0.114) Latent Sexism - - 0.128 (0.169) - Constant 5.377 5.326 2.718 4.518 
     N 54 55 54 61 F 3.19 0.83 2.28 0.78 R2 0.31 0.09 0.24 0.09 RMSE 1.01 0.969 1.12 1.08 
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Figure 12: Willingness to Support Candidate As a Function of Ideology (Republicans) 
 
The next set of analyses replace the “willingness to support” measure as the dependent 
variable with a different measure asking voters to indicate the degree to which they believe the 
candidate they evaluate would be a good representative of their interests if elected.  Table 13 and 
Figure 13 present the regression analysis and predicted levels of representation capacity across 
the four candidate types.  In no instance is there a statistically significant relationship between 
voters’ level of conservatism and their perceptions of a candidate’s capacity to represent their 
interests.  Although I theorized above that more ideologically moderate Republicans would rate 
 86 
African American or female candidates as better representatives than white male candidates, this 
is not the case.  Nor do higher levels of conservatism lead Republicans to perceive white 
candidates as increasingly better representatives.  Consistent with all the findings so far, voters 
simply do not “penalize” counterstereotypical candidates in the way I expected they would. 
 
Table 13: Perceptions of Representation Capacity as a Function of Ideology (Republicans) 
 
 Control White  Female  African American Respondent Conservatism -0.159 (0.220) 0.003 (0.149) -0.172 (0.176) 0.095 (0.116) Party Affect 0.024 (0.009)* 0.012 (0.006)** 0.039 (0.009)** 0.013 (0.008) Weak Partisan 0.175 (0.362) -0.058 (0.011) -0.016 (0.341) -0.003 (0.353) Age -0.002 (0.015) -0.006 (0.011) 0.009 (0.013) -0.025 (0.012) White respondent -0.088 (0.078) 0.020 (0.100) 0.067 (0.296) 0.078 (0.116) Education -0.089 (0.144) 0.074 (0.081) -0.116 (0.120) -0.113 (0.129) Female respondent -0.598 (0.351)* -0.098 (0.204) 0.185 (0.349) 0.534 (0.300)* Income -0.003 (0.040) 0.030 (0.037) 0.032 (0.049) 0.028 (0.041) Latent Racism - - - 0.139 (0.128) Latent Sexism - - 0.093 (0.158) - Constant 5.897 4.253 2.440 4.00 
     N 54 55 54 61 F 2.12 1.78 3.38 2.42 R2 0.29 0.13 0.038 0.21 RMSE 1.04 0.80 1.10 1.01 
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Panel C: Female Candidate 
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Panel D: African American Candidate 
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Figure 13: Perceptions of Representation Capacity as a Function of Ideology (Republicans) 
 
Above I argued that ideological congruence may be an even more important measure 
than a pure measure of ideology.  To fully flesh out the congruence issue I re-estimate the last 
two sets of regression replacing the measure of respondents’ conservatism with the ideological 
congruence variable created earlier.  As a general expectation, higher levels of congruence 
should lead to more favorable evaluations.  In other words, when specified this way the slope for 
the ideological congruence variable should be negative and significant.  The correlation between 
ideological congruence and the support and representation capacity are moderately strong at       
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-0.35 and -0.36, respectively.  Table 14 and Figure 14 display the results.   Note that unlike 
above, where the x-axis in each panel represents respondents’ level of ideological conservatism, 
here the x-axis presents the perceived ideological difference, or “gap,” between voter and 
candidate (e.g. “0” mean voters rate themselves as ideologically identical).    
 
Table 14: Effects of Ideological Congruence on Perceptions of Support/Represent.Capacity (Republicans) 
 
 Control White Female African American  Support Rep. Cap. Support Rep. Cap. Support Rep. Cap. Support Rep. Cap. Ideological Congruence -0.413** (0.152) -0.493** (0.131) -0.378** (0.170) -0.348** (0.154) -0.281* (0.164) -0.251 (0.198) -0.259* (0.150) -0.163 (0.141) Party Affect 0.015** (0.006) 0.016** (0.006) 0.011 (0.007) 0.015** (0.005) 0.011 (0.009) 0.026** (0.010) 0.015 (0.009) 0.014* (0.008) Weak Partisan -0.229 (0.287) -0.048 (0.307) -0.318 (0.284) -0.215 (0.231) -0.521 (0.341) -0.013 (0.294) 0.048 (0.353) -0.135 (0.307) Age -0.026** (0.008) -0.008 (0.012) 0.0003 (0.011) -0.007 (0.011) -0.0002 (0.013) 0.010 (0.012) -0.008 (0.014) -0.024* (0.012) White respondent 0.036 (0.135) -0.124* (0.067) -0.023 (0.180) -0.010 (0.072) -0.013 (0.158) -0.098 (0.299) -0.027 (0.193) 0.101 (0.130) Education -0.073 (0.128) -0.047 (0.140) 0.006 (0.105) 0.036 (0.070) 0.063 (0.112) -0.134 (0.124) -0.067 (0.106) -0.095 (0.118) Female respondent -0.082 (0.303) -0.541 (0.302) 0.238 (0.263) -0.122 (0.209) 0.275 (0.293) 0.201 (0.323) 0.151 (0.299) -0.491* (0.286) Income 0.030 (0.028) 0.003 (0.034) 0.035 (0.046) 0.043 (0.036) 0.0001 (0.040) 0.003 (0.048) 0.009 (0.045) 0.021 (0.040) Latent Racism - - - - - - -0.028 (0.112) 0.106 (0.125) Latent Sexism - - - - 0.166 (0.161) 0.114 (0.139) - - Constant 5.968 6.156 4.287 4.720 3.578 2.778 4.899 4.693 
         N 54 54 55 55 54 54 61 61 F 4.69 4.77 0.91 2.83 2.10 4.45 1.22 1.70 R2 0.43 0.44 0.16 0.24 0.29 0.40 0.15 0.22 RMSE 0.92 0.92 0.93 0.75 1.08 1.08 1.05 1.01 
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Consistent with expectations, in almost every case the ideological congruence coefficient 
is negative and significant, indicating that as the ideological gap between a voters’ own ideology 
and the perceived ideology of the candidate they evaluate decreases, voters will be more likely to 
(1) support that candidate and (2) view that candidate as a good representative.  Interestingly, the 
only exceptions to this pattern occur with female and African American candidates on the issue 
of representation capacity.  Here, a decrease in ideological congruence does not have a negative 
impact on how voters assess candidates as potential representatives.  A closer look at Panels F 
and H and Figure 14 suggest, however, that this null effect may be due to the distribution of 
observations on the extreme end of the ideological congruence variable.  Female (n=8) and 
African American (n=7) voters both had a handful of observations in which the perceived 
ideological distance between voter and candidate was greater than two.  White male Republicans 
only hand three such cases.  Other than somewhat larger error bars for African American and 
female candidates on the righthand side of the plot on the representation capacity variable, all the 
slopes in Figure 14 are roughly similar.  Figure 15 presents all four candidates on one graph, 
and reaffirms the finding that all four candidates share a similar negative slope, but they are not 
statistically distinct on demographic grounds        
 These results add additional evidence to the findings above.  According to these data, but 
inconsistent with the theory presented in the last chapter, demographic status simply has little to 
no effect on candidate evaluations within the Republican Party.  While some of the results were 
in the expected direction according to the theory (e.g. African American candidates were 
perceived to be the most liberal of the four; the average perceived ideological gap between voter 
and candidate was higher among counterstereotypical candidates), they did not by and large 
achieve statistical significance.  The absence of even basic differences in ideological perception 
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across demographic groups is surprising given the consistency with which gender- and race-
based ideological stereotypes are uncovered in the social science literature.  
 Care must be taken in drawing conclusions from these data, however, particularly since 
they stand in stark contrast to much of the previous literature on this subject.  The most 
charitable interpretation of these results would conclude that race and gender simply do not 
matter in the assessment of candidates when party information is known and constant across 
them.  I do not draw this conclusion.  There are several potential explanations for an absence of 
findings – for instance, as noted above, the particular photographs used to indicate demographic 
status were intentionally selected so as to reduce the likelihood that race and gender affect 
perceptions.  At the same time, though, if the results are valid, they contribute significantly to our 
understanding of how demographic cues interact with other types of information.  It may be, for 
instance, that demographic/ideological stereotypes persist, but party membership is a more 
powerful cue to voters’ minds and therefore any negative consequences female or African 
American Republicans may theoretically suffer can be mediated solely through party affiliation.  
Additionally, it may be that the presence of other information about candidates mediates the role 
of race and gender in voter evaluations.  Before moving on to looking at race and gender in 
primary elections when individuating policy information is also available to voters, however, I 
first assess demographic cues in Democratic voters’ evaluations. 
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 Panel A: Control Candidate (Support)  
 
2
3
4
5
6
Su
pp
or
t f
or
 C
an
di
da
te
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Ideological Gap Between Voter and Candidate
Predictive Margins with 90% CIs
 
 
Panel B: Control Candidate (Rep. Capacity) 
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Panel C: White Male Candidate (Support) 
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Panel D: White Male Candidate (Rep. Capacity) 
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Panel E: Female Candidate (Support) 
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Panel F: Female Candidate (Rep. Capacity) 
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Panel G: African American Candidate (Rep. Cap.) 
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Panel H: African American Candidate (Rep. Cap.) 
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Figure 14: Perceptions of Support/Rep. Capacity as a Function of Ideological Incongruence (Republicans) 
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Panel A: Support for Candidate 
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Panel B: Perceived Representation Capacity 
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Figure 15: Perceptions of Support/Rep. Capacity as a Function of Ideological Congruence (Republicans) 
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4.3 CANDIDATE EVALUATIONS: DEMOCRATS 
4.3.1 Perceived Ideology: Democrats 
The absence of results for Republican voters makes it all the more important to consider 
Democrats, as well.  If no significant demographic effects occur here, I have more reason to 
revisit the experimental design, or, potentially, I have a stronger basis for arguing that it is 
possible demographic considerations do not “carry over” into party politics.  The analysis in this 
section mirrors that above.  First, I plot the perceived ideological location of each type of 
Democrat, shown in Figure 16 (Not to scale).  As expected, the African American candidate was 
perceived to be the most liberal, roughly 0.35 points more liberal than other candidates, who are 
all clustered around the 3.30/7.  However, as with Republicans, this difference is not statistically 
significant.  An examination using one-way ANOVA comparing means across all four groups 
show demographic status does not affect ideological perceptions among Democrats, either (F = 
1.56, Prob > F = 0.200). 
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Figure 16: Perceived Ideological Location of Democratic Candidates (All Democrats) 
 
 
Table 15 presents the results from the regression models estimating the effects of voter 
ideology on perceived candidate ideology.  Consistent with literature showing the individuals 
tend to impose their own ideological views on candidates they evaluate, there is a positive slope 
for all four candidates on the respondent conservatism coefficient.  That is, across all four 
candidates, although only marginally significant for two of them, white male and female 
Democrats, as voters grow increasingly conservative in their own ideology the more 
conservative they perceive candidates to be.  Figure 17 presents these results in graphical form.  
As with Republicans, Democratic voters tend to rate candidates ideologically on the basis of 
their own political views and not on the demographic group to which the candidates belong.  
This result is somewhat surprising given the persistence of racial and gender effects in a variety 
of contexts, but it is somewhat less surprising than the similar null findings among Republicans.  
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Since there are no counterstereotypical candidates in the Democratic field, and since all cues are 
consistent with a more liberal ideology, it follows that there is a strong association between voter 
ideology and his perceptions of candidate ideology.  
 
Table 15: Determinants of Perceived Candidate Conservatism (Democrats) 
 
 Control White  Female  African American Respondent Conservatism 0.256 (0.116) 0.264 (0.145)* 0.258 (0.137)* 0.138 (0.179) Party Affect -0.012 (0.005)** -0.010 (0.012) -0.0002 (0.007) -0.023 (0.010)** Weak Partisan -0.432 (0.322) -0.394 (0.392) -0.033 (0.426) -0.210 (0.432) Age 0.001 (0.010) 0.010 (0.016) 0.023 (0.013)* 0.005 (0.013) White respondent -0.054 (0.082) 0.092 (0.163) -0.279 (0.130) -0.092 (0.081) Education 0.043 (0.080) 0.199 (0.114)* -0.119 (0.144) 0.129 (0.110) Female respondent -0.309 (0.235) 0.296 (0.286) 0.285 (0.350) -0.217 (0.317) Income 0.016 (0.036) -0.068 (0.045) -0.038 (0.046) -0.038 (0.036) Latent Racism - - - 0.305 (0.178)* Latent Sexism - - -0.077 - Constant 4.069 2.194 2.71 3.261 
     N 69 67 65 64 F 1.54 2.04 2.88 3.34 R2 0.17 0.15 0.23 0.18 RMSE 0.92 1.28 1.21 1.13 
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 Panel A: Control Candidate 
2
3
4
5
6
Pe
rc
ei
ve
d 
C
an
di
da
te
 C
on
se
rv
at
is
m
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Respondent Conservatism
Predictive Margins with 90% CIs
 
Panel B: White Male Candidate 
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Panel C: Female Candidate 
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Panel D: African American Candidate 
2
3
4
5
Pe
rc
ei
ve
d 
C
an
di
da
te
 C
on
se
rv
at
is
m
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Respondent Conservatism
Predictive Margins with 90% CIs
 
 
Figure 17: Predicting Candidate Conservatism As a Function of Voter Ideology (Democrats) 
 
4.3.2 Ideological Congruence: Democrats 
As with Republicans, ideology should be assessed not only in raw terms but in terms of 
congruence between voter and candidate.  I again calculate an ideological congruence variable, 
generated by taking the absolute values of the difference between where a voter locates herself 
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on a seven-point ideological scale and where she places the candidate she evaluated.  Table 16 
displays the average perceived ideological gap between Democrats and each type of candidate.  
Consistent with expectations, the smallest differences (indicating highest levels of ideological 
congruity) occur among female and African American candidates.  Yet the difference in 
differences between white male candidates/voters and African American and female 
candidates/voters is relatively small in magnitude.  Not surprisingly, the effect is statistically 
insignificant when subjected to ANOVA tests (F = 0.32, Prob > F = 0.81).  The initial analysis of 
ideological congruity, then, provides no evidence to support the claim that Democrats see 
themselves as particularly ideologically proximate to more “liberal looking” candidates. 
 
Table 16: Average Ideological Distance Between Voter and Candidate (Democrats) 
 
 Average Gap Standard Deviation 
Control 1.29 1.11 
White 1.38 1.25 
Female 1.33 1.29 
African American 1.19 1.22 
 
Still, Table 16 cannot uncover any effects of differences in ideology among Democratic 
voters when it comes to evaluating candidates.  For that I turn to an additional set of regression 
analysis in which the dependent variable is ideological incongruence rather than a simple 
measure of ideology.  Theoretically, I expect that the slope should be negative and significant for 
white male candidates, indicating that as Democrats grow more conservative, they will 
increasingly perceive themselves as ideologically similar to white male candidate (i.e. low 
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incongruence).  The slopes for female and African American candidates should be positive, since 
highly liberal respondents should see a smaller ideological gap between themselves and female 
or African American candidates than they would when evaluating white male candidates. 
 
Table 17: Determinants of Perceived Ideological Congruity Between Voter and Candidate (Democrats) 
 
 Control White  Female  African American Respondent Conservatism -0.363 (0.141)** -0.266 (0.141)* -0.398 (0.155)** -0.212 (0.192) Party Affect -0.012 (0.006)** -0.013 (0.012) -0.001 (0.007) -0.0123 (0.011) Weak Partisan -0.531 (0.253)** -0.526 (0.270) -0.207 (0429) -0.431 (0.387) Age 0.003 (0.012) 0.014 (0.017) 0.022 (0.014) 0.023 (0.014) White respondent -0.060 (0.087) 0.082 (0.132) -0.350 (0.119)** -0.103 (0.075) Education 0.104 (0.080) 0.093 (0.121) -0.194 (0.150) 0.169 (0.118) Female respondent -0.256 (0.248) 0.493 (0.277)* 0.204 (0.390) -0.201 (0.303) Income -0.001 (0.035) -0.044 (0.040) -0.028 (0.039) -0.033 (0.047) Latent Racism - - - -0.077 (0.215) Latent Sexism - - -0.006 (0.205) - Constant 3.159 1.701 2.708 2.086 
     N 69 67 65 64 F 4.92 2.92 4.04 1.92 R2 0.35 0.21 0.31 0.21 RMSE 0.95 1.19 1.17 1.17 
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The data, however, do not reveal this to be the case.  Although an increase in 
conservatism among Democrats corresponds with a significant decrease in the perceived 
ideological gap with white male candidate in Panel B of Figure 18, in support of Hypothesis 3d, 
this is not an isolated affect.  The evidence reveals that this negative slope emerges across all 
candidates.  Only in the African American candidate condition does this affect not reach 
statistical significance.  The results are consistent with the pattern of demographic status having 
little bearing on ideological inference about candidates.  Democratic voters, not surprisingly, 
systematically perceive their ideological incongruence with all candidates to increase as the 
voters themselves grow more conservative.  Somewhat more surprising, though, is that 
demographic status does little to affect this process.  It simply supports the contention that 
regardless of what a candidate looks like, more conservative Democrats will view that candidate 
as more ideologically incongruent than they will more moderate party candidates.   
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Panel B: White Male Candidate 
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Panel C: Female Candidate 
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Panel D: African American Candidate 
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Figure 18: Perceived Ideological Congruence As a Function of Voter Ideology (Democrats) 
 
4.3.3 Evaluating Candidates on Support and Representation Capacity: Democrats 
If demographic status does not affect ideological impressions, I noted above, it follows that 
subsequent attitudes may not be affected.  This was the case among Republican voters.  Here I 
look at race and gender in Democratic contests to see support and representation capacity are 
similarly unaffected demographic information given what has been observed thus far in the 
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results.  Table 18 displays the results of models predicting support for different types of 
Democratic candidates.  The original theory would have more ideologically conservative voters 
expressing more support for white male candidates than female or African American candidates.  
This does not appear to be the case.  The coefficient for respondent ideology is highly 
insignificant in the white male model yet in the female condition it is significant and positive, 
which was unexpected.  The results suggest that Democrats are more inclined to support female 
party candidates as the voters themselves grow more conservative.  Moving from the most liberal 
to the most conservative Democrats, predicted levels of support increase almost two points on a 
seven-point scale (4.77 to 6.55).  Moreover, size of the respondent conservatism variable for the 
female candidate is dramatically larger than either other demographic group.  This raises a 
cautionary flag, for there is little theoretical reason for women to be perceived so differently 
from other demographic groups.  Even if this effect is artifactual, however, the larger point 
remains: Overall, Democratic voters are not more inclined to support one demographic group 
over another on the basis of voter ideology. 
A final point worth making on the support issue is to reiterate a comment made earlier: in 
this instance female and African American candidates have different slopes – positive for 
women, negative for African Americans (Panels C and D in Figure 19).  While the effect of 
ideology is insignificant in the latter case, the results again suggest that I must be careful in 
theoretically treating women and African Americans as analogous entities in this context.  While 
their results are usually similar, and while demographic status usually does not have a bearing on 
attitudes towards candidates, there are clearly some instances in which voters may react 
differently to different demographic cues. 
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Table 18: Support for Candidate as a Function of Ideology (Democrats) 
 
 Control White  Female  African American Respondent Conservatism 0.170 (0.095)* -0.031 (0.120) 0.298 (0.149)** -0.083 (0.157) Party Affect 0.013 (0.005)** 0.034 (0.007)** 0.013 (0.007)* 0.011 (0.010) Weak Partisan -0.079 (0.262) -0.063 (0.251) -0.542 (0.461) -0.131 (0.329) Age 0.011 (0.009) -0.011 (0.012) -0.019 (0.013) -0.005 (0.009) White respondent 0.053 (0.104) 0.107 (0.138) 0.152 (0.126) -0.059 (0.084) Education 0.032 (0.070) 0.001 (0.108) 0.030 (0.135) -0.080 (0.100) Female respondent 0.384 (0.220)* -0.206 (241) -0.048 (0.314) -0.437 (0.248) Income -0.006 (0.031) 0.015 (0.035) 0.016 (0.043) 0.038 (0.037) Latent Racism - - - -0.253 (0.182) Latent Sexism - - -0.070 (0.194) - Constant 2.378 3.218 4.347 6.74 
     N 69 67 65 64 F 3.14 3.27 2.56 2.14 R2 0.26 0.29 0.18 0.16 RMSE 0.83 1.03 1.24 0.97 
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Panel B: White Male Candidate 
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Panel C: Female Candidate 
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Panel D: African American Candidate 
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Figure 19: Willingness to Support Candidate As a Function of Ideology (Democrats) 
 
I turn next to the issue of representation capacity.  Not surprisingly, there are few results to speak 
of across candidate groups.  Interestingly, the only time respondent ideology has a significant 
effect is in the female candidate treatment condition, and again the effect is a positive and 
moderately significant slope.  Table 19 presents the regression results and Figure 20 presents 
the plots of predicted level of representation capacity.  As with the support variable, the more 
conservative a Democratic respondent, the higher the perceived representation capacity – but 
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only for female candidates!  Respondent ideology does not condition the attitudes towards 
representation for any other type of candidate.  In fact, not only are the results statistically 
insignificant for both white and African American men, but their slopes slightly negative.  
Coupled with the findings concerning support above, these results suggest there may be 
something about the female candidate that is appealing to more conservative Democrats.  The 
underlying cause of this pattern may be related to this particular treatment, or there may be 
another explanation not predicted here.  Additional analysis in future experiments will help tease 
out why I observe these curious results. 
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Table 19: Perceptions of Representation Capacity as a Function of Ideology (Democrats) 
 
 Control White  Female  African American Respondent Conservatism 0.123 (0.089) -0.003 (0.133) 0.271 (0.139)* -0.067 (0.173) Party Affect 0.018 (0.005)** 0.023 (0.011)** 0.007 (0.006) 0.014 (0.012) Weak Partisan -0.077 (0.250) 0.123 (0.318) -0.320 (0.412) 0.010 (0.351) Age 0.016 (0.009)* -0.003 (0.014) -0.016 (0.012) -0.005 (0.010) White respondent 0.053 (0.066) 0.059 (0.139) -0.090 (0.157) -0.028 (0.091) Education -0.029 (0.057) 0.146 (0.141) 0.022 (0.119) -0.070 (0.092) Female respondent 0.156 (0.214) -0.0268 (0.250) 0.107 (0.293) -0.318 (0.269) Income -0.017 (0.028) -0.030 (0.052) 0.028 (0.058) 0.007 (0.037) Latent Racism - - - 0.411 (0.210)* Latent Sexism - - -0.046 (0.154) - Constant 2.823 3.185 4.664 6.735 
     N 69 67 65 64 F 3.36 1.07 1.20 2.06 R2 0.34 0.12 0.09 0.16 RMSE 0.78 1.21 1.09 1.05 
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Panel B: White Male Candidate 
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Panel C: Female Candidate 
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Panel D: African American Candidate 
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Figure 20: Perceptions of Representation Capacity as a Function of Ideology (Democrats) 
 
A final set of models assess the role of ideological incongruity on attitudes towards 
Democratic primary candidates.  As with Republicans these results are combined into a single 
table – Table 20.  Recall that when respondent ideology is replaced with a measure of 
ideological congruence, the coefficient should generally be negative and significant, indicating 
that as the perceived ideological gap between voter and candidate increases, support for 
candidates and perceptions of representation capacity should go down.  This is precisely what we 
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observe.  With one exception, the ideological incongruence measure is indeed negative and 
significant across all candidates.  Figure 21 shows a series of predicted levels of support and 
representation capacity across demographic groups and they are roughly similar throughout.  
Moreover, when any combination of candidates are plotted on the same figure the slopes are 
parallel but statistical significance across demographic types never emerges.  Figure 22 overlays 
the prediction slopes for all four candidates.  The pattern is similar for all four.  As with the rest 
of this chapter, the results here suggest that it is the voters – not the candidates – who have the 
greatest impact on attitudes towards candidates.  Since there are no counterstereotypical 
candidates in the Democratic Party, it is somewhat more plausible that few results emerge.  
However, they still roundly refute the theory that demographic cues lead to ideological subtyping 
within parties. 
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 Table 20: Effects of Ideological Congruence on Perceptions of Support/Represent.Capacity (Democrats) 
 
 Control White Female African American  Support Rep. Cap. Support Rep. Cap. Support Rep. Cap. Support Rep. Cap. Ideological Congruence -0.410** (0.098) -0.340** (0.086) -0.194* (0.109) -0.363** (0.124) -0.653** (0.103) -0.527** (0.115) -0.305* (0.159) -0.329 (0.120) Party Affect 0.008** (0.004) 0.014** (0.004) 0.032** (0.007) 0.019** (0.008) 0.013** (0.005) 0.006 (0.005) 0.007 (0.009) 0.010 (0.011) Weak Partisan -0.275 (0.249) -0.258 (0.234) 0.212 (0.264) -0.125 (0.312) -0.612 (0.278) -0.340 (0.289)) -0.411 (0.300) -0.269 (0.366) Age 0.012 (0.007) 0.017** (0.008) -0.009 (0.012) 0.001 (0.013) -0.005 (0.010) -0.004 (0.010) 0.001 (0.007) 0.001 (0.010) White respondent 0.027 (0.085) 0.032 (0.066) 0.104 (0.139) 0.067 (0.140) -0.072 (0.104) -0.266* (0.138) -0.114 (0.083) -0.084 (0.105) Education 0.072 (0.059) 0.006 (0.056) 0.036 (0.123) 0.200 (0.129) -0.095 (0.100) -0.077 (0.094) -0.025 (0.069) -0.011 (0.084) Female respondent 0.287 (0.202) 0.069 (0.185) -0.140 (0.245) -0.124 (0.256) -0.089 (0.254) 0.220 (0.270) -0.507** (0.220) -0.392 (0.239) Income -0.005 (0.025) -0.017 (0.024) 0.013 (0.034) -0.038 (0.052) -0.004 (0.031) 0.010 (0049) 0.023 (0.039) -0.010 (0.041) Latent Racism - - - - - - -0.216 (0.135) -0.381** (0.176) Latent Sexism - - - - -0.069 (0.132) -0.041 (0.108) - - Constant 3.702 3.897 3.348 3.560 6.115 6.09 7.068 7.133 
         N 69 69 67 67 65 65 64 64 F 5.19 5.74 5.63 2.26 8.59 3.63 3.05 2.85 R2 0.41 0.45 0.33 0.24 0.48 0.37 0.27 0.27 RMSE 0.74 0.71 1.00 1.12 0.98 0.91 0.91 0.97 
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 Panel A: Control Candidate (Support)  
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Panel B: Control Candidate (Rep. Capacity) 
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Panel C: White Male Candidate (Support) 
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Panel D: White Male Candidate (Rep. Capacity) 
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Panel E: Female Candidate (Support) 
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Panel F: Female Candidate (Rep. Capacity) 
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Panel G: African American Candidate (Rep. Cap.) 
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Panel H: African American Candidate (Rep. Cap.) 
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Figure 21: Perceptions of Support/Rep. Capacity as a Function of Ideological Incongruence (Democrats) 
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Panel B: Perceived Representation Capacity 
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Figure 22: Perceptions of Support/Rep. Capacity as a Function of Ideological Incongruence (Democrats) 
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4.4 CONCLUSIONS: A CASE OF MINIMAL DEMOGRAPHIC EFFECTS 
Since Democrats of different demographic stripes arguably represent less cue conflict than 
similar candidates do for Republicans, it may not be particularly surprising to observe little 
variation in attitudes and preferences within the Democratic Party.  Yet to find almost no 
demographic effects in the Republican Party, as well, is a curious observation.  Across both 
parties, a candidate’s demographic status did not affect individuals’ perceptions either of 
candidate ideology or ideological congruence between voter and politician.  Nor did 
demographic status impact voters’ willingness to support candidates or their perceptions of 
candidates’ ability to represent them.  Critically, contrary to expectations, African American and 
female Republicans were not perceived to be more ideologically aligned candidate options than 
white male candidates among the more moderate and liberal members of the Republican Party.  
Nor were those same candidates rated more favorably by increasingly liberal members of the 
Democratic Party.          
 The results overall suggest that ideological congruence matters far more that 
demographic status as an informational cue.  Across all candidates, as voters perceived higher 
levels of ideological incongruence between themselves and the candidates they evaluated, their 
impressions of those candidates grew, predictably, less favorable.  Yet the slopes for each 
demographic type of candidate – in both parties – statistically overlapped quite a bit, reinforcing 
the conclusion that demographic effects are simply not emerging as expected.   
 A natural question to emerge from this analysis is why are there no demographic effects 
in this experiment despites decades of research concluding that demographic stereotypes are 
routinely applied when evaluating politicians (or others)?  As Sanbonmatsu and Dolan (2009, 
485) conclude, “the presence of a party cue does not preclude a role for candidate gender.”  Yet 
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the results here – along with those in some other studies (e.g. Hayes 2011; Huddy and Capelos 
2002) – fail to unearth gender (or race) effects.  There are several possible explanations.  First, as 
noted above, the treatment may not have been sufficiently stimulating.  By utilizing “bland” 
photographs to depict different demographic groups, it may simply be that the pictures did not 
convey a strong enough sense of race and gender.  This is one downside to a conservative 
treatment strategy – it increases the potential for a Type II error.    
 There are other possibilities, though.  An alternative interpretation would be that partisan 
information has an equalizing effect across candidate groups.  It may be that the presence of 
partisan cues overwhelms demographic stereotyping that is in fact happening.  I cannot definitely 
draw this conclusion using these data, however, since partisanship never varied in any of the 
treatment conditions.  Ultimately, in the debate over how demographic and partisan cues interact 
to affect voter behavior, the results from this chapter contribute additional evidence to the 
position that demographic information is not particularly effective in inducing shifts in 
evaluations of political candidates.  Yet I again caution that these results do not settle the issue.  
Indeed, the absence of effects in this experiment make it all the more necessary to continue to 
probe this issue empirically.  In the next chapter I take steps to begin to do this. 
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5.0  CHAPTER 5: IDEOLOGICAL PERCEPTIONS IN A HIGH-INFORMATION 
CONTEXT 
The second survey experiment expands on the first one by adding another element – policy 
information – to the evaluative process.  The results illustrate that partisan voters clearly 
distinguish different ideological types of candidates within their own parties – despite shared 
party status – and these distinctions have significant consequence for candidate inference.  Below 
I focus on the interaction between demographic cues and ideological policy information within 
political parties, assessing their effects on ideological perceptions of different types of 
candidates.  Recall that counterstereotypical status is theorized to make little difference in a high-
information environment, and this in fact turns out to be the case: the results show that variations 
in ideological perceptions are largely driven by (1) the tone of candidates’ messages and (2) the 
nature of voters’ ideology, just as the results in the last chapter. 
5.1 MANIPULATION CHECK 
The analysis begins with a manipulation check of the information treatment conditions.  This is 
done by comparing the control group candidates (with no demographic information) across their 
ideological subgroups.  Overall, the manipulations were successful. Republicans identified the 
conservative party candidate as significantly more conservative than the moderate Republican (t 
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= 10.39, p = 0.000), and Democrats perceived the liberal candidate to be significantly more 
liberal than the moderate Democrat (t = 2.72, p = 0.007).  Despite a common party label, then, 
partisans overall recognized some party candidates as ideologically distinct from others within 
their party based on policy information.  Moreover, these results hold regardless of demographic 
cues; African American, white, male, or female, conservative (liberal) policy information leads 
respondents to view candidates as considerably more conservative (liberal) than moderate policy 
information.  These results represent a positive start, for they affirm that voters recognize and 
distinguish ideological substance in candidate messages over and beyond party identification.  I 
can now turn to more explicit tests of the interaction between policy and demographic 
information. 
5.2 THE EFFECTS OF DEMOGRAPHIC CUES AND POLICY INFORMATION ON 
IDEOLOGICAL PERCEPTIONS: REPUBLICANS 
In the theory above I argued the policy information draws individuals away from cue conflict, 
and therefore when this information is available voters will not perceive significant ideological 
differences across demographic groups when candidates all share the same policy information 
(Hypothesis 7).  To assess this question I begin by presenting results from two-way ANOVA 
tests in which I interact the policy factor (moderate, conservative) with the demographic factor 
(control, white, female, African American).  Since the number of interactions created by doing 
this is large (28), I focus for the moment only demographic comparisons within ideological 
groups (e.g. moderate candidates vs. moderate candidates).  Theoretically, a difference in 
perceived ideology should not differ. 
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 Table 21: Perceptions of Candidate Ideology Across Ideological Subgroups: Republicans  
Comparison Contrast Standard error T White Male (moderate) vs. Female (moderate) -0.224 0.223 -1.01 White Male (moderate) vs. African American (moderate) -0.275 0.222 -1.24 Female (moderate) vs. African American (moderate) -0.051 0.223 -0.23 White Male (conservative) vs. Female (conservative) 0.011 0.208 0.05 White Male (conservative) vs. African American (conservative) -0.119 0.213 -0.56 Female (conservative) vs. African American (conservative) -0.30 0.212 -0.61  
 
The results in Table 21 are consistent with expectations.  In no instance is there a 
significant difference between any pair of candidates sharing similar ideological views.  While 
there are main effects for ideology (F = 223.94, Prob > F = 0.000), there are no main effects for 
the demographic factor (F = 1.33, Prob > F = 0.234) or the interaction of the two (F = 1.13, Prob. 
> F = 0.336).  Yet while the evidence supports Hypothesis 7, it is important to bear in mind the 
demographic cues did not affect ideological perceptions in the low-information environment, 
either.  It is possible that these results, like those above, may be artifacts of, for instance, weak 
treatments.  Nevertheless, the evidence here is at least suggestive that any theoretical differences 
in how difference gender and racial groups are ideologically evaluated may dissolve when 
specific ideological information is available to voters.      
 One implication of these results is that counterstereotypical candidates may not only 
achieve ideological parity with conventional ones through their policy messages, but they may be 
able to assert themselves as significantly more conservative if they run against moderate white 
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males.  To assess this possibility I present another set of comparisons from the two-way 
ANOVA, this time comparing different demographic and ideological groups.  Table 22 presents 
the results from this set of comparisons.  Unlike before, these comparisons are all statistically 
significant, indicating that not only are there no effect of demographic status within ideological 
subgroups but counterstereotypical candidates can ever appear more conservative than white 
male candidates given the right combination of policy agendas. 
 
Table 22: Perceptions of Candidate Ideology Across Ideological and Demographic Subgroups: Republicans 
 
Comparison Contrast Standard error T White Male (moderate) vs. Female (conservative) 1.383 0.214 6.46 White Male (moderate) vs. African American (conservative) 1.352 0.219 5.71 Female (moderate) vs. African American (conservative) 1.477 0.221 6.69 White Male (conservative) vs. Female (moderate) -1.600  0.217 -7.36 White Male (conservative) vs. African American (moderate) -1.646 0.217 -7.63 Female (conservative) vs. African American (moderate) -1.657 0.214 -7.75  
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5.2.1 Assessing Race, Gender, and Policy Information on Perceived Candidate Ideology 
The two-way ANOVA provides a reasonable start to the analysis, but, as in the previous chapter, 
they do not explicitly account for the ideology of Republican participants.  While correlation 
between ideology and partisanship is modest (0.50) the two variables must be considered 
distinctly in the theoretical model.  Thus I again employ regression analysis that will allow me to 
account for variation in evaluations as a function of both of these considerations.  I begin with an 
overall assessment of the role of voter characteristics in the ideological perception process by 
analyzing the control group candidates only.  One model is estimated for moderate candidates 
and a second is estimated for conservative candidates.  The results are presented in Table 23 and 
Figure 23, respectively.  Like the ANOVA results above, policy information is the driving force 
behind differences in ideological perceptions across candidates.  Figure 23 affirms that 
individuals tend to impose their own ideology on perceptions of candidates.  As Republicans 
grow more conservative, they tend to view conservative candidates increasingly conservative and 
moderate candidates as increasingly liberal.  The initial regression results, in short, support the 
pattern that has emerged thus far: policy information, in conjunction with voters’ own 
ideological disposition, conditions ideological perceptions of candidates.   
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Table 23: Perceptions of Candidate Ideology in Control Condition (Republicans) 
 
 Control  Moderate Conservative Respondent Conservatism -0.030 (0.193) 0.114 (0.123) Party Affect 0.019 (0.009)** -0.002 (0.005) Weak Partisan -0.294 (0.378) -0.066 (0.229) Age 0.001 (0.014) 0.007 (0.008) White respondent 0.753 (0.630) 0.047 (0.272) Female respondent -0.017 (0.346) -0.041 (0.234) Education 00.143 (0.111) 0.003 (0.079) Income 0.027 (0.047) -0.004 (0.026) Constant 3.482 5.680 
   N 61 57 F 1.41 0.72 R2 0.19 0.08 RMSE 1.201 0.654 
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Figure 23: Perceptions of Control Group Candidate Ideology by Policy Message (Republicans) 
 
Table 24: Perceptions of Ideological Congruence in Control Condition (Republicans) 
 
 Control  Moderate Conservative Respondent Conservatism 0.217 (0.163) -0.596 (0.131)** Party Affect -0.022 (0.008)** 0.001 (0.005) Weak Partisan -0.169 (0.327) -0.020 (0.234) Age 0.016 (0.112) 0.002 (0.007) White respondent -0.670 (0.623) 0.160 (0.341) Education 0.093 (0.106) 0.0322 (0.077) Female respondent -0.072 (0.301) -0.049 (0.196) Income -0.038 (0.048) 0.016 (0.027) Constant 1.711 4.034 
   N 61 57 F 2.97 7.28 R2 0.25 0.56 RMSE 1.121 0.614 
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Figure 24: Perceptions of Ideological Congruence in Control Condition by Policy Message (Republicans) 
 
Before moving to the analysis of race and gender I also assess the role of policy 
information in terms of ideological congruence within the control condition.  In this instance, the 
slope for conservative candidates should be negative and significant while the slop for moderate 
candidates should be positive and significant.  That is, as Republicans grow more conservative, 
they should perceive a smaller ideological difference between themselves and conservative 
candidates but perceive a larger ideological difference between themselves and moderate 
candidates.  Table 24 and Figure 24 present the results, which are exactly as anticipated.  
Ideological congruence with conservative (moderate) candidates increases (decreases) as 
Republican voters grow more conservative.  The results are consistent with a model of decision-
making in which voters use ideological information to assess the degree to which they 
ideologically align with primary candidates.  In the next sections, I extend this analysis to 
integrate demographic information. 
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5.2.1.1 Policy Information, Gender, and Perceptions of Candidate Ideology 
 
In this section of the analysis I compare counterstereotypical candidates separately.  In the first 
set of regressions, African American candidates are dropped from the analysis and male and 
female Republican candidates are assessed relative to the baseline control group.  In the next 
section, female candidates are omitted and white and African American men are compared.  This 
division of candidates is useful for two reasons: first, it more accurately reflects Republican 
primaries in that to the extent that counterstereotypical candidates are present there is often just 
one (e.g. a female or an African American).  Second, this step allows me to compare two groups 
more explicitly that are theoretically expected to generate similar outcomes.  Recall, for instance, 
that in the last chapter there were instances of African American and female candidates 
generating different empirical outcomes. 
 In Table 25 I present a pair of regressions, one for the moderate and one for the 
conservative.  The control group candidates are included to facilitate separate estimates of male 
and female candidates.  Following the estimation of the model predicted ideology values are 
generated for each of the four candidate types (Moderate Male, Conservative Male, Moderate 
Female, Conservative Female) and Figure 25 presents a series of comparison across them.  The 
results show that policy information continues to be the principal determinant of candidate 
ideology.  The results here mirror those in the two-way ANOVA above – in every pairwise 
comparison of moderates vs. conservatives – regardless of the gender of the two candidates 
contrasted – the conservative candidate is perceived to be significantly more conservative than 
the moderate candidate (Panels A – D in Figure 25).  Similarly, when men and women sharing 
the same ideology are compared, perceived ideology is unaffected by gender.  Here, however, 
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the effect is shown to hold up while controlling for respondent ideology.   As above, slopes for 
all candidates are positive, consistent with the idea that voters project their own ideology onto 
candidates they evaluate.  The results here are remarkably similar to those above when only 
control candidates were analyzed, and facilitate the interpretation that policy information, not 
gender, is the basis for ideologically discriminating between male and female Republican 
primary candidates.  As theorized, gender effects disappear in the high-information environment. 
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Table 25: Perception of Male and Female Ideology by Policy Message Type (Republicans) 
 
 Moderate Conservative Respondent Conservatism 0.198 (0.113)* 0.131 (0.091) Party Affect 0.021 (0.005)** -0.005 (0.003) Weak Partisan 0.224 (0.229) -0.086 (0.189) Age -0.009 (0.007) 0.014 (0.006)** White respondent 0.667 (0.357)* 0.107 (0.373) Shared Gender -0.017 (0.236) -0.126 (0.203) Education -0.009 (0.073) 0.036 (0.067) Income -0.18 (0.026) 0.030 (0.020) Latent Sexism 0.047 (0.114) -0.080 (0.132) Female Candidate -0.070 (0.250) -0.174 (0.161) Male Candidate 0.139 (0.245) -0.301 (0.241) Constant 1.617 5.469 
   N 162 173 F 2.87 1.66 R2 0.17 0.13 RMSE 1.17 0.962 
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 Panel A: Conservative Female vs. Moderate Female 
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Panel B: Conservative Male vs. Moderate Male 
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Panel C: Conservative Female vs. Moderate Male 
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Panel D: Conservative Male vs. Moderate Female 
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Panel E: Conservative Female vs. Conservative Male 
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Panel F: Moderate Female vs. Moderate Male 
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Panel G: All Candidates 
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Figure 25: Perception of Male and Female Ideology by Policy Message Type (Republicans) 
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5.2.1.2 Policy Information, Race, and Perceptions of Candidate Ideology 
 
The same analysis is repeated with female candidates dropped from the sample and white male 
and African American male candidates contrasted relative to control group candidates.  The 
model is largely the same, although this time the demographic indicator represents shared race 
between respondent and candidate rather than shared gender above.  The results, however, do not 
change.  Policy information and respondent ideology condition ideological interpretations.  
Figure 26 below displays plots that are nearly identify to those in the last figure: when different 
ideological groups are compared, voters perceive moderates and conservatives differently, 
regardless of race (Panels A-D).  Simultaneously, when ideology is constant across candidate 
group (Panels E-F), there are no perceived differences on the basis of race.  Consistent with 
expectations, then, these results show that policy information continues to be the central 
consideration, across both gender and race. 
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Table 26: Perception of White and African American Ideology by Policy Message Type (Republicans) 
 
 Moderate Conservative Respondent Conservatism 0.019 (0.109) 0.175 (0.090)* Party Affect 0.023 (0.006)** -0.003 (0.004) Weak Partisan 0.048 (0.273) -0.065 (0.209) Age -0.011 (0.008) 0.010 (0.005) Shared Race -0.037 (0.617) 0.127 (0.738) Female respondent -0.080 (0.210) -0.097 (0.158) Education -0.112 (0.067)* 0.004 (0.062) Income 0.050 (0.025)** 0.038 (0.021) Latent Racism 0.057 (0.105) -.055 (0.069) White Candidate 0.195 (0.628) -0.329 (0.747) African American Candidate -0.164 (0.231) -0.413 (0.152)** Constant 3.440 4.992  
   N 163 167 F 3.65 2.14 R2 0.17 0.14 RMSE 1.169 0.932 
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 Panel A: Conservative White vs. Moderate White 
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Panel B: Conservative AfrAm vs. Moderate AfrAm 
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Panel C: Conservative White vs. Moderate AfrAm 
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Panel D: Moderate White vs. Conservative AfrAm 
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Panel E: Conservative White vs. Conservative AfrAm 
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Panel F: Moderate White vs. Moderate AfrAm 
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Panel G: All Candidates 
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Figure 26: Perception of White and African American Ideology by Policy Message Type (Republicans) 
 128 
5.2.2 Assessing Race, Gender, and Policy Information on Perceived Ideological 
Congruence 
As with all the previous analysis the results here are subjected to tests of ideological congruity 
and not simply measures of ideology.  If information remains as central to the evaluation process 
as it has thus far, we should expect to that ideological congruence should vary as a function of 
voter ideology, just as it did above in the control group-only setting.  The difference here is as 
Republicans grow more conservative, they should perceive a smaller ideological difference 
between themselves and male or female (African American) conservative candidates but 
perceive a larger ideological difference between themselves and male or female (African 
American) moderate candidates.   
5.2.2.1 Gender, Policy Information, and Ideological Congruence 
 
The results stand as expected.  When candidates of different genders offer similar policy 
messages, voters use that information to determine ideological congruity between themselves 
and their primary option.  Table 27 present results for male and female candidates in both a 
moderate condition and conservative condition.  It follows that among that in the population of 
moderate candidates, voters perceive an increasingly large ideological gap as their own ideology 
grows more conservative.  Similarly, among conservative candidates, the respondent 
conservatism coefficient is negative and significant.  Critically, however, as Figure 27 
demonstrates, this pattern holds both within and between candidate gender types.  Panels A and 
B compare moderates and conservatives of the same gender while Panels C and D compare male 
and female candidates across ideology.  In all four cases the slope for moderate candidates is 
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positive (as expected), and the slope for conservative candidates is negative (as expected).  In 
short, policy information remains the principal determinant of ideological perceptions, both in 
terms of raw ideology levels as well as ideological congruence between voter and candidate. 
 
Table 27: Perceptions of Ideological Incongruence With Male and Female Candidates by Policy Message Type 
(Republicans) 
 
 Moderate Conservative Respondent Conservatism 0.226 (0.090)** -0.709 (0.092)** Party Affect -0.019 (0.005)** 0.005 (0.003)* Weak Partisan -0.339 (0.207)* -0.003 (0.172) Age 0.007 (0.007) -0.003 (0.005) White respondent -0.489 (0.344) -0.336 (0.288) Shared Gender 0.072 (0.220) -0.329 (0.164)** Education 0.012 (0.067) 0.013 (0.056) Income -0.006 (0.026) 0.0145 (0.019) Latent Sexism 0.022 (0.102) -0.0156 (0.119) Female Candidate -0.116 (0.237) -0.132 (0.147) Male Candidate -0.129 (0.237) 0.076 (0.692) Constant 1.752 5.376 
   N 162 173 F 2.96 13.09 R2 0.18 0.49 RMSE 1.09 0.810 
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 Panel A: Conservative Female vs. Moderate Female 
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Panel B: Conservative Male vs. Moderate Male 
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Panel C: Conservative Female vs. Moderate Male 
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Panel D: Conservative Male vs. Moderate Female 
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Panel E: Conservative Female vs. Conservative Male 
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Panel F: Moderate Female vs. Moderate Male 
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Panel G: All Candidates 
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Figure 27: Perceptions of Ideological Incongruence by Gender and Policy Message Type (Republicans) 
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5.2.2.2 Assessing Race and Policy Information on Perceived Ideological Congruence 
 
The same analysis is conducted replacing the gender-model with a race-based model.  The 
results, presented in Table 28, are nearly identical to those in the last section with one curious 
exception.  While the findings do not change overall, here we see some of the first evidence of 
demographic information affecting ideological perceptions.  The effect occurs with moderate 
African American Republican candidates.  Note that in Panel B (and C) of Figure 28 there is a 
negative and significant slope for conservative African American (white) Republicans, indicating 
that as Republicans grow more conservative they view themselves as increasingly aligned with 
these candidates.  Yet among moderate African Americans, the slope, while positive, is not 
significant.  That is, more liberal Republican voters do not perceive themselves to be more 
ideologically aligned with moderate African American Republicans than more conservative 
voters do.  This was not the case with women, where moderate female candidates did enjoy an 
admittedly small congruence gain among more liberal voters in the party.      
 Panel E is even more indicting.  Whereas in the gender setting there was not a perceived 
difference between men and women sharing the same ideological views, in the racial setting 
there is among moderate candidates.  African American and white moderate candidates share 
similar slopes but their intercepts vary significant.  Republican voters across all ideology levels 
perceive themselves as more ideologically incongruent with African American candidates than 
white American candidates, even ideological moderates.  These results represent some of the 
first evidence in this study that there may be a racial backlash for counterstereotypical African 
Americans in the Republican Party.  It may be that a moderate policy message coupled with a 
liberal demographic cue generates pause among Republicans, and they do not dismiss 
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demographic information to the extent the theory predicted.  Indeed, in this instance, the results 
are inconsistent with the theory, but they are unpredicted in a way that is plausible – African 
American moderates in the Republican Party appear to have a harder time establishing 
ideological congruity with more liberal Republican voters than do white male moderates.  They 
suggest an important implication for electoral politics – if Republican voters do not distinguish 
candidates along racial lines when candidates are conservative, but they may do so when 
candidates are moderate, African American Republicans should be particularly incentivized to 
move to the ideological right in primaries. 
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Table 28: Perception of Ideological Congruence with White and African American Candidates by Policy Message 
Type (Republicans) 
 
 Moderate Conservative Respondent Conservatism 0.183 (0.121) -0.581 (0.114)** Party Affect -0.021 (0.005)** 0.001 (0.003) Weak Partisan -0.409 (0.245)* 0.106 (0.183) Age 0.010 (0.007) -0.002 (0.004) Shared Race -0.445 (0.612) -0.053 (0.569) Female respondent 0.056 (0.193) 0.094 (0.138) Education 0.071 (0.060) 0.0564 (0.047) Income -0.047 (0.025)* 0.015 (0.019) Latent Racism -0.186 (0.107)* -0.026 (0.060) White Candidate 0.246 (0.623) -0.034 (0.586) African American Candidate 0.001 (0.218) -0.361 (0.138) Constant 2.138 4.074 
   N 163 167 F 3.91 9.67 R2 0.19 0.42 RMSE 1.118 0.820 
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 Panel A: Conservative White vs. Moderate Afr. Am. 
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Panel B: Conserv. Afr. Am. Vs. Moderate Afr. Am. 
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Panel C: Conservative White vs. Moderate Afr. Am. 
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Panel D: Moderate White vs. Conservative Afr. Am. 
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Panel E: Conservative White vs. Conserv. Afr. Am. 
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Panel F: Moderate White vs. Moderate Afr. Am 
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Panel G: All Candidates 
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Figure 28: Perception of Ideological Incongruence by Race and Policy Message Type (Republicans) 
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5.3 THE EFFECTS OF DEMOGRAPHIC CUES AND POLICY INFORMATION ON 
IDEOLOGICAL PERCEPTIONS: DEMOCRATS 
Democratic voters tend to behave in similar ways to Republicans.  Policy information is far more 
relevant than demographic information in the course of inferring about candidate ideology.  
Since the results are largely analogous to those discussed in this section, I do not include a 
separate discussion of Democrats here.  The same estimations for Democrats are available in 
Appendix C.  The principal difference between Republicans and Democrats is that among the 
latter group the effects are not as robust.  Slopes and predicted values of ideology/ideological 
congruence are all in the anticipated direction, but there are more instances of overlapping 
confidence intervals.  Even with these minor differences, however, the results are quite 
consistent with Republicans, allowing me to wrap up the chapter with a discussion of the key 
findings that appear highly generalizable across parties. 
5.4 CONCLUSIONS: POLICY INFORMATION SHAPES IDEOLOGICAL 
PERCEPTIONS 
This chapter set out to assess the impact of race and gender in a high-information environment in 
which demographic information was accompanied by policy messages with distinct ideological 
tones.  According to the theory above, as specific information increases about candidates, race 
and gender should be increasingly irrelevant to the formation of perceptions about candidate 
ideology.  This contention is supported by the empirical evidence.  However, before 
summarizing and discussing the specific findings in this chapter, I must reiterate that given the 
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absence of demographic-based variation in candidate evaluations in a low-information 
environment in the previous chapter, it is possible that some of the null findings here may result 
from the same phenomena that influenced the null findings previously.    
 That said, however, in this chapter a theoretical claim for not finding demographic effects 
is much more justified.  Even when categorical cues like party and race are in conflict, 
ideological information provides a more relevant means for sorting candidates.  Thus the conflict 
is effectively resolved.  This is what occurs here.  Differences in perceived ideology of 
candidates depend almost exclusively on what they say.  Starting with the ANOVA tests and all 
the way through the regression analysis considering straight ideology as well as ideological 
incongruence, Republican (and Democratic) voters evaluate candidates’ ideology based on what 
is being said, and not what candidates look like.  In the ANOVA analysis, for instance, I 
observed that significant perception differences occurred when ideological moderates were 
contrasted with ideological conservatives, but not when men were compared with women 
(African Americans).  Similarly, predicted values of ideological conservatism were influenced 
heavily by the tone of candidate messages, but never by the demographic status of the message 
provider.           
 There is also evidence that ideological perceptions depend in part on the voters 
themselves.  As respondents’ level of conservatism grows, they perceive conservative candidates 
to be increasingly conservative and moderate candidates to be increasingly moderate.  By 
extension, ideological congruence also depends on where voters see themselves in a 
unidimensional ideological space.  The more ideologically liberal Republicans are, the more 
incongruence they feel with conservative candidates.  Among more conservative partisans, the 
opposite occurs: they feel higher levels of congruence with conservative candidates while 
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perceiving moderate candidates to be more ideologically distant.     
 The one exception to this pattern occurs with moderate African American Republicans.  
More liberal Republicans consider both moderate and conservative African American 
Republicans as similar in terms of ideological congruence, which is to say none of these 
candidates are considered especially proximate.  In other words, while more liberal Republicans 
generally perceived less ideological incongruence with ideologically moderate candidates, this 
was not the case with African American Republicans.  These candidates are not perceived to be 
ideologically similar with any group of Republican voters.  Above I speculated that this may be 
due to the fact that a moderate policy message coupled with a liberal demographic cue may have 
been perceived as “too moderate,” even by more liberal Republican partisans.  Yet it is 
interesting to note that this pattern only occurs among African American Republicans – women 
do not struggle to achieve congruence with moderate voters.  It should also be pointed out that 
given the relative paucity of liberal Republicans, the small number of observations at this end of 
the scale makes it more difficult to uncover racial effects if they do indeed exist.  Nevertheless, 
this represents some of the first potential effects of demographic cues in this analysis of primary 
elections. 
 Ultimately, the evidence here supports the theory above, but, as I have outlined, the 
results need to be taken with a grain of salt.  The evidence suggests that race and gender do not 
matter (much) when candidates provide ideological information about where their political 
outlook lies within the field of party candidates.  This is consequential.  It appears that 
demographic cues associated with liberal stereotypes are not the burden we may presume them to 
be in Republican primary elections.  Instead, voters focus principally on policy messages and 
evaluate candidates’ ideologies on the basis of them. 
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 Even if voters do not respond to certain candidate characteristics, their perceptions are 
colored in part by their own.  Indeed, a key ancillary finding in this chapter is that respondent’s 
own ideology significantly affects how they perceive the ideology of others.  While this is not a 
new finding in and of itself, this chapter represents the first evidence of this pattern occurring in 
a primary context.  Voters across different levels of ideology routinely perceive different 
ideological “gaps” between themselves and different (ideological) types of candidates.  This 
finding underscores the importance of policy messages in primary elections, for they imply that 
ideological sorting is an important aspect of the evaluative process among primary voters.   
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6.0  CHAPTER SIX: ATTITUDES TOWARDS CANDIDATES 
The most consistent pattern to emerge from the data so far is that demographic cues have little 
impact in candidate evaluation in intra-partisan primary contests.  This was contrary to 
expectations in the first empirical chapter, but in the last one it is largely consistent with 
expectations: when candidates establish an ideological identity via policy messages, voters 
respond to the more specific information rather than categorical demographic cues.  Still 
unaddressed, however, is the crucial question of whether counterstereotypical status can benefit 
female and African American Republicans.  This issue is taken up in this chapter.  I assess 
whether race, gender, and policy information interact in such a way that female and African 
American candidates may actually be preferred to white male candidates under certain 
conditions.  Since demographically counterstereotypical candidates do not exist in the 
Democratic treatment conditions, I focus exclusively on Republicans in this analysis. 
6.1 THE EFFECTS OF DEMOGRAPHIC CUES AND POLICY INFORMATION ON 
CANDIDATE EVALUATIONS: REPUBLICANS 
I begin this analysis with simple two-way ANOVA tests in which, as in the last chapter, I 
interact the policy factor (moderate, conservative) with the demographic factor (control, white, 
female, African American).  Since the number of interactions created by doing this is large (28), 
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I focus for the moment only demographic comparisons within ideological groups (e.g. moderate 
candidates vs. moderate candidates).  Theoretically, the difference in perceived ideology should 
not differ.  While these tests to not explicitly account for the ideology of respondents, they 
provide a useful first step in comparing (1) support and (2) representation capacity across 
different types of candidates. 
 Table 29 presents the ANOVA results across demographic conditions on the issue of 
candidate support.  The results show no significant differences across groups – Republican voters 
do not support a particular type of conservative over moderate or vice versa.  As before, it is 
ideological information that is driving the results.  There are robust main effects of ideology (F = 
13.41, Prob > F = 0.000) but not for the demographic factor (F = 0.13, Prob > F = 0.923) or the 
interaction between the two.  When specific candidates of different ideologies are contrasted, 
though, there is little evidence suggesting meaningful differences.  This is somewhat curious, for 
I would expect Republicans in general to prefer conservative candidates to more moderate ones.  
Yet this may also be due in part to that counterstereotypical status is somewhat beneficial to 
female and African American candidates and therefore even moderate counterstereotypes can 
maintain an equal support footing with conservative white men.  Alternatively, however, I have 
cautioned throughout, this may be an artifact of the design if demographic cues were not as 
stimulative as originally expected. 
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Table 29: Differences in Support for Candidates Across Ideological Subgroups (Republicans)  
Comparison Contrast Standard error T 
White Male (moderate) vs. Female (moderate) -0.077  0.255 -0.30 
White Male (moderate) vs. African American (moderate) -0.137 0.254 -0.54 
Female (moderate) vs. African American (moderate) -0.060 0.255 -0.24 
White Male (conservative) vs. Female (conservative) 0.294 0.238 1.23 
White Male (conservative) vs. African American (conservative) 0.252 0.245 1.03 
Female (conservative) vs. African American (conservative) -0.042  0.243 -0.17 
White Male (moderate) vs. Female (conservative) 0.470 0.245 1.92 
White Male (moderate) vs. African American (conservative) 0.428 0.252 1.70 
Female (moderate) vs. African American (conservative) 0.504 0.253 2.00 
White Male (conservative) vs. Female (moderate) -0.256 0.248 -1.02 
White Male (conservative) vs. African American (moderate) -0.214 0.247 -1.27 
Female (conservative) vs. African American (moderate) -0.608 0.245 -2.48 
 
I estimate the same two-way ANOVA test for the issue of representation capacity.  The 
results are presented in Table 30.  The patterns are analogous to those in Table 29.  
Demographic information does not stimulate differences in perceptions about candidates’ 
abilities to represent voters’ interests, at least when pooled in this way, with one possible 
exception.  There is a slightly higher level of support for female conservatives over moderate 
African American candidates (significant at the 0.10-level, two-tailed test), but this is the only 
instance of a significant interaction.  The lack of significant results in these early tests suggests 
that if there is variation in attitudes towards candidates it occurs at a more mirco level. 
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Table 30: Differences in Representation Capacity of Candidates Across Ideological Subgroups (Republicans) 
 
 
Comparison Contrast 
Standard 
error T 
White Male (moderate) vs. Female (moderate) -0.095 0.239 -0.40 
White Male (moderate) vs. African American (moderate) -0.098 0.238 0.41 
Female (moderate) vs. African American (moderate) -0.004 0.239 -0.02 
White Male (conservative) vs. Female (conservative) 0.410 0.223 1.84 
White Male (conservative) vs. African American (conservative) 0.257 0.229 -1.12 
Female (conservative) vs. African American (conservative) -0.152 0.227 0.67 
White Male (moderate) vs. Female (conservative) 0.539 0.230 2.35 
White Male (moderate) vs. African American (conservative) 0.386  0.236 1.64 
Female (moderate) vs. African American (conservative) 0.480 0.237 2.03 
White Male (conservative) vs. Female (moderate) -0.224 0.233 -0.96 
White Male (conservative) vs. African American (moderate) -0.227 0.212 -0.98 
Female (conservative) vs. African American (moderate) -0.637 0.230 -2.77 
 
 
6.1.1 Gender Effects 
6.1.1.1 Support 
 
To explore the effects of voter characteristic on attitudes towards candidates I estimate a series of 
regression models as I did before and plot predicted values of these variables as a function of 
voter ideology.  Table 31 presents a series of models predicting voters’ willingness to support 
particular candidates based on (1) voter’s raw ideology and (2) the perceived ideological 
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congruence between voter and candidate.  If the corresponding hypotheses (9a – 9d) are 
supported by the data, I should observe that voters tend to express more support for 
counterstereotypical candidates than stereotypical cones at various ideological levels.  As in the 
last chapter, I analyze female and African American candidates separately. 
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 Table 31: Effects of Gender, Ideology, and Ideological Incongruence on Support for Candidates 
 
 
 Moderate Conservative Respondent Conservatism -0.149 (0.099) - 0.309 (0.056)** - Perceived Ideological Gap - -0.628 (0.976) - -0.222 (0.084)** Party Affect 0.024 (0.006) 0.014 (0.006) 0.003 (0.004) 0.003 (0.004) Weak Partisan 0.371 (0.272) 0.151 (0.204) -0.556 (0.149)** -0.711 (0.146)** Age -0.009 (0.008) -0.005 (0.007) 0.005 (0.005) 0.007 (0.005) White respondent 0.510 (0.388) 0.225 (0.236) 0.313 (0.260) 0.226 (0.245) Shared Gender 0.008 (0.204) -0.046 (0.182) -0.169 (0.139) -0.241 (0.142)* Education 0.048 (0.082) 0.075 (0.072) -0.035 (0.056) 0.031 (0.020) Income 0.018 (0.028) 0.001 (0.023) 0.0284 (0.018) -0.014 (0.054) Latent Sexism 0.064 (0.125) 0.067 (0.102) -0.075 (0.086)  0.090 (0.095) Female Candidate 0.057 (0.258) 0.021 (0.219) 0.258 (0.163) 0.235 (0.172) Male Candidate 0.236 (0.219) 0.187 (0.198) -0.299 (0.192) -0.222 (0.182) Constant 3.267 4.249 3.286 5.167 
     N 213 213 226 22657 F 2.25 8.59 11.30 9.15 R2 0.13 0.35 0.31 0.28 RMSE 1.385 1.120 0.936 0.957 
 145 
 Panel A: Conservative Female vs. Moderate Female 
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Panel B: Conservative Male vs. Moderate Male 
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Panel C: Conservative Female vs. Moderate Male 
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Panel D: Conservative Male vs. Moderate Female 
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Panel E: Conservative Female vs. Conservative Male 
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Panel F: Moderate Female vs. Moderate Male 
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Panel G: All Candidates 
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Figure 29: Effects of Gender and Ideology on Support for Candidates 
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Note that the models for both respondent ideology and perceived ideological congruence 
are consolidated into one table.  As should be expected, the coefficients for these ideological 
measures are negative (though shy of statistical significance) in the moderate candidate condition 
and positive and highly significant in the conservative candidate condition.  Figure 29 presents 
estimates of values of candidate support across different pairs of candidates as function of voter 
ideology.  Ideology continues to be the more powerful factor.  The graphs show that when a 
conservative candidate is compared to a moderate candidate (Panels A to D), the slope for 
moderate candidates is negative and the slope for conservative candidates is positive.  The most 
liberal of Republicans, in other words, prefer the moderate candidate to the conservative 
candidate and the most conservative Republicans express more support for the more conservative 
candidate, regardless of the gender of either candidate.       
 A key test of Hypothesis 9, however, comes when two candidates with the same ideology 
are contrasted.  Panels E and F present these results.  It is logical that both slopes are positive 
since both candidates share the same ideology.  Interestingly, the female candidate’s intercept is 
higher than the conservative white male’s intercept.  The effect, while consistent with the 
expectations violations part of the theory, falls shy of statistical significance.  I cannot conclude 
with certainty that conservative women enjoy more support than men, but the results do suggest 
at a minimum that parity is achieved.  The same conclusion applies to moderate candidates.  
Here male candidates rate slightly more support at each ideological level, but the effect is clearly 
insignificant.  On the issue of support, then, there is little evidence to suggest 
counterstereotypical status is an electoral asset.  Voters do respond to ideology, but unexpected 
candidates do not enjoy an affective boost from not “looking the part.” 
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 Panel A: Conservative Female vs. Moderate Female 
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Panel B: Conservative Male vs. Moderate Male 
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Panel C: Conservative Female vs. Moderate Male 
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Panel D: Conservative Male vs. Moderate Female 
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Panel E: Conservative Female vs. Conservative Male 
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Panel F: Moderate Female vs. Moderate Male 
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Panel G: All Candidates 
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Figure 30: Effects of Gender and Ideological Incongruence on Support for Candidates 
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The results are similar when the key independent variable of interest is the perceived 
incongruence between voter and candidate.  Figure 30 presents these predictions.  Note that here 
the x-axis is ideological incongruence between voter and candidate.  Higher values (moving left 
to right) indicate a larger perceived ideological “gap” between where voters view themselves and 
where they locate candidates.  As should be expected, values of support decrease the more voters 
perceive candidates to be ideologically distant.  When congruence is high, however, there are 
almost no demographic or ideological effects.  For instance, when voters view themselves as 
either ideologically equivalent or one-unit away from a candidate, there is no preference for any 
particular demographic group or ideological group.  This is clear in Panels A to D.  When 
congruence is high (the left-hand part of the figures), differences between candidates are slight.  
As that incongruence increases, though, differences emerge.  These distinctions are entirely 
ideologically based – the slope for the moderate candidate – regardless of gender – is steep while 
the slope for the conservative candidate – again, regardless of gender – is shallower.  This means 
that once voters perceive candidates to be about two ideological units away from themselves, 
they start to view moderate and conservative candidates differently.  Support lingers for 
conservative candidates longer than moderate ones.  The key, though, is that this effect is 
independent of gender.         
 As above, the real test of the expectancy violation hypothesis comes when men and 
women with the same ideology are contrasted.  This is shown in Panels E and F.  Once again, 
when two conservatives are compared the female candidate actually enjoys higher levels of 
support than men, but the effect is not statistically significant.  When two moderates face off, 
levels of support for men and women are nearly identical across the range of ideological 
congruence.  All told, these results are in some ways inconsistent with the theory but add 
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empirical evidence to the conclusions reached throughout this project.  Primary voters respond 
principally to ideological information, not gender cues.  While these results should not be 
interpreted as evidence that sexism has been eradicated within the Republican Party, they are at 
least consistent with the notion that given particular party labels and ideological information, 
gender-based ideological stereotypes may not be as pervasive as once thought. 
6.1.1.2 Representation Capacity 
 
The same analysis is conducted on the issue of representation capacity.  Again, results are broken 
down by ideology and ideological congruence.  As Table 32 demonstrates, among conservative 
political candidate there is a positive and significant increase in perceived representation capacity 
for female candidates (relative to the control group) but not for white male candidates.  This is 
the first evidence that counterstereotypical status may yield some electoral gains for female 
Republicans.  Indeed, turning to Panel E in Figure 31, we observe that female conservatives 
enjoy higher representation ratings than do white male candidates.  As respondents grow 
increasingly conservative, this difference becomes statistically significant (at the 90% confidence 
level).  This result, while only moderately robust statistically, is quite telling substantively.  In 
this instance two candidates with the same ideology are compared and the female conservative is 
perceived as a better representative than the male conservative.  The data provide some evidence 
in support of the potential for counterstereotypical status to be beneficial for female candidates, 
although it is far from conclusive evidence given the previous findings. 
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Table 32: Effects of Gender, Ideology, and Ideological Incongruence on Perceived Representation Capacity 
 
 
 
 Moderate Conservative Respondent Conservatism -0.084 (0.089) - 0.322 (0.054)** - Perceived Ideological Gap - -0.523 (0.074)** - -0.225 (0.067)** Party Affect 0.027 (0.006) 0.019 (0.005)** 0.010 (0.004)** 0.010 (0.005)** Weak Partisan 0.528 (0.246) 0.300 (0.183)* -0.413 (0.142)** -0.578 (0.142) Age -0.018 (0.008) -0.013 (0.006) -0.006 (0.005) -0.004 (0.005) White respondent 0.519 (0.332) 0.281 (0.304) 0.293 (0.239) 0.202 (0.235) Shared Gender -0.066 (0.183) -0.120 (0.164) -0.123 (0.123) -0.198 (0.126) Education 0.028 (0.076) 0.051 (0.067) -0.060 (0.050) -0.038 (0.050) Income -0.014 (0.025) -0.027 (0.021) 0.046 (0.016) 0.049 (0.017)** Latent Sexism 0.072 (0.111) 0.083 (0.091) 0.015 (0.087) 0.032 (0.094) Female Candidate 0.133 (0.228) 0.094 (0.203) 0.371 (0.150)** 0.346 (0.161)** Male Candidate 0.289 (0.204) 0.252 (0.188) -0.027 (0.179) -0.188 (0.169) Constant 3.221 4.240 3.327 5.276 
     N 213 213 226 226 F 2.99 7.61 8.79 7.23 R2 0.19 0.37 0.31 0.28 RMSE 1.241 1.096 0.889 0.914 
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 Panel A: Conservative Female vs. Moderate Female 
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Panel B: Conservative Male vs. Moderate Male 
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Panel C: Conservative Female vs. Moderate Male 
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Panel D: Conservative Male vs. Moderate Female 
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Panel E: Conservative Female vs. Conservative Male 
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Panel F: Moderate Female vs. Moderate Male 
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Panel G: All Candidates 
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Figure 31: Effects of Gender and Ideology on Perceived Representation Capacity of Candidates 
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 Panel A: Conservative Female vs. Moderate Female 
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Panel B: Conservative Male vs. Moderate Male 
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Panel C: Conservative Female vs. Moderate Male 
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Panel D: Conservative Male vs. Moderate Female 
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Panel E: Conservative Female vs. Conservative Male 
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Panel F: Moderate Female vs. Moderate Male 
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Panel G: All Candidates 
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Figure 32: Effects of Gender and Ideological Incongruence on Perceived Represent. Capacity of Candidates 
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Figure 32 presents the results of ideological congruence and perceptions of representation 
capacity.  The results suggest caution must be taken when inferring about expectancy violations 
because Panel E in this figure shows that while conservative women continue to enjoy higher 
levels of support than conservative men across ideological values, the effect here does not quite 
achieve statistical significance.  The rest of the figure closely mirrors the results from the support 
variable.  When ideological incongruence is low, voters tend not to distinguish among different 
types of candidates.  As incongruence grows, moderate candidates – of both genders – see a 
sharp decline in perceived representation capacity while conservative candidates of both genders 
see a shallower decline.  The results affirm that it is not merely ideology, but ideological 
congruence, that determines attitudes towards candidates.  The results show that when 
congruence is high, other information – even ideological policy information – is not particularly 
compelling.  Simply put, voters support and view as good representatives the candidates with 
whom they are most ideologically aligned. 
6.1.2 Racial Effects 
6.1.2.1 Support 
 
The same analysis is here applied to race instead of gender.  Although there are some similar 
patterns across the counterstereotypical groups, there are some distinct differences, as well.  
Consider first Table 33 and Figure 33.  These results focus on the effects of race and respondent 
ideology on support for white versus African American candidates.  In general, the candidates’ 
slopes are all in the expected direction (e.g. as voters grow more conservative, they express more 
support for conservative candidates).  In Panels A to D, it is clear that towards the conservative 
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end of the ideological spectrum Republican voters clearly distinguish moderate from 
conservative candidates.  As with women, more conservative Republicans express more support 
for the conservative candidate, regardless of race.  Yet it is interesting to note that, unlike with 
women, there is not parallel process occurring at the other end of the spectrum.  That is, in the 
gender analysis, more liberal Republicans expressed more support for the moderate candidate 
over the conservative one (see Panels A to D in Figure 31).  Yet in the racial analysis this does 
not occur – while the moderate candidate is rated higher than the conservative candidate, as 
expected, the difference is not statistically significant.        
 It should be noted that these results could be artifactual owing to the relatively few 
number of liberal Republicans in the sample (and the population).  Yet the same was true for the 
gender analysis, and some important distinctions emerged there.  Consequently, another 
interpretation worth considering is that Republican voters may be somewhat more comfortable 
with moderate female party candidates than moderate African American party candidates.  Of the 
two counterstereotypes, women are far more common in the Republican Party than African 
Americans.  As a result, the considerable variance in the case of moderate African American 
Republicans may partially be due to some Republicans hesitating to support unconventional 
candidates, even when those candidates’ ideologies align well with the voters.   
 As before, however, an important test of the expectancy violations hypothesis comes in 
Panels E and F in which demographic status is constant across different ideological types of 
candidates.  Here there is some evidence supporting the theoretical expectation that within 
ideological subgroups counterstereotypical candidates may gain some affective boost.  In Panel 
E, across nearly every level of ideology, the conservative African American candidate enjoys 
significantly higher levels of support than does the equally conservative white male candidate.  
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Since ideology is effectively held constant, the only explanation is that the counterstereotypical 
African American candidate benefited simply by being a conservative African American.   
 
Table 33: Effects of Race, Ideology, and Ideological Incongruence on Support for Candidates 
 
 
 Moderate Conservative Respondent Conservatism 0.019 (0.109) - 0.327 (0.073)** - Perceived Ideological Gap - -0.760 (0.057) - -0.308 (0.092)** Party Affect 0.023 (0.006)** 0.007 (0.003)** 0.004 (0.005) 0.004 (0.005) Weak Partisan 0.048 (0.273) -0.433 (0.138) -0.535 (0.180)** -0.655 (0.172)** Age -0.011 (0.008) -0.001 (0.005) 0.004 (0.006) 0.004 (0.006) Shared Race -0.037 (0.617) -0.394 (0.240) 0.459 (0.595) 0.476 (0.467) Female Respondent -0.080 (0.210) -0.014 (0.146) 0.091 (0.166) 0.128 (0.167) Education -0.112 (0.067) -0.067 (0.052) -0.014 (0.059) 0.009 (0.057) Income 0.050 (0.025)** 0.015 (0.017) 0.033 (0.020)* 0.038 (0.021) Latent Racism 0.057 (0.104) -0.101 (0.068) 0.097 (0.075) 0.082 (0.073) White Candidate 0.195 (0.628) 0.390 (0.246) -0.815 (0.634) -0.853 (0.509)* African American Candidate -0.164 (0.231) -0.172 (0.158) -0.165 (0.184) -0.333 (0.188)* Constant 3.440 6.059 3.311 5.449 
     N 163 163 167 167 F 3.65 22.39 8.50 7.79 R2 0.17 0.62 0.32 0.32 RMSE 1.169 0.794 0.963 0.966 
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Turning to moderate candidates, the same expectancy violation hypothesis is not 
supported.  Here white and African American candidates follow similar positive tracks across 
ideology but there is never a statistical distinction made between them by voters at any 
ideological level.  Coupled with the results from the gender analysis, the evidence overall 
suggests that violating expectations may yield some benefit to counterstereotypical candidates – 
but only if they are ideologically conservative.  When they are ideologically moderate they tend 
to be rated similarly to white male candidates.  That is, counterstereotypical candidates appear 
neither to lose nor gain from ideological moderation, but they do potentially gain from being 
conservative. 
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 Panel A: Conservative White vs. Moderate White 
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Panel B: Conserv. Afr. Am. Vs. Moderate Afr. Am. 
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Panel C: Conservative White vs. Moderate Afr. Am. 
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Panel D: Moderate White vs. Conservative Afr. Am. 
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Panel E: Conservative White vs. Conserv. Afr. Am. 
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Panel E: Moderate White vs. Moderate Afr. Am 
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Panel G: All Candidates 
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Figure 33: Effects of Race and Ideology on Support for Candidates 
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 Panel A: Conservative White vs. Moderate White 
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Panel B: Conserv. Afr. Am. Vs. Moderate Afr. Am. 
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Panel C: Conservative White vs. Moderate Afr. Am. 
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Panel D: Moderate White vs. Conservative Afr. Am. 
 
2
3
4
5
6
Su
pp
or
t f
or
 C
an
di
da
te
0 2 4 6
Perceived Ideological Incongruence
Moderate_White Conservative_AfrAm
 
 
Panel E: Conservative White vs. Conserv. Afr. Am. 
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Panel E: Moderate White vs. Moderate Afr. Am 
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Panel: All Candidates 
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Figure 34: Effects of Race and Ideological Congruence on Support for Candidates 
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When it comes to ideological congruence, the racial analysis bears similar results as the 
gender tests above.  Figure 34 shows that, as should be expected, the slopes for both moderate 
and conservative candidates are negative in all panels.  As ideological incongruence increases, 
voters are less likely to support any candidate.  In Panels A and C the slopes decline at different 
rates but they are never statistically distinguishable from each other.  In Panels B and D, 
however, as ideological incongruence increases Republicans begin to express different levels of 
support for moderate and conservative candidates.  In both of these panels the conservative 
candidate is African American, and is contrasted with a moderate African American and a 
moderate white candidate in Panels B and D, respectively.  It follows that the conservative 
African American candidate enjoys a (marginally) significantly statistical edge over moderate 
candidates while stereotypical white male conservatives do not.  The results are hardly 
conclusive, but they are consistent with the previous results suggesting the conservative African 
American Republican candidates can benefit from their counterstereotypical status.  
 There are limits to this conclusion, however.  Panels E and F in Figure 34, for instance, 
indicate that conservative candidates of either race lose support as ideological incongruence 
increases.  That is, African American conservatives do not experience a more shallow drop in 
support than their white male counterparts.  Nor do African American moderates.  Take with the 
raw ideology plots in Figure 33, the evidence here suggests that counterstereotypical status can 
be beneficial when voters are comparing ideologically like-minded candidates. However, 
ideological congruence is more important that expectancy violations.  If voters perceive any 
candidates to be relatively distant from themselves ideologically, they will express less support 
for those candidates regardless of race. 
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6.1.2.2 Representation Capacity 
 
The last empirical section considers the effects of race and ideology on how voters perceive 
white and African American candidates as potential representatives.  Table 34 and Figures 35 
and 36 present the results.  Panels A to D in Figure 35 display a similar pattern as emerged in 
the gender analysis above.  Differences in perceived representation capacity are a function of 
candidate ideology, not demographic status.  In each of these four panels, conservative 
candidates enjoy a positive slope as respondents grow more conservative.  Moderate candidates, 
on the other hand, enjoy significantly higher representation ratings among more liberal 
Republicans, but see a steady decline as respondents’ conservatism grows.  These effects are 
similar across all racial combinations of candidates, and are entirely consistent with the notion 
that ideological information trumps demographic considerations in candidate evaluations.   
 The test of the expectancy violations hypothesis in Panels E and F provide little evidence 
of an effect.  As with women, in Panel E conservative African American candidates are rated as 
better representatives than white male conservatives, but the effect does not achieve statistical 
significance.  Moreover, in Panel F the moderate white male is rated slightly higher than the 
moderate African American, although again the effect is not close to being a significant one.  
Once again the evidence for a pure expectancy violations gain for counterstereotypical 
candidates is mixed.  There are some instances in which it appears to play a role, but other times 
the effects are small, insignificant, or do not appear at all. 
 
 
 
 
 161 
Table 34: Effects of Race, Ideology, and Ideological Incongruence on Perceived Representation Capacity 
 
 
 
 Moderate Conservative Respondent Conservatism -0.124 (0.100) - 0.311 (0.074)** - Perceived Ideological Gap - -0.528 (0.082)** - -0.270 (0.081)** Party Affect 0.035 (0.006)** 0.024 (0.005)** 0.011 (0.006)* 0.011 (0.006)* Weak Partisan 0.564 (0.257)** 0.377 (0.173)** -0.476 (0.167)** -0.606 (0.170(** Age -0.028 (0.009) -0.023 (0.007)** -0.008 (0.005) -0.008 (0.005) Shared Race 0.185 (0.541) -0.047 (0545) 0.625 (0.571) 0.646 (0.494) Female respondent 0.172 (0.200) 0.120 (0.178) 0.144 (0.160) 0.179 (0.164) Education 0.023 (0.085) 0.062 (0.074) 0.002 (0.059) 0.024 (0.059) Income 0.011 (0.030) -0.0145 (0.027) 0.040 (0.017) 0.044 (0.018)** Latent Racism 0.104 (0.109) 0.008 (0.088) 0.069 (0.069) 0.054 (0.070) White Candidate 0.243 (0.560) 0.372 (0.0553) -0.876 (0.617) -0.918 (0.546)* African American Candidate 0.225 (0.240) 0.227 (0.205) -0.111 (0.180) -0.268 (0.188) Constant 3.427 4.385 3.274 5.293 
     N 163 163 167 167 F 5.98 13.03 6.90 6.81 R2 0.31 0.48 0.34 0.33 RMSE 1.206 1.054 0.938 0.947 
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 Panel A: Conservative White vs. Moderate White 
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Panel B: Conserv. Afr. Am. Vs. Moderate Afr. Am. 
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Panel C: Conservative White vs. Moderate Afr. Am. 
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Panel D: Moderate White vs. Conservative Afr. Am. 
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Panel E: Conservative White vs. Conserv. Afr. Am. 
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Panel E: Moderate White vs. Moderate Afr. Am 
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Panel: All Candidates 
 
3
4
5
6
7
Pe
rc
ep
tio
n 
of
 C
an
di
da
te
's
 R
ep
re
se
nt
at
io
n 
C
ap
ac
ity
0 2 4 6 8
Respondent's Conservatism
Conservative_White Moderate_White
Conservative_AfrAm Moderate_AfrAm
 
 
 
Figure 35: Effects of Race and Ideology on Perceived Representation Capacity of Candidates 
 163 
 Panel A: Conservative White vs. Moderate White 
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Panel B: Conserv. Afr. Am. Vs. Moderate Afr. Am. 
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Panel C: Conservative White vs. Moderate Afr. Am. 
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Panel D: Moderate White vs. Conservative Afr. Am. 
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Panel E: Conservative White vs. Conserv. Afr. Am. 
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Panel E: Moderate White vs. Moderate Afr. Am 
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Panel: All Candidates 
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Figure 36: Effects of Race and Ideological Incongruence on Perceived Represent. Capacity of Candidates 
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  Finally, Figure 36 presents the effects of race and ideological congruence.  As expected, 
and consistent with previous findings, the slopes for moderate and conservative candidates are 
negative in all panels, further affirming that voters recognize ideological incongruence with 
candidates are modify their evaluations of them accordingly.  Moderates of both races see a 
sharper decline in perceived representation capacity relative to conservatives of both races, but 
only when ideological incongruence is extremely high do these differences yield significantly 
different predictions.  This last figure contributes additional evidence to support the claim that 
when ideological information is present, candidates’ demographic status is largely disregarded 
by voters.  If valid, this is a normatively encouraging pattern. 
6.2 CONCLUSIONS: SOME EVIDENCE OF EXPECTANCY VIOLATIONS 
This chapter sought to extend the ideological perceptions analysis in Chapter 5 to other important 
attitudes about candidates.  It is here I anticipated that expectancy violations may lead to a 
significant electoral boost for female and African American candidates over stereotypical white 
male candidates in Republican primaries.  There is indeed some evidence of this, but it is not 
overwhelming, nor is it distributed evenly across all candidate types.  On the issue of candidate 
support, there is a modest increase for conservative women (and African American men) over 
conservative men across Republican voters.  Given the experimental design, this effect is 
consistent with an expectancy violations model – unexpected candidates within ideological 
subgroups do stimulate some positive affect relative to conventional candidates.  In some cases, 
as in conservative African American candidates relative to conservative white male candidates, 
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the effect is relative substantive – around and even over one point on a seven point scale.  Some 
Republicans also perceive conservative women as somewhat better representatives than 
conservative white males.         
 However, the effects are not always this pronounced.  The increased difference in support 
for women over men, for instance, does not quite achieve statistical significance.  Nor do 
Republican voters perceive differences in representation capacity between conservative white 
men and conservative African American men.  Most importantly, demographic-based differences 
in support and representation capacity only emerge among conservative candidates.  When 
moderate candidates are contrasted, race and gender do not generate positive affect, perhaps 
because moderate policy information works in conjunction with a liberal demographic cue to 
make Republican voters a bit wary.        
 One interesting finding in this analysis more generally is that demographic information 
does interact with policy information to generate (some) significant differences across candidate 
groups.  So far the empirical work has suggested that demographic cues simply do not matter.  
The results in this chapter qualify that pattern – race and gender certainly appear to be less 
powerful cues when applied in a high-information context, but there are several instances 
discussed above where they do influence evaluations, for better in some cases, for worse in 
others.  In the next and final chapter I synthesize the findings of the two studies here and discuss 
their implication for primary politics in America. 
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7.0  CHAPTER SEVEN: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This project represents a foray into information use in primary elections and how voters utilize 
cues entirely within a friendly but complex partisan context.  Specifically, I focused on the role 
of race and gender within party primaries at a time when the ever-shifting demographic make-up 
of the United States is beginning to have serious implications for the long-term viability of at 
least one major political party.  The Republican Party in particular has struggled to diversify its 
constituency and is actively pursuing strategies to recruit more women and people of color to run 
for office under the party banner.  While well-intentioned, these efforts, I argue, may not resolve 
the issue if voters are not also willing to support these candidates in party primary elections 
where their counterstereotypical status may – in theory – pose problems in winning over the 
primary electorate.  The rest of the project is designed to help advance our understanding of how 
and when this support occurs. 
I develop a theory in which I argue that candidate success in primaries is a function of 
both voter-centric and candidate-centric attributes.  Since party labels do fulfill their usual role as 
go-to heuristic for voters selecting a candidate, and since the electorate is more ideologically 
homogenous during primaries, race, gender, and the voters’ self-identification within parties 
should be more central to decision-making than they would be in general elections.  Given the 
ideological signals embedded within demographic cues, I argue that when primary voters know 
little about a candidate other than his or her race and gender as well as status as a co-partisan, 
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they will apply sort primary options and select a most-preferred option.  The second element of 
the theory proposes that counterstereotypical candidates presenting conflicting information cues 
– say, an African American Republican – can signal to voters which piece of information is more 
relevant to the decision-making process through policy messages contained in their rhetoric.  
Candidates can, in effect, resolve the cognitive conflict generated by their counterstereotypical 
status.  Two survey experiments explore these dynamics.        
 The rest of this chapter contains four sections: First, I summarize key findings from the 
studies explored in detail above.  Second, I return to and revise the original Republican dilemma 
introduced in Chapter 1, proposing that conventional wisdom about counterstereotypical 
candidates, while not inaccurate, is incomplete.  Third, I address the implications these results 
have for the Republican Party moving forward in the 2016 election and beyond.  Finally, I 
discuss how these results inform a research agenda that continues to explore the nature of 
information and decision-making in primary elections. 
7.1 KEY FINDINGS 
This project set out to more clearly reveal the interplay between demographic, partisan, and 
policy identities in primary elections.  Thematically, perhaps the most significant general 
contribution of this work is to illustrate how context can dramatically affect the nature of 
influence of information.  I uncover evidence suggesting that the relative impact of different 
types of information depends heavily on the context of the interaction between voter and 
candidate.  A candidate’s demographic status matters quite a bit in certain conditions, but is 
largely irrelevant in others.  Voters’ perceptions and evaluations of candidates are often a 
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function of their own ideological position and how much they see themselves as ideologically 
similar – or distinct – from candidates.    I consider in turn how variance in voters and 
candidates, respectively, affects the evaluative process. 
7.1.1 Voters 
One of the central arguments I put forth above is that in primary elections the ideological identity 
of voters – i.e. where they see themselves within their parties – is central to how they use 
information to evaluate primary candidates.  Partisans indeed differ considerably even within 
parties.  Even when race and gender proved to have minimal effects on candidate evaluations, a 
consistent pattern in the data is that voters’ imposed their own ideological viewpoints on their 
perceptions of candidates.  This phenomenon manifested itself in predictable ways.  For instance, 
more conservative Republicans saw more conservative Republican candidates as increasingly 
ideologically proximate while also perceiving more moderate candidates as more ideologically 
distant.  While not a direct interest in this project, these results underscore the urgency with 
which we must (better) understand how information is used to sort primary candidates.  
 Indeed, this discussion motivates a key conclusion/qualification of the theory proposed 
above.  While voters appear to use race and gender in some circumstances, the results of the 
experiments above appear to be more a function of ideological signals than pure expectancy 
violations.  There is minimal evidence that merely being counterstereotypical is advantageous – 
the first study shows no gains for these candidates in low-information environments.  Instead, 
counterstereotypical status is only advantageous when coupled with conservative policy 
information.  When this occurs, it (1) levels the playing field among strong Republican voters 
while (2) leading to gains for counterstereotypical candidates (relative to stereotypical ones) 
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among weak partisans.  Overall, however, for a pure expectancy violations theory to hold here, 
we might expect to see all Republicans or strong Republicans alone prefer the unexpected 
candidate – this is not the case.  The effects here are driven largely by ideological inference as a 
function of policy message. 
7.1.2 Candidates 
The information candidates provide to primary voters also plays a significant role in determining 
which candidates will succeed and the circumstances under which they do.  Information matters 
more under some conditions than others.  Notably, in the low-information environment simulated 
in the first study, I find little evidence that demographic traits have much of an effect on how 
voters evaluate candidates.  Instead, it appears that when voters are asked to evaluate co-
partisans, their evaluations depend much more on party affect than they do on the candidates.  
Counterstereotypical candidates do not gain among weak Republican partisans, nor do they 
suffer among strong Republican partisans.  This is encouraging news insofar as it suggests that 
counterstereotypical candidates will not simply be written off as too liberal for Republican 
voters.  Again, however, this is also a possible artifact of the experimental design and weak 
treatment stimuli.          
 Design concerns aside, though, the results allow me to more forcefully conclude that 
what matters for candidates is the messages they furnish to voters.  The nature of what 
candidates say directly affects how demographic cues will be incorporated into voter decision-
making – often by rendering them irrelevant.  Conservative (liberal) voters tend to express more 
favorable impression of conservative (liberal) candidates, regardless of race and gender.  The 
results, then, suggest that counterstereotypical African American or female Republicans may not 
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actually struggle with demographic stereotypes as much as once thought.  Among Republicans, 
this is especially the case when candidates are ideologically conservative.  In the next section, 
however, I discuss some important qualifications to this statement, and synthesize the results of 
this project into the larger discussion about demographic cues and party politics. 
7.2 REVISING THE REPUBUBLCAN DILEMMA 
A critical premise of this entire project was what we may call the dilemma of the female (African 
American) Republican.  These politicians are unusual in that they present multiple pieces of 
information that are not consistent with ideological stereotypes.  In other words, these candidates 
simultaneous provide a liberal signal as well as a conservative one.  Voters, consequently, may 
struggle to disentangle conflicting information cues and draw conclusions about these 
counterstereotypical candidates.  As Mcdermott (1997) puts it: “because a Republican woman 
provides voters with two competing [categorical] cues, […] voters may not know which cue to 
give more weight” (278).  Furthermore, it is well-established that uncertainty corresponds with 
lower levels of support for candidates (Alvarez 1997).  The result is a dilemma for 
counterstereotypical candidates: voters, independent of any potential latent sexism or racism, 
may fail to support female or African American candidates because they are not sure what these 
candidates stand for.           
  The results of this project suggest a revision of the dilemma is necessary moving 
forward.  It is not so much that the dilemma is wrong or illusory, but simply that it is incomplete.  
Scholars thus far have done little to assess how voters respond to information that can break “cue 
ties” presented by counterstereotypical candidates.  In this project I have taken steps to begin to 
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do so, and the results imply that the conventional wisdom about counterstereotypical candidates 
is inadequate.  It requires more nuance.  Indeed, many of the findings above might be taken 
initially to suggest that counterstereotypical candidates are not in as much electoral danger as we 
might have suspected – after all, in most cases they even the playing field, and even reverse it 
among certain voters.  Yet the story is not this simple.  The results also illustrate the potential 
additional challenges these candidates face, and here I seek to revise the dilemma of the 
counterstereotypical Republicans to more accurately portray political reality for these candidates.  
This new dilemma, I argue, is comprised of three parts.      
 Counterstereotypical candidates must hold conservative views.  One of the key findings 
above was that counterstereotypical Republican candidates succeed in leveling the playing field 
– and even reversing it – in party primary elections.  More ideologically extreme (conservative or 
liberal) voters heavily favor ideologically extreme candidates, and moderate partisans prefer 
conservative women and African Americans to conventional white men.  Yet the reality is that, 
on average, women and persons of color tend to be more liberal than white men in both parties.  
As Koch (2000, 426) concludes when assessing the political views of male and female 
congressional candidates, “the [actual] ideology scores of the women candidates [are] more 
liberal than those of their male counterparts […]. Thus, citizens' generalization that women 
candidates are more liberal than male candidates [is] in fact true.”       
 In this project, the findings underscore a potentially distressing reality – 
counterstereotypical candidates, who are often more ideologically moderate, really only gain an 
electoral edge if they are conservative.  Moreover, moderate counterstereotypical candidates did 
not always have an advantage over conservative candidates even among ideologically moderate 
voters.  Recall that even though ideologically moderate voters perceived themselves as 
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ideologically aligned with moderate candidates generally, this did not hold true for moderate 
African American Republicans.  Together, these findings may help explain why there are 
relatively few counterstereotypical Republicans (assuming they campaign on sincere policy 
views) running for office.42  They are also consistent with the observation that many 
counterstereotypical Republican candidates who achieve even moderate prominence in American 
politics are quite conservative – these are the candidates have sufficient credentials to appeal to 
the Republican base.         
 Messages must be received in order to affect evaluations.  This project was not 
concerned with the nature of the distribution of information across the primary electorate – all 
respondents in this study were presented with complete information about the candidates.  This 
represents a legitimate external validity concern and an important qualification when 
extrapolating to party politics outside of this study.  Yet even though information is held constant 
here, in practical political terms these conclusions suggest that the most important goal for all 
primary candidates is to get their policy/ideological profile out for voters to hear.  The structure 
of primary elections in the United States, however, may hinder these efforts.  At the presidential 
level, the sheer number of candidates struggling to be heard makes it difficult for any one voice 
to rise above the rest short of massive advertising efforts (and the massive costs that go with 
them).  At the congressional level and in even lower levels of office, the struggle may be even 
more challenging, for voters pay even less attention to these races.  While this general challenge 
arises for all candidates, it may be especially pronounced for counterstereotypical candidates 
who may face additional struggles in gaining party nomination.  For instance, Lawless and 
Pearson (2008) conclude that women are more likely to face primary challengers than men. 
42 Granted, much of this is due to the ideological distribution of female and African Americans in general.  These 
groups tend not to be conservative and/or Republicans. 
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  Shattered ceilings may hurt general election chances.  I have committed steadfastly to 
analyzing primary elections exclusively in this project, but clearly we must focus somewhat on 
what these results mean for the general elections that follow.  Unfortunately, the findings here do 
not paint a particularly rosy picture.  We observe that female and African American candidates 
benefit most when they are conservative, and not simply counterstereotypical.  This suggests, 
however, that to the extent that these candidates can successfully secure their party’s nomination 
for the fall, the result is a party candidate potentially out of step with the general election 
electorate to whom s/he must now appeal.  Political pundits and strategists alike often discuss the 
need for a candidate to “move to the middle” once the primary election is over in order to try and 
win over moderate voters in addition to the partisans who will now almost certainly vote for him.  
If winning the party’s nomination requires counterstereotypical candidates to emphasize 
especially conservative credentials, it may come back to hurt them in the fall.  Indeed, this may 
be one of the factors contributing to the general election losses by candidates like far right-
leaning Sharon Angle in 2010, who lost to a very unpopular incumbent.    
 All told, the electoral picture painted by these results represents a double-edged sword.  
On the one hand, there is evidence that demographic information is in many cases not 
particularly central to candidate evaluations in party primaries.  The first survey experiment 
yielded evidence that voters rely much more on partisanship than race or gender; knowledge that 
a particular candidate shares your party identification rendered demographic cues irrelevant 
when inferring about candidates.  The second study found that policy information is also a strong 
motivating factor in candidate evaluations.  Strong partisans in particular care much more about 
what candidates say than what they look like.  These results are encouraging insofar as 
debunking – or at least deflating – the proposition that women and minorities will struggle to win 
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in Republican party contests.          
 On the other hand, demographic cues still matter, and they are not always electoral assets.  
Counterstereotypical candidates in the Republican Party tend to be ideological moderates, yet 
this project reveals that moderate voters – those whom we should expect to be especially 
attracted to moderate candidates – actually prefer moderate stereotypical candidates to moderate 
counterstereotypical candidates.  The conflicting information cues presented by female/African 
American moderates lead to ambivalence between moderate counterstereotypical candidates and 
conservative ones.  Coupled with other considerations – message dissemination, the relative 
scarcity of conservative counterstereotypical Republicans, etc. – and the picture is not quite as 
optimistic as a simple reading of the experimental results might imply. 
7.3 WHAT ARE THE ADVANTAGES TO BEING COUNTERSTEREOTYPICAL? 
Given the discussion above, it is worth briefly revisiting precisely when counterstereotypical 
candidate do and do not gain an electoral advantage over their white male counterparts.  There 
are two instances in which this edge is gained.  The first is purely ideological: when 
counterstereotypical conservatives run against stereotypical moderates in Republican primaries, 
Republican voters tend to prefer the conservative counterstereotypical candidate.  This is a 
logical conclusion given the overwhelming power of ideological information demonstrated 
above.  Yet this finding is not trivial, for it demonstrates that voters do not hesitate to support 
unconventional candidates when they have policy credentials voters prefer.     
 The second way counterstereotypical candidates may capitalize on their status is affect-
based, not information-based.  Above I documented some evidence that when conservative 
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counterstereotypical candidates (e.g. female or African American Republicans) are running 
against stereotypical (white male) candidates, there are some instances when voters express more 
favorability for the unconventional candidate.  In other words, they gain an electoral edge by 
virtue of simply being counterstereotypical (since all information is constant).  These effects are 
far less pronounced than the information-based gains, but they exist.  Moreover, if the treatment 
stimuli were selected to bias the findings against demographic-based findings, the emergence of 
racial and gender effects may actually be more pronounced outside of this experiment.  
Additional research using additional/alternative stimuli will help clarify this issue. 
7.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR REPUBLICAN PARTY MOVING FORWARD 
It is worth taking a moment to consider the results of this project in a larger political context.  
What do the findings above mean for the Republican Party?  As the revised dilemma suggests, 
the results are simultaneously heartening as well as discouraging.  Perhaps the most important 
observation, and one inconsistent with much of the research on demographic cues, is that 
counterstereotypical status does not tend to be a detriment to primary candidates.  In low 
information environments, no one demographic type of candidate is preferable to another.  As 
policy information is introduced, counterstereotypical candidates may even gain an advantage 
over conventional candidates when they provide the right policy information.  In short, 
conservative counterstereotypical Republicans have the potential to do compete in Republican 
primaries.           
 At the same time, we saw that moderate counterstereotypes do not enjoy the same 
advantages.  Moderate African American candidates struggled to appeal (in some cases) even 
 176 
with moderate Republican voters.  Given that most counterstereotypical Republicans in the 
population do tend to be more moderate, this means that the potential gains African American or 
female Republicans may enjoy are limited to relatively few African American or female 
politicians – the conservative ones that come to mind when we are asked to identify prominent 
non-white or non-male Republicans.  Indeed, this is the reason that the counterstereotypical 
Republicans we do see tend to be quite conservative.      
 At the same time, other considerations may be less important than we might theoretically 
expect.  Consider primary types as an example.  We might predict, a priori, that open primary 
states may be better for counterstereotypical Republicans since moderate independent voters can 
participate.  Yet the findings here suggest that moderate counterstereotypical Republicans do not 
really have that much to gain by running in states with high concentrations of moderate voters 
participating.  Of course, we cannot read too much into the results of a single project.  These 
studies have limitations like all others, and we cannot conclusively determine here if 
counterstereotypical will always do better under one system or another.  Still, the results 
underscore the need for the party to focus not just on descriptive represented of historically 
underrepresented constituencies, but also to think strategically about where and how these 
candidates can succeed in winning the party’s nomination for the fall election.  
 The Party should also consider the nature of information dissemination in primary 
elections.  The revised dilemma above concludes based on the research that counterstereotypical 
candidates need to be heard moreso than do stereotypical ones.  When messages are received, 
they have an effect, but we observed above that evaluations of white men do not really change as 
a function of policy information.  They do when it is a counterstereotypical candidate speaking.  
Therefore the party may want to review rules how, for instance, it decides which candidates are 
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invited to participate in primary debates.  Presumably, counterstereotypical candidates may 
benefit from this kind of exposure far more than conventional candidates do.  If the party is truly 
committed to diversifying its candidate pool, it may even consider taking steps to actively 
promote the ability of counterstereotypical candidates to connect with primary voters.43 
 Finally, it is worth taking a moment to consider recent Republican elections and how well 
the results of this study align with them.  In many ways, the findings here reflect electoral reality.  
The most prominent counterstereotypical Republican candidates to emerge on the national scene 
– Sarah Palin, Michelle Bachman, Herman Cain, and Ben Carson, to name a few – are united by 
strong conservative credentials.  None have won their party’s nomination for president, but it is 
interesting to note that some of the most experienced moderate counterstereotypical Republicans 
– Susan Collins and Olympia Snowe, for instance – have not even attempted to do so.  Moderate 
and libertarian candidates like Gary Johnson and Ron Paul struggled to gain traction at all, 
despite being stereotypical Republican candidates.  Clearly, these anecdotal observations are just 
that, and cannot be taken as irrefutable evidence of how primary voters treat candidates more 
generally.  Still, the results of this project are consistent with the observation that prominent 
counterstereotypical Republicans are almost exclusively of the conservative variety, and even 
then they have had mixed success. 
43 This, of course, would itself be a counterstereotypical move given the Party’s resistance to affirmative-action type 
policy positions. 
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7.5 CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE LITERATURE, LIMITATIONS, AND NEXT STEPS 
I conclude the chapter with a brief summary of the contributions this project makes to the 
literature as well as few additional qualifications and a discussion of how to advance this line of 
research.  The most important contribution I make is to explicitly analyze the relationship 
between demographic and partisan information.  Most research on demographic cues ignores 
partisan labels, and the few that integrate the two fail to generate consistent results.  Critically, in 
my view, none of this work looked at party primaries where voters are asked to evaluate 
candidates seeking a nomination and not simply an office.  However, this work is far from the 
last word on the issue of demographic cues in primary elections.  Since I am principally 
concerned with better understanding how voters evaluate candidates, this project does not 
directly test how those perceptions affect specific – and important – behaviors like the decision 
to vote on Election Day or whether certain types of candidates motivate voters to seek additional 
information about them.  I focused on manipulating key factors of interest – demographic cues 
and policy messages – but there are many other relevant issues that are required to paint a more 
complete picture of electoral behavior in primary elections.  In the course of crafting a 
parsimonious experimental design, a number of important elements were necessarily left to 
future endeavors.  Below I highlight a few of the most important avenues of additional work. 
7.5.1 Gendered and Racialized Policy Domains 
In the course of developing policy messages for this study, I intentionally avoided policy 
domains known to have high degrees of association with particular races or genders.  This was 
done in order to better ensure that demographics effects were indeed the result of basic 
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demographic differences among candidates and not due to specific issues those candidates 
discussed.  Yet women and candidates of color are in a unique position to address and advocate 
issues especially relevant to the demographic groups whom they descriptively represent.  Indeed, 
as discussed above, voters hold stereotypes about politicians’ policy competence, with men and 
women, black and white individuals perceived as being especially skillful – or inept – in 
different policy areas.  Future work on race and gender in party primaries can look at not only 
the ideological tone of policy messages as I do here, but more acutely assess the role these sorts 
of policy domains play in the evaluative process.  This is especially relevant given that there 
were some occasions in the experiments above where African American and female candidates 
did not generate similar reactions among voters.  
7.5.2 Viability, Strategic Voting, and Multi-Candidate Contests 
This project is also limited in that other unique features of the primary election process are not 
explicitly addressed (or replicated in the experiments above).  For instance, I do not simulate 
multi-candidate environments voters encounter in actual elections.  In this project, voters only 
evaluate a single candidate within their party, but elections (usually) require voters to select from 
multiple candidates, especially in primary elections.  I have several projects in the development 
stage that will expand on this work by asking individuals to actually select from multiple 
candidate options.  For instance, borrowing from reference dependence theory, one such 
experiment will manipulate information not about a particular candidate, but instead who is 
running against that candidate in a primary election.  I expect that perceptions of one electoral 
choice are shaped not merely by her own attributes, but by those of her challenger. 
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This project also does not consider the role for strategic voting or the concept of viability 
more generally.  Primary elections are the first in a two-stage process, and it is not unreasonable 
to presume that (some) voters may make decision in the first stage that are not independent of the 
second stage.  That is, a primary vote choice may be made with an eye towards the subsequent 
election.  This sort of strategic voting is a central interest of mine and I already have some work 
under way to begin to explore this concept.  For example, a colleague and I have conducted an 
experiment in which we attempt to identify the conditions under which a voter will defect from a 
sincere primary vote choice to a strategic one.  Initial results suggest that some voters are indeed 
willing to abandon their most preferred candidate for one that has a better chance of winning the 
fall general election.            
 These findings underscore the importance of incorporating viability into future endeavors 
related to primary elections.  Race and gender offer additional opportunities to explore the 
strategic voting, particularly in Republican primaries as the party actively seeks to boost the 
presence of non-white, non-male politicians within its ranks.  These considerations may also 
yield important insights into so-called “downstream effects.” For instance, scholars have noted 
that some candidates can attract voters from the other party in general elections.  Democratic 
women, for example, may siphon off some Republican women in fall elections.  There is 
additional work to do exploring how primary choices by voters affect general elections that 
follow spring nomination contests.   For instance, latent resentment towards women or African 
Americans – or other groups – may manifest itself not in vote choice, but in turnout, with some 
voters being especially likely or less likely to show up at the polls when their party has 
nominated a particular candidate.  Additionally, do party leaders devote extra time and attention 
to counterstereotypical candidates who advance through primary elections in the fall?  
 181 
Ultimately, while the project contributes to our understanding of how the Republican Party may 
– or may not – succeed in diversifying its voting base, primary victories are only the first step on 
the path to increased representation. 
7.5.3 Reconciling Other Forms of Information Conflict 
A third line of work I plan to pursue relates loosely to the concept of information conflict and 
how voters reconcile cognitive inconsistencies.  This sort of conflict extends well beyond 
demographic cues.  I plan to consider issues like how partisan voters deal with candidates who 
share some – but not all – conventional party policy stances.  To what extent can politicians “get 
away” with not towing the party line, or engage in what we may call “policy exception making?”  
In addition, I intend to contribute to the burgeoning line of research assessing how voters 
respond to bipartisanship and the consequences it has for policy evaluation.  In an age of 
increased polarization in American politics, these sorts of questions are particularly relevant to 
understanding how voters conceive of public policy and, ultimately, how elected officials make 
it.  Counterstereotypical messages and concepts, as they become less common (see, e.g. the 
decline of Blue Dog Democrats), also become potentially more influential when they emerge. 
7.5.4 Clarifying Information-Based and Affective-Based Models of Candidate Evaluation 
Students of political behavior have approached the question from a variety of theoretical 
perspectives.  A social cognition approach, for instance, emphasizes affect and shared identity 
between voter and candidate.  A Bayesian, or information-based approach emphasizes the role of 
new information in compelling individuals to update previously held belief.  In the theory above, 
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I principally employ the latter approach, but argue that conditional on certain information being 
available, affect may also be generated via expectancy violations.  Empirically, the two 
approaches yield similar theoretical as well as empirical expectations, yet there remains a tension 
between the two schools.  Rather than relying on one model or the other, future work must seek 
to clarify the relationship between affective and informational processes, not only in primary 
politics, but in American politics more generally.  Here I offer one way in which the two 
traditions may simultaneously apply to behavioral processes, but this project represent a very 
preliminary first step in this larger endeavor. 
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APPENDIX A 
SURVEY QUESTIONS 
Study 1: Candidate Evaluation and Party Subgroups 
Part 1: Eligibility Question Block 
Note: not all questions in the eligibility block directly concern eligibility.  Questions 1, 2, 
and 5 are the pertinent queries.  The others are included to minimize the likelihood that 
an ineligible respondent can go back and change an answer in order to “make” herself 
eligible after learning that she is not. 
These first few questions will be used to determine your eligibility for this survey.  Please answer 
them honestly.   
Q1: What is your age in years? 
A1: Open-ended: Respondent inputs age 
Note: If respondent is under 18 years of age, the survey will end 
Q2: Are you a citizen of the United States? 
A2: Respondent selects “yes” or “no” 
Note: if respondent is not a citizen of the United States, the survey will end 
Q3: In what state do you currently reside? 
A3: Respondents select state of residence from dropdown menu 
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Q4: Which of the following best describes your religion? 
A4: Respondents select religion from dropdown menu (Baptist – any denomination; 
Protestant (e.g. Methodist, Lutheran, Presbyterian, Episcopal); Catholic; Mormon; 
Jewish; Muslim; Hindu; Buddhist; Pentecostal; Eastern Orthodox; Other-Christian; 
Atheist; Agnostic) 
Q5: Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an 
independent or what? 
A5: Respondent selects “Republican,” “Democrat,” “Independent,” Something else” 
Note: If respondent is neither “Republican” nor “Democrat” the survey will end 
Q6: Are you (Check all that apply): 
A6: Respondent select one or more buttons: “Married,” “Divorced,” “Widowed,” 
“Separated,”  “Single,” “Single parent” 
Part 2: Interest and Media 
Q7: Generally speaking, how interested are you in what’s going on in government and politics? 
A7: Respondents will select one of the following buttons: “Extremely interested,” “Very 
interested,” “Moderately interested,” “Slightly interested,” or “Not interested at all” 
Q8: During a typical week, about how many hours per week do you spending watching political 
media? 
A8: Open-ended: Respondent inputs number 
Part 3: Candidate evaluation (including experimental conditions) 
Note: Respondents will be randomly assigned to learn about one of four fictional political 
candidates within their own party.  Four candidates (A white male, a white female, a 
black male, and a candidate with no demographic information) will provide identical  
policy  messages.  All Republican respondents, then, will be presented with one of the 
variations of Question 9.  All Democratic respondents will be presented with one of the 
variations of Question 10. 
Q9.1 (Condition A = Republican Control Group - No Demographic information provided): “I 
am running to be the nominee for the [Democratic/Republican] Party in the general 
election this fall.  I am running because I believe in America and want to do my part to 
help Americans thrive like they never have before.  I pledge that I will work tirelessly to 
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 achieve important goals like providing a quality education for our children, stimulating a 
 strong economy, and a keeping our streets safe for our citizens. 
Q9.2 (Condition B = White Republican male candidate): The same message from Q9.1 will be 
 presented along with a photograph of a fictional white male politician. 
 
Q9.3 (Condition C = White Republican female candidate): The same message from Q9.1 will be 
 presented along with a photograph of a fictional white female politician. 
 
Q9.4 (Condition D = Black Republican male candidate): The same message from Q9.1 will be 
 presented along with a photograph of a fictional black male politician. 
 
Q10.1 (Condition E = Democratic Control Group - No Demographic information provided): 
 same message from Q9.1 will be presented with no accompanying photograph of a 
 fictional politician. 
 
Q10.2 (Condition F = White Democratic male candidate): The same message from Q9.1 will be 
 presented along with a photograph of a fictional white male politician 
 
Q10.3 (Condition G = White Democratic female candidate): The same message from Q9.1 will 
 be presented along with a photograph of a fictional white female politician. 
 
Q10.4 (Condition H = Black Democratic male candidate): The same message from Q9.1 will be 
 presented along with a photograph of a fictional black male politician. 
 
 
 Note: Photographs of the three candidates to be used for both political parties: 
        
 
Part 4: Candidate Evaluation 
Note: all respondents will answer the same questions but party labels are applied to 
respondents of each party, respectively.  For instance, Republicans will be asked to 
evaluate how good this candidate would be for the Republican Party and Democrats will 
be asked to evaluate how good this candidate would be for the Democratic Party. 
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Please provide us with some of your thoughts about this candidate.  Be honest.  There are no 
right or wrong answers.  We are only interested in your opinion. 
Q11: Which of the following do you think best describes this candidate’s political ideology? 
A11: Respondents will select one of the following buttons: “Very liberal,” “Somewhat 
liberal,” “Closer to liberals,” “Neither liberal nor conservative,” “Closer to 
conservatives,” “Conservative,” “Very conservative” 
Q12: I would support this candidate as the Republican Party’s nominee for the fall election. 
A12: Respondents will select one of the following buttons: “Strongly disagree,” 
“Disagree,”  “Somewhat disagree,” “Neither agree nor disagree,” “Somewhat 
agree,” “Agree,” “Strongly  agree” 
Q13: If elected, this candidate would support the interests of people like me. 
A13: Respondents will select one of the following buttons: “Strongly disagree,” 
“Disagree,”  “Somewhat disagree,” “Neither agree nor disagree,” “Somewhat 
agree,” “Agree,” “Strongly agree” 
Q14: How appealing do you think this candidate would be to independent voters and voters who 
belong to other political parties? 
A14: Respondents will select one of the following buttons: “Very unlikely,” “Unlikely,” 
“Somewhat unlikely,” “Undecided,” “Somewhat likely,” “Likely,” “Very likely” 
Q15: How confident are you that your impressions of this candidate are accurate? 
A15: Respondents will select one of the following buttons: “Extremely confident,” “Very 
confident,” “Somewhat confident,” “Not very confident,” “Not at all confident”  
Part 5: Personal Characteristics Block 
Q16: Which of the following best describes you? 
A16: Respondents select one of the following buttons: “White/Caucasian,” “African 
American,” “Hispanic,” “Asian,” “Native American,” “Pacific Islander,” “Other” 
Q17: Which is the highest level of education you have completed? 
A17: Respondents select education level from dropdown menu (Less than high school; 
 High  school/GED; Some college; 2-year college degree; 4-year college degree; 
Masters degree; Doctoral degree; Professional degree (JD, MD)) 
Q18: What is your gender? 
A18: Respondents select either “Male” or “Female” 
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Q19: What is your annual household income? 
A19: Respondents select income range from dropdown menu ($20,000-29,999; $30,000-
39,999; $40,000-49,999; $50,000-59,999; $60,000-69,999; $70,000-79,999; $80,000-
89,999; $90,000-99,999; $100,000-109,999; $110,000-119,999; $120;000-129,999; 
$130,000-139,999; $140,000-149,999; $150,000+) 
Part 6: Gender and Society Battery 
Next we would like to hear your opinions about modern American society.  Please indicate the 
degree to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about men and 
women in America today. 
Q20: When women lose fairly to men in equal competition, they often claim discrimination. 
A20: Respondents will select one of the following buttons: “Strongly disagree,” 
“Disagree,” “Somewhat disagree,” “Neither agree nor disagree,” “Somewhat 
agree,” “Agree,” “Strongly agree” 
Q21: Women do not need to be protected by men. 
A21: Respondents will select one of the following buttons: “Strongly disagree,” 
“Disagree,”  “Somewhat disagree,” “Neither agree nor disagree,” “Somewhat 
agree,” “Agree,” “Strongly agree” 
Q22: Women often exaggerate problems at work. 
A22: Respondents will select one of the following buttons: “Strongly disagree,” 
“Disagree,” “Somewhat disagree,” “Neither agree nor disagree,” “Somewhat 
agree,” “Agree,” “Strongly agree” 
Q23: In a disaster, women do not necessarily need to be rescued first. 
A23: Respondents will select one of the following buttons: “Strongly disagree,” 
“Disagree,” “Somewhat disagree,” “Neither agree nor disagree,” “Somewhat 
agree,” “Agree,” “Strongly agree” 
Part 7: Political Preferences 
Q24: The Democratic [Republican] Party includes many types of people.  In general, how would 
you describe yourself? 
A24: Respondents select either “Strong Democrat (Republican)” or “Weak Democrat 
(Republican)” 
Q25: Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose the Tea Party? 
A25: Respondents select one of the following buttons: “Support,” “Oppose,” “Neither 
support nor oppose” 
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Q26: When it comes to politics, how would you describe yourself, and the following, as liberal, 
conservative, or neither liberal nor conservative? 
A26: For each of three entities (“You,” “Democrats,” and “Republicans”) respondents 
will select one of the following buttons: “Very liberal,” “Somewhat liberal,” “Closer to 
liberal,” Neither liberal nor conservative,” “Closer to conservatives,” “Somewhat 
conservative,” “Very  conservative” 
Q27: We would like to get your overall feelings towards political parties in America.  On the 
scale below, ratings between 50 and 100 mean you feel favorable and warm toward the 
party.   Ratings between 0 and 50 degrees mean that you do not feel favorable toward the 
party.  A rating exactly at the 50 degree means you do not feel particularly warm or cold 
towards the Party.  Where would you place yourself on this scale?  
A27: Respondents will use a sliding scale (0 to 100) to identify a level of 
favorability/warmth towards both the Democratic, Republican, and Tea Parties 
Q28: If you had to give President Obama a letter grade, where "F" means terrible and "A" means 
excellent, how would you rate his overall performance as president? 
A28: Respondents will use a sliding scale (“A+” to “F”) to give President Obama a 
letter grade 
Q29: During the last few years, did you usually vote in national, state, and local elections, or did 
you usually not vote? 
A29: Respondents select “usually voted” or “usually did not vote” 
Part 8: Political knowledge battery 
Q30: What job or political office is held by Joe Biden? 
A30: Open-ended: Respondent inputs answer 
Q31: Whose responsibility is it to determine if a law is constitutional or not? 
A31: Respondents will select one of the following buttons: “The President,” “Congress,” 
“The  Supreme Court” 
Q32: How much of a majority is required for the U.S. Senate and House to override a 
presidential veto? 
A32: Respondents will select one of the following buttons: “Any majority,” “51%,” 
“60%,” “67%,” “75%” 
Q33: Which political party would you say is generally more conservative than the other 
A33: Respondents will select one of the following buttons: “Democratic Party,” 
“Republican  Party” 
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Part 9: Opinions about American Society 
Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements 
about race in American Society. 
On average, African-American students get lower scores on standardized tests than do whites.  
How much of the difference in test scores: 
Q34: Occurs because most blacks do not have the chance to get a good education? 
A34: Respondents will select one of the following buttons: “A great deal,” “Some,” 
“A Little,” “None,” “Don’t know” 
Q35: Can be explained by discrimination against blacks 
A35: Respondents will select one of the following buttons: “A great deal,” “Some,” 
“A Little,” “None,” “Don’t know” 
Q36: Occurs because most blacks do not teach their children the values and skills which are 
required to be successful in school?   
A36: Respondents will select one of the following buttons: “A great deal,” “Some,” 
“A Little,” “None,” “Don’t know” 
Q37: Occurs because most blacks just don't have the motivation or will power to perform well. 
A37: Respondents will select one of the following buttons: “A great deal,” “Some,” 
“A Little,” “None,” “Don’t know” 
Q38: Is due to racial differences in intelligence? 
A38: Respondents will select one of the following buttons: “A great deal,” “Some,” 
“A Little,” “None,” “Don’t know” 
Q39: Occurs because of fundamental genetic differences between the races? 
A39: Respondents will select one of the following buttons: “A great deal,” “Some,” 
“A Little,” “None,” “Don’t know” 
On average, African-Americans have lower income and worse housing than white people.  How 
much of the economic difference between blacks and whites: 
Q40: Occurs because most blacks do not have the chance to get a good education? 
A40: Respondents will select one of the following buttons: “A great deal,” “Some,” 
“A Little,” “None,” “Don’t know” 
Q41: Can be explained by discrimination against blacks 
A41: Respondents will select one of the following buttons: “A great deal,” “Some,” 
“A Little,” “None,” “Don’t know” 
Q42: Occurs because most blacks do not teach their children the values and skills which are 
required to be successful in school?   
A42: Respondents will select one of the following buttons: “A great deal,” “Some,” 
“A Little,” “None,” “Don’t know” 
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Q43: Occurs because most blacks just don't have the motivation or will power to perform 
well?   
A43: Respondents will select one of the following buttons: “A great deal,” “Some,” 
“A Little,” “None,” “Don’t know” 
Q44: Is due to racial differences in intelligence? 
A44: Respondents will select one of the following buttons: “A great deal,” “Some,” 
“A Little,” “None,” “Don’t know” 
Q45: Occurs because of fundamental genetic differences between the races? 
A45: Respondents will select one of the following buttons: “A great deal,” “Some,” 
“A Little,” “None,” “Don’t know” 
Part 10: Candidate Recall 
Q46: Please think back to the candidate you evaluated earlier.  What do you recall about the 
candidate?  List anything that you remember. 
A46: Open-ended: respondent inputs answer 
Part 11: Debrief and Payment Code 
Thank you for participating!  This study had you looking at a fictional political candidate within 
your own party to learn more about how people make decisions in elections. 
Important: In order to get credit for participating, you must input the following code into the 
Mechanical Turk payment code box. 
Note: a random code will be generated at the end of the survey which respondents must 
copy and paste into the Mechanical Turk web page to complete the survey. 
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Study 2: Electoral Effects of Counterstereotypical Cues 
Part 1: Eligibility Question Block 
Note: not all questions in the eligibility block directly concern eligibility.  Questions 1, 2, 
and 6 are the pertinent queries.  The others are included to minimize the likelihood that 
an ineligible respondent can go back and change an answer in order to “make” herself 
eligible after learning that she is not. 
These first few questions will be used to determine your eligibility for this survey.  Please answer 
them honestly.   
Q1: What is your age in years? 
A1: Open-ended: Respondent inputs age 
Note: If respondent is under 18 years of age, the survey will end 
Q2: Are you a citizen of the United States? 
A2: Respondent selects “yes” or “no” 
Note: if respondent is not a citizen of the United States, the survey will end 
Q3: Were you born in the United States? 
A3: Respondent selects “yes” or “no” 
Q4: In what state do you currently reside? 
A4: Respondents select state of residence from dropdown menu 
Q5: Which of the following best describes your religion? 
A5: Respondents select religion from dropdown menu (Baptist – any denomination; 
Protestant (e.g. Methodist, Lutheran, Presbyterian, Episcopal); Catholic; Mormon; 
Jewish; Muslim; Hindu; Buddhist; Pentecostal; Eastern Orthodox; Other-Christian; 
Atheist; Agnostic) 
Q6: Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an 
independent or what? 
A6: Respondent selects “Republican,” “Democrat,” “Independent,” Something else” 
Note: If respondent is neither “Republican” nor “Democrat” the survey will end 
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Q7: Are you (Check all that apply): 
A7: Respondent select one or more buttons: “Married,” “Divorced,” “Widowed,” 
“Separated,”  “Single,” “Single parent” 
Part 2: Personal Characteristics Block 
Thank you very much for taking this survey.  Please tell us a little bit more about yourself. 
Q8: Which of the following best describes you? 
A8: Respondents select one of the following buttons: “White/Caucasian,” “African 
American,” “Hispanic,” “Asian,” “Native American,” “Pacific Islander,” “Other” 
Q9: Which is the highest level of education you have completed? 
A9: Respondents select education level from dropdown menu (Less than high school; 
High school/GED; Some college; 2-year college degree; 4-year college degree; Masters 
degree; Doctoral degree; Professional degree (JD, MD)) 
Q10: What is your annual household income? 
A10: Respondents select income range from dropdown menu ($20,000-29,999; $30,000-
39,999; $40,000-49,999; $50,000-59,999; $60,000-69,999; $70,000-79,999; $80,000-
89,999; $90,000-99,999; $100,000-109,999; $110,000-119,999; $120;000-129,999; 
$130,000-139,999; $140,000-149,999; $150,000+) 
Part 3: Political Preferences 
Q11: Which of the following options best describes how you view yourself as a 
[Democrat/Republican]? 
Note: Respondents will be sorted based on their answer to Question 6 so that they 
identify themselves within their own party  
A11: Respondents select either “Strong Democrat (Republican)” or “Weak Democrat 
(Republican)” 
Q12: Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose the Tea Party? 
A12: Respondents select one of the following buttons: “Support,” “Oppose,” “Neither 
support nor oppose” 
Q13: When it comes to politics, how would you describe yourself, and the following, as liberal, 
conservative, or neither liberal nor conservative? 
A13: For each of three entities (“You,” “Democrats,” and “Republicans”) respondents 
will select one of the following buttons: “Very liberal,” “Somewhat liberal,” “Closer to 
liberal,” Neither liberal nor conservative,” “Closer to conservatives,” “Somewhat 
conservative,” “Very  conservative” 
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Q14: Generally speaking, how interested are you in what’s going on in government and politics? 
A14: Respondents will select one of the following buttons: “Extremely interested,” “Very 
interested,” “Moderately interested,” “Slightly interested,” or “Not interested at all” 
Q15: During a typical week, about how many hours per week do you spending watching political 
media? 
A15: Open-ended: Respondent inputs number 
Q16: I would like to get your overall feelings towards political parties in America.  On the scale 
below, ratings between 50 and 100 mean you feel favorable and warm toward the party.  
Ratings between 0 and 50 degrees mean that you do not feel favorable toward the party.  
A rating exactly at the 50 degree means you do not feel particularly warm or cold towards 
the Party.  Where would you place yourself on this scale?  
A16: Respondents will use a sliding scale (0 to 100) to identify a level of  
favorability/warmth towards both the Democratic and Republican Parties 
Q17: During the last few years, did you usually vote in national, state, and local elections, or did 
you usually not vote? 
A17: Respondents select “usually voted” or “usually did not vote” 
Q18: How likely are you to vote in the upcoming 2014 Congressional elections? 
A18: Respondents select a button on a ten-point scale ranging from “Extremely 
Unlikely” to “Extremely Likely” 
Part 4: Candidate evaluation (including experimental conditions) 
Note: Respondents will be randomly assigned to learn about one of four fictional political 
candidates within their own party.  Four candidates (A white male, a white female, a 
black male, and a candidate with no demographic information) will provide policy 
preferences which imply either ideological moderation or ideological extremism.  All 
Republican respondents, then, will be presented with one of the variations of Question 
19. All Democratic respondents will be presented with one of the variations of Question
20.
Q19.1 (Republican Control A): Candidate with no demographic cues provides an ideologically 
moderate message: “I am running to be the nominee for the Republican Party in the 
general election this fall. As a life-long public servant, I have always believed that our 
job in government is to provide basic services to the people so that they may be able to 
pursue the American Dream.  I will work to make sure that our economy is strong and 
citizens have jobs, that our country is safe and protected, and that our children all have 
access to a quality education.  The best way to achieve these goals is for everyone in 
government to come together  and pursue reasonable, balanced public policy through 
compromise.  The best public policy is made by taking the best ideas from both parties.” 
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Q19.2 (Republican Control B): Candidate with no demographic cues provides an ideologically 
extreme message: “I am running to be the nominee for the Republican Party in the 
general election this fall.  As a life-long conservative, I have always believed that our job 
in government is to provide a few basic services to the public and otherwise stay out of 
the way so that everyone may be free to pursue the American Dream. I will work to make 
sure that the economy is free so that businesses can compete and grow and produce jobs. 
I will work to protect American citizens by ensuring that our military is the strongest in 
the world so it can protect our citizens.  I will see that our children get the best education 
possible by supporting school voucher programs and reducing the negative influence of 
teachers unions so that school leadership is returned to the local level where it belongs.  
The best public policy is made by committing to core conservative ideals.  As your 
candidate, I promise to do just that.” 
Q19.3 (Moderate White Republican male candidate): The same message from Q19.1 will be 
presented along with a photograph of a fictional white male politician. 
Q19.4 (Extreme White Republican male candidate): The same message from Q19.2 will be 
presented along with a photograph of a fictional white male politician. 
Q19.5 (Moderate White Republican female candidate): The same message from Q19.1 will be 
presented along with a photograph of a fictional white female politician. 
Q19.6 (Extreme White Republican female candidate): The same message from Q19.2 will be 
presented along with a photograph of a fictional white female politician. 
Q19.7 (Moderate Black Republican male candidate): The same message from Q19.1 will be 
presented along with a photograph of a fictional black male politician. 
Q19.8 (Extreme Black Republican male candidate): The same message from Q19.2 will be 
presented along with a photograph of a fictional black male politician. 
Q20.1 (Democrat Control A): Candidate with no demographic cues provides an ideologically 
moderate message: “I am running to be the nominee for the Democratic Party in the 
general election this fall. As a life-long public servant, I have always believed that our 
job in government is to provide basic services to the people so that they may be able to 
pursue the American Dream.   I will work to make sure that our economy is strong and 
citizens have jobs, that our country is safe and protected, and that our children all have 
 access to a quality education.  The best way to achieve these goals is for everyone in 
government to come together  and pursue reasonable, balanced public policy through 
compromise.  The best public policy is made by taking the best ideas from both parties.” 
Q20.1 (Democrat Control B): Candidate with no demographic cues provides an ideologically 
extreme message: “I am running to be the nominee for the Democratic Party in the 
general election this fall.  As a life-long progressive, I have always believed that our job 
in government is to provide important services to the people to help ensure that everyone 
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has what they need to pursue the American Dream.  I will work to make sure that the 
government keeps an eye on the economy and makes sure that people from all walks of 
life can find good jobs.  I will work to protect American citizens by ensuring that we 
engage and work diplomatically with countries around the world to prevent conflict.  I 
will see that our children get the best education possible by supporting teachers and 
additional education spending in our classrooms so everyone has the resources they need 
to succeed.  The best public policy is made by committing to core progressive ideals.  As 
your candidate, I promise to do just that." 
Q20.3 (Moderate White Democratic male candidate): The same message from Q20.1 will be 
presented along with a photograph of a fictional white male politician. 
Q20.4 (Extreme White Democratic male candidate): The same message from Q20.2 will be 
presented along with a photograph of a fictional white male politician. 
Q20.5 (Moderate White Democratic female candidate): The same message from Q20.1 will be 
presented along with a photograph of a fictional white female politician. 
Q20.6 (Extreme White Democratic female candidate): The same message from Q20.2 will be 
presented along with a photograph of a fictional white female politician. 
Q20.7 (Moderate Black Democratic male candidate): The same message from Q20.1 will be 
presented along with a photograph of a fictional black male politician. 
Q20.8 (Extreme Black Democratic male candidate): The same message from Q20.2 will be 
presented along with a photograph of a fictional black male politician. 
Note: Photographs of the three candidates to be used for both political parties: 
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Part 4: Candidate Evaluation 
Note: all respondents will answer the same questions but party labels are applied to 
respondents of each party, respectively.  For instance, Republicans will be asked to 
evaluate how good this candidate would be for the Republican Party and Democrats will 
be asked to evaluate how good this candidate would be for the Democratic Party. 
Please provide us with some of your thoughts about this candidate.  Be honest.  There are no 
right or wrong answers.  We are only interested in your opinion. 
Q21: Which of the following do you think best describes this candidate’s political ideology? 
A21: Respondents will select one of the following buttons: “Very liberal,” “Somewhat 
liberal,” “Closer to liberals,” “Neither liberal nor conservative,” “Closer to 
conservatives,” “Conservative,” “Very conservative” 
Q22: I would support this candidate as the Republican Party’s nominee for the fall election. 
A22: Respondents will select one of the following buttons: “Strongly disagree,” 
“Disagree,” “Somewhat disagree,” “Neither agree nor disagree,” “Somewhat agree,” 
“Agree,” “Strongly  agree” 
Q23: If elected, this candidate would support the interests of people like me. 
A23: Respondents will select one of the following buttons: “Strongly disagree,” 
“Disagree,” “Somewhat disagree,” “Neither agree nor disagree,” “Somewhat agree,” 
“Agree,” “Strongly agree” 
Q24: How appealing do you think this candidate would be to independent voters and voters who 
belong to other political parties? 
A24: Respondents will select one of the following buttons: “Very unlikely,” “Unlikely,” 
“Somewhat unlikely,” “Undecided,” “Somewhat likely,” “Likely,” “Very likely” 
Q25: How confident are you that your impressions of this candidate are accurate? 
A25: Respondents will select one of the following buttons: “Extremely confident,” “Very 
confident,” “Somewhat confident,” “Not very confident,” “Not at all confident”  
Part 5: Political knowledge battery 
Q26: What job or political office is held by Joe Biden? 
A26: Open-ended: Respondent inputs answer 
Q27: Whose responsibility is it to determine if a law is constitutional or not? 
A27: Respondents will select one of the following buttons: “The President,” “Congress,” 
“The Supreme Court” 
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Q28: How much of a majority is required for the U.S. Senate and House to override a 
presidential veto? 
A28: Respondents will select one of the following buttons: “Any majority,” “51%,” 
“60%,” “67%,” “75%” 
Q29: Which political party would you say is generally more conservative than the other? 
A29: Respondents will select one of the following buttons: “Democratic Party,” 
“Republican Party” 
Part 6: Opinions about American Society 
Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements 
about yourself and modern American Society 
Q30: Most Americans are unselfish towards others. 
A30: Respondents will select one of the following buttons: “Strongly disagree,”  
“Disagree,”  “Somewhat disagree,” “Neither agree nor disagree,” “Somewhat agree,” 
“Agree,” “Strongly agree” 
Q31: Most Americans tend to be disorganized. 
A31: Respondents will select one of the following buttons: “Strongly disagree,” 
“Disagree,”  “Somewhat disagree,” “Neither agree nor disagree,” “Somewhat 
agree,” “Agree,” “Strongly agree” 
Q32: Americans tend to be more interested in sports than in art and culture. 
A32: Respondents will select one of the following buttons: “Strongly disagree,” 
“Disagree,” “Somewhat disagree,” “Neither agree nor disagree,” “Somewhat 
agree,” “Agree,” “Strongly agree” 
Q33: When women lose to men in fair competition, they typically complain about being 
discriminated against.  
A33: Respondents will select one of the following buttons: “Strongly disagree,” 
“Disagree,” “Somewhat disagree,” “Neither agree nor disagree,” “Somewhat agree,” 
“Agree,” “Strongly agree” 
Q34: The world would be better if women support men more and criticize them less. 
A34: Respondents will select one of the following buttons: “Strongly disagree,” 
“Disagree,” “Somewhat disagree,” “Neither agree nor disagree,” “Somewhat agree,” 
“Agree,” “Strongly agree” 
Q35: The more women advance in the business world the better. 
A35: Respondents will select one of the following buttons: “Strongly disagree,” 
“Disagree,” “Somewhat disagree,” “Neither agree nor disagree,” “Somewhat 
agree,” “Agree,” “Strongly  agree” 
Q36: Most Americans tend to have a forgiving nature. 
A36: Respondents will select one of the following buttons: “Strongly disagree,” 
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“Disagree,” “Somewhat disagree,” “Neither agree nor disagree,” “Somewhat 
agree,” “Agree,” “Strongly agree” 
Q37: By and large, Americans tend to be more assertive than other people around the world. 
A37: Respondents will select one of the following buttons: “Strongly disagree,” 
“Disagree,” “Somewhat disagree,” “Neither agree nor disagree,” “Somewhat 
agree,” “Agree,” “Strongly agree” 
Q38: I prefer new and predictable experiences over fun but routine ones. 
A38: Respondents will select one of the following buttons: “Strongly disagree,” 
“Disagree,” “Somewhat disagree,” “Neither agree nor disagree,” “Somewhat agree,” 
“Agree,” “Strongly agree” 
Q39: I laugh more when I watch a comedy with others than when I watch it alone. 
A39: Respondents will select one of the following buttons: “Strongly disagree,” 
“Disagree,” “Somewhat disagree,” “Neither agree nor disagree,” “Somewhat agree,” 
“Agree,” “Strongly agree” 
Q40: I am not always the person I appear to be to others. 
A40: Respondents will select one of the following buttons: “Strongly disagree,” 
“Disagree,” “Somewhat disagree,” “Neither agree nor disagree,” “Somewhat agree,” 
“Agree,” “Strongly agree” 
Q41: I would not change or modify my opinions in order to please someone else or win favor. 
A41: Respondents will select one of the following buttons: “Strongly disagree,” 
“Disagree,” “Somewhat disagree,” “Neither agree nor disagree,” “Somewhat agree,” 
“Agree,” “Strongly agree” 
Q42: Even if I am not enjoying myself, I often pretend to be having a good time. 
A42: Respondents will select one of the following buttons: “Strongly disagree,” 
“Disagree,” “Somewhat disagree,” “Neither agree nor disagree,” “Somewhat agree,” 
“Agree,” “Strongly agree” 
Q43: Americans tend to worry and stress more than they need to in life. 
A43: Respondents will select one of the following buttons: “Strongly disagree,” 
“Disagree,” “Somewhat disagree,” “Neither agree nor disagree,” “Somewhat agree,” 
“Agree,” “Strongly agree” 
Q44: People today are more interested in sharing opinions about events than learning about all 
relevant facts about them.  
A44: Respondents will select one of the following buttons: “Strongly disagree,” 
“Disagree,” “Somewhat disagree,” “Neither agree nor disagree,” “Somewhat agree,” 
“Agree,” “Strongly agree” 
Q45: I would prefer to spend an evening in with a good movie or book over going out to a bar or 
club.  
A45: Respondents will select one of the following buttons: “Strongly disagree,” 
“Disagree,” “Somewhat disagree,” “Neither agree nor disagree,” “Somewhat agree,” 
“Agree,” “Strongly agree” 
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Q46: Discrimination against racial minorities is no longer a problem in the United States. 
A46: Respondents will select one of the following buttons: “Strongly disagree,” 
“Disagree,” “Somewhat disagree,” “Neither agree nor disagree,” “Somewhat agree,” 
“Agree,” “Strongly agree” 
Q47: Affirmative action programs on colleges campuses constitute reverse discrimination. 
A47: Respondents will select one of the following buttons: “Strongly disagree,” 
“Disagree,” “Somewhat disagree,” “Neither agree nor disagree,” “Somewhat agree,” 
“Agree,” “Strongly agree” 
Part 7: Candidate Recall 
Q48: Please think back to the candidate you evaluated earlier.  What do you recall about the 
candidate?  List anything that you remember. 
A48: Open-ended: respondent inputs answer 
Part 8: Debrief and Payment Code 
Thank you for participating!  This study had you looking at a fictional political candidate within 
your own party to learn more about how people make decisions in primary elections. 
Important: In order to get credit for participating, you must input the following code into the 
Mechanical Turk payment code box. 
Note: a random code will be generated at the end of the survey which respondents must 
copy and paste into the Mechanical Turk web page to complete the survey. 
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APPENDIX B 
IRB DOCUMENTS 
STUDY 1 
The follow pages include all documents submitted to the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the 
University of Pittsburgh for approval of Study 1.  The project was granted IRB approval on 
March 26, 2014. 
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STUDY 2 
The follow pages include all documents submitted to the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the 
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APPENDIX C 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR DEMOCRATS IN STUDY 2 
Table 35: Perceptions of Candidate Ideology in Control Condition (Democrats) 
Control Moderate Liberal Respondent Conservatism 0.289 (0.128)** 0.620 (0.173)** Party Affect -0.007 (0.008) -0.016 (0.006)**Weak Partisan -0.520 (0.283)* -0.359 (0.329)Age -0.009 (0.009) -0.031 (0.011)**White respondent 0.232 (0.248) -0.104 (0.324)Female respondent 0.143 (0.255) 0.903 (0.269)** Education -0.035 (0.093) 0.001 (0.111) Income 0.074 (0.043) 0.016 (0.047) Constant 3.143 3.204 N 68 71 F 1.53 4.62 R2 0.17 0.37 RMSE 1.07 1.04 
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Figure 37: Perceptions of Control Group Candidate Ideology by Policy Message (Democrats) 
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Table 36: Perceptions of Ideological Congruence in Control Condition by Policy Message (Democrats) 
 
 Control  Moderate Liberal Respondent Conservatism -0.110 (0.140) 0.107 (0.136) Party Affect -0.012 (0.007) 0.015 (0.006)** Weak Partisan -0.900 (0.275)** -0.185 (0.273) Age 0.008 (0.008) -0.010 (0.011) White respondent 0.021 (0.318) -0.136 (0.297) Female respondent 0.277 (0.254) 0.500 (0.251)** Education -0.067 (0.092) -0.012 (0.095) Income 0.045 (0.047) -0.070 (0.034)** Constant 2.415 2.353 
   N 68 71 F 2.27 2.41 R2 0.21 0.20 RMSE 1.033 0.958 
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Figure 38: Perceptions of Ideological Congruence in Control Condition (Democrats) 
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 Table 37: Perception of Male and Female Candidate Ideology by Policy Message Type (Democrats) 
 
 Moderate Liberal Respondent Conservatism 0.025 (0.089)** 0.327 (0.124)** Party Affect -0.006 (0.004) 0.004 (0.004) Weak Partisan -0.308 (0.195) 0.047 (0.189) Age 0.004 (0.006) -0.001 (0.005) White respondent 0.310 (0.218) -0.178 (0.194) Shared Gender 0.043 (0.203) 0.075 (0.176) Education -0.051 (0.059) -0.034 (0.055) Income 0.029 (0.027) -0.022 (0.020) Latent Sexism 0.194 (0.107)* -0.059 (0.102) Female Candidate 0.045 (0.225) -0.125 (0.218) Male Candidate 0.049 (0.210) -0.219 (0.196) Constant 2.291 2.211 
   N 194 207 F 2.17 2.27 R2 0.11 0.16 RMSE 1.095 1.013 
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 Panel A: Liberal Female vs. Moderate Female 
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Panel B: Liberal Male vs. Moderate Male 
 
1
2
3
4
5
Pe
rc
ei
ve
d 
Id
eo
lo
gy
 o
f C
an
di
da
te
0 2 4 6 8
Respondent's Conservatism
Liberal_Male Moderate_Male
 
 
Panel C: Liberal Female vs. Moderate Male 
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Panel D: Liberal Male vs. Moderate Female 
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Panel E: Liberal Female vs. Liberal Male 
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Panel F: Liberal Female vs. Moderate Male 
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Panel G: All Candidates 
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Figure 39: Perception of Male and Female Ideology by Policy Message Type (Democrats) 
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 Table 38: Perception of White and African American Candidate Ideology by Policy Message Type (Democrats) 
 Moderate Liberal Respondent Conservatism 0.249 (0.087)** 0.387 (0.110)** Party Affect -0.002 (0.005) -0.007 (0.005) Weak Partisan -0.115 (0.164) 0.173 (0.187) Age 0.003 (0.005) -0.011 (0.006)* Shared Race 0.296 (0.316) -0.025 (0.214) Female respondent -0.030 (0.146) 0.479 (0.152)** Education 0.011 (0.056) 0.003 (0.048) Income 0.016 (0.022) -0.008 (0.019) Latent Racism 0.128 (0.093) -0.052 (0.240) White Candidate -0.087 (0.342) -0.057 (0.239) African American Candidate -0.261 (0.164) -0.274 (0.184)** Constant 1.989 2.075 
  2.076 N 187 194 F 1.92 3.35 R2 0.10 0.22 RMSE 0.981 0.948 
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 Panel A: Liberal White vs. Moderate White 
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Panel B: Liberal AfrAm vs. Moderate AfrAm 
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Panel C: Liberal White vs. Moderate AfrAm 
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Panel D: Moderate White vs. Liberal AfrAm 
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Panel E: Liberal White vs. Liberal AfrAm 
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Panel F: Moderate White vs. Moderate AfrAm 
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Panel G: All Candidates 
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Figure 40: Perception of White and African American Ideology by Policy Message Type (Democrats) 
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Table 39: Perceptions of Ideological Congruence With Male and Female Candidates by Policy Message Type 
(Democrats) 
 
 Moderate Liberal Respondent Conservatism -0.420 (0.124) -0.042 (0.093) Party Affect -0.007 (0.004)* -0.012 (0.004)** Weak Partisan 0.287 (0.216) -0.217 (0.148) Age 0.003 (0.005) 0.004 (0.005) White respondent 0.012 (0.203) -0.182 (0.164) Shared Gender 0.029 (0.187) -0.151 (0.159) Education -0.066 (0.059) -0.027 (0.049) Income 0.004 (0.026) -0.028 (0.018) Latent Sexism 0.251 (0.107)** 0.179 (0.101)* Female Candidate 0.041 (0.217) 0.133 (0.195) Male Candidate -0.100 (0.203) 0.054 (0.178) Constant 2.220 1.625 
   N 194 207 F 3.66 2.02 R2 0.20 0.11 RMSE 1.04 0.891 
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 Panel A: Liberal Female vs. Moderate Female 
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Panel B: Liberal Male vs. Moderate Male 
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Panel C: Liberal Female vs. Moderate Male 
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Panel D: Liberal Male vs. Moderate Female 
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Panel E: Liberal Female vs. Liberal Male 
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Panel F: Moderate Female vs. Moderate Male 
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Panel G: All Candidates 
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Figure 41: Perceptions of Ideological Congruence by Gender and Policy Message Type (Democrats) 
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Table 40: Perception of Ideological Congruence with White and African American Candidates by Policy Message 
Type (Republicans) 
 
 Moderate Liberal Respondent Conservatism -0.325 (0.123) 0.079 (0.079) Party Affect -0.003 (0.004) 0.004 (0.004) Weak Partisan -0.229 (0.200) -0.072 (0.157) Age -0.002 (0.005) -0.003 (0.006) Shared Race -0.120 (0.297) 0.167 (0.211) Female respondent 0.121 (0.146) 0.241 (0.138)* Education -0.031 (0.055) -0.015 (0.045) Income 0.003 (0.200 -0.036 (0.018)** Latent Racism 0.116 (0.081) 0.080 (0.080) White Candidate 0.057 (0.315) -0.167 (0.233) African American Candidate -0.028 (0.166)* -0.077 (0.166) Constant 1.834 0.576 
   N 187 194 F 4.63 1.26 R2 0.19 0.06 RMSE 0.974 0.893 
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 Panel A: Liberal White vs. Moderate Afr. Am. 
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Panel B: Liberal Afr. Am. Vs. Moderate Afr. Am. 
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Panel C: Liberal White vs. Moderate Afr. Am. 
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Panel D: Moderate White vs. Liberal Afr. Am. 
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Panel E: Liberal White vs. Liberal Afr. Am. 
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Panel F: Moderate White vs. Moderate Afr. Am 
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Panel G: All Candidates 
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Figure 42: Perception of Ideological Incongruence by Race and Policy Message Type (Democrats) 
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